










Migration, Equality and Racism trigger ever more salient societal 
debates. More than 80 VUB academics and co-authors joined forces 
for this book. Philosophers, lawyers, psychologists, health scientists, 
sociologists, geographers, criminologists, communication and political 
scientists … look at migration, equality and racism from different 
disciplinary angles.
Together they aim to contribute to an exercise of humanism as a 
praxis of criticism or a ‘technique of trouble-making’, in the words of 
Edward Said. Through 44 thought-provoking and informed opinion 
pieces, they question widespread beliefs on migration, equality and 
racism and propose solutions that might disturb.
Let this book be a source of inspiration for those who want to spark 
an informed debate on the ever more salient issues of migration, 
equality and racism, for those who want to learn more on how and 
why humanism has often remained an empty box for migrants and 
racialized groups. Or for those who are in search of inspiration for a 
just future for all.
Migration, Equality and Racism is the work of Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
(VUB) think tank POINcaré and was created under the direction of 
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This book is the result of the active engagement of many people. First of all, the editors 
would like to thank all the authors for their enthusiasm and energetic collaboration on 
this project. From the first collective brainstorming exercise until the very end of the 
process, their constructive and critical feedback has improved the book and compelled 
us to constantly reexamine our own ideas. We also thank the VUB’s POINcaré think 
thank and the rectorate for their support and gratefully acknowledge their financial 
support for this project. Thank you, Caroline Pauwels, Patrick Stouthuysen and Lynn 
Tytgat for getting the ball rolling. A book with 47 chapters demands a huge amount of 
coordination and logistical support. This project would have been simply impossible 
without Jane Verlinden and her endless day-to-day organizational and logistic support. 
Special thanks go to Tanja Saariaho, Antonia Wilkens and Giulia Rigirozzo for assuming 
a number of organizational and editorial tasks during their internships. The editors also 
gratefully acknowledge the support of Hannah Vermaut, the coordinator of BIRMM 
(VUB’s Brussels Interdisciplinary Research centre on Migration and Minorities),  during 
the late stages of this publication process. Also involved in this book’s production were 
Esther King, a journalist who taught us academics to write in a more accessible way, and 
Caroline Walcot, who did a great job in proofreading the chapters. We are grateful to the 


























All the major challenges that we face today as a society require a multidisciplinary 
approach. And yet almost all our scientific institutes are organized within the boundaries 
of one discipline.
To change that, in the fall of 2016, I brought together a group of researchers of all ages and 
working in very diverse fields of science. My question was simple: think about what you 
would like to research together in the light of the challenges we face today as a society.
This resulted in various project groups: one on the idea of  a humane city, another on 
the social consequences of robotization, a third one on migration and, in the midst of 
the COVID-19 crisis, a new ad hoc group emerged. The members of the project groups 
think together, discuss each other’s ideas, write texts that circulate in the group and 
which, after a while, are brought together into a book. Three books have since been 
published – De Humane Stad (2017), Homo Roboticus (2019), Post viraal naar een nieuw 
normal (2020). This is the fourth book in the series. 
The topics of migration, equality and racism have triggered salient societal and political 
debates. It is clear that you can only approach such major social challenges in an 
interdisciplinary manner. They prove, for those who still doubt this, how intertwined 
everything is and how the fields of scientific disciplines inevitably both overlap and 
complement each other. Only by bringing different expertise together and engaging in 
dialogue do we understand complex problems and can we start working on solutions. 
This book is the result of that conversation between disciplines.
The various project groups sail under the flag of POINcaré. This name is a reference to 
the French mathematician and scientific philosopher Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), who 
described, among other things, the principle of free research, which continues to inspire 
the scientific and social project of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel today.
Our teaching, research and societal outreach are based on a radical humanism. This 























For us, freedom stands for free inquiry: the principle that thinking must never submit 
itself. For us, equality stands for fairness, equal opportunity and recognition of diversity. 
Solidarity stands for our commitment to the major social challenges and our concern for 
a respectful relationship with fellow human beings and with the world.
These values  are the common thread running through the initiatives of the POINcaré 
group. Each time the question is asked what the impact is of expected developments on 
our values  and how we can best safeguard them.
Nobel Laureate in Economics Robert J. Shiller wrote: ‘In the longer run and for 
wide-reaching issues, more creative solutions tend to come from imaginative inter- 
disciplinary collaboration.’
That must also be the ambition of our universities. At least that is the ambition I share 
with the members of the POINcaré group.
Caroline Pauwels,


























by Ilke Adam, Tundé Adefioye, Serena D’Agostino, Nick Schuermans  
and Florian Trauner
While we were compiling this book, the world changed in a way so dramatic that hardly 
anybody could have predicted. The coronavirus pandemic caused global social and 
economic disruption. It led to the closure of borders, slashed possibilities to get access to 
asylum in Europe, and made it impossible for transnational families to reunite. Covid-19 
also exacerbated the structural inequalities already faced by migrants and minorities in 
Europe.1 Migrants and minorities are overrepresented in the labour sectors that are more 
exposed to Covid-19, and in the sectors suffering job losses due to the corona-induced 
economic crisis. The corona crisis also led to increased ethnic profiling by the police due 
to enhanced controls for public health reasons. Inequalities already existing in health, at 
work and during policing were reinforced during the pandemic. 
In the middle of this unforeseen context, on 25 May 2020 George Floyd, an African-
American, was killed by the police during an arrest in Minnesota. Floyd’s death was the 
last straw that broke the camel’s back. It came on top of the deaths of Breonna Taylor, 
Ahmaud Arberry and many others also killed by racist police violence in the US. Protests 
were sparked off in the US and spread internationally, including to Europe and Belgium. 
The BlackLivesMatter movement flared up far beyond the USA. It also reinvigorated 
existing protest movements that draw attention to past and present cases of police 
violence, such as the death of Dieumerci Kanda who hung himself in a police cell, Adil C., 
killed during a police chase2, Akram Kadri killed in Antwerp, the little Mawda and many 
others. In the weeks and months afterwards, the problem of structural racism faced by 
minorities began to show up in political and media agendas. Claims made by racialized 
anti-racist activists for more than a decade already were now finally heard, even if policy 
responses have so far remained modest. In Belgium and Brussels, the anti-racist claims 
have strongly centered around Belgian’s colonial atrocities and the link with current-day 
racism. 
Such sudden metamorphoses are particularly intense for the topics that this book 
addresses: migration, equality and racism. For several decades already, the topics of 

























Rare are the days when we can wake up without encountering new news reports on 
these divisive issues. Migration is always hot news because it touches upon issues of 
sovereignty, national identity, prejudice and inequity. Divergent ideological views, 
or the different ideas we all have on the ideal society and how to reach it, adds to the 
polarization. It influences the views we might have on how important it is to reach equal 
chances to a good life for migrants and minorities, and it affects the strategies we propose 
to reach these equal chances. 
For many, migration raises unfounded fears that migrants are taking away jobs and 
making undeserved claims on social security. Others see ‘our norms and values’ 
threatened when new migrants, especially Muslims, arrive. Racism fuel these fears, shown 
by the simple fact that the immigrant groups with the largest numbers in Belgium (for 
example, Dutch and French nationals) are not considered as threatening, and not even 
considered as real migrants . This concept seems to be reserved for ‘others’. For others, 
migration raises hope and expectations, for example for boosting population growth, 
for stimulating rich new encounters and booming economies, for increasing creativity, 
solidarity and fostering new opportunities for those who arrive and aspire to have stable 
jobs and build better opportunities for their children. Politicians have exploited these 
fears and, rarer, the hopes, for political gain, leading to an overrepresentation of the 
images of migrants as job-stealers, criminals and a threat to ‘the European way of life’. 
These hopes and fears notwithstanding, migration is a fact. It is as old as humanity. 
Recent constructions of walls and fences have shown that it cannot be stopped. Slogans 
that continue to defend a similar discourse are misleading. The persistence of wars, 
political oppression and economic inequalities provide explanations for some migration 
movements, but these are not even the main explanations. Migration is mainly driven by 
the ever-existing human drive to search for better opportunities and preferred lifestyles. 3
Migration thus is and will be. It is a component of our societies. It is therefore necessary to 
have informed debates on migration, and the process of settling in that follows. Informed 
debates are not based only on personal opinions or experiences, or on the newspaper 
article one has just read. Informed debates should also be inspired by academic research 
and critical thinking. This academic research is abundantly available. However, it is most 
often published in scientific journals and books, and only reaches a small audience. This 
knowledge is also split up per discipline. Moreover, in the academic journals in which 
academics publish, researchers often refrain from telling what should be done. They try to 

























Academics take a stance
In this book, more than 80 academics of the VUB and co-authors are trying a different 
approach. As philosophers, lawyers, psychologists, health scientists, sociologists, 
geographers, criminologists, communication and political scientists we are here joining 
forces. Together we are writing not for our colleagues but for a wider audience that wishes 
to learn and participate in an informed debate. We also take a stance on what should be 
done, and say clearly what we think is good and what we think is bad. Academics are not 
neutral − nobody is − and our opinions and proposals are far from sacred. But they are 
based on academic research: systematic and controlled observations, empirical and critical 
inquiries into how certain phenomena are interrelated, and we do this by applying strict 
rules for analysis. In doing so, we question common sense ideas on migration, equality 
and racism and propose solutions that might disturb the reader. These solutions are not 
necessarily aligned and might even contradict each other. Academics do not necessarily all 
agree, as their work is inspired from different disciplinary angles and diverging positions. 
This book is thus not one coherent one-size-fits-all recipe for just migration and equality 
policies. Instead, it is a thought-provoking kaleidoscope of informed opinions on different 
possible paths to reach just migration and equality policies. Our book is intended to 
inspire readers who wish to spark an informed debate on migration, equality and racism. 
It is meant to offer ideas to people who want to learn more on how and why humanism 
has often remained an empty box for migrants and racialized groups. Or to provide fuel to 
those who search for inspiration for a just future for all. 
The journey towards this book started in April 2019. Soon after the creation of the 
Brussels Interdisciplinary Research centre on Migration and Minorities (BIRMM), the 
VUB Rector Caroline Pauwels asked the coordinators of the centre, Florian Trauner and 
Ilke Adam, whether they would be interested in publishing a collective and accessible 
book that would transcend disciplinary boundaries. BIRMM members were enthusiastic 
about that idea, and two of them – Nick Schuermans and Serena D’Agostino – actively 
volunteered to join the editorial team. Lynn Tytgat, project coordinator at the VUB 
rectorate, and Jane Verlinden, VUB events coordinator, were asked to assure the practical 
coordination and contacts with possible sponsors, media and cultural institutions. KVS 
joined the initiative as a partner for the book launch, and one of its city dramaturges, 
Tundé Adefioye, contributed to the project as a co-editor and author. First abstracts 
of the papers received feedback during the summer of 2019. In November 2019, the 
first drafts of the papers were presented and discussed collectively in a book workshop. 

























Most of the authors who have contributed to this book work at the Vrije Universiteit 
Brussel. Many of them also call Brussels home. As such, it should not come as a surprise 
that many opinion pieces in this book deal explicitly with Brussels. Pictures from 
Brussels, taken by Esma Alouet, illustrate the text. Brussels also ranks as the second city 
in the world for having the most diverse population. It counts over 180 nationalities and 
over 60% of its population is foreign-born.4 Moreover, it is the capital of the European 
Union, which steers national migration and anti-discrimination policies. While this book 
could thus carry a “made in Brussels” label, it does not deal solely with the capital. Rather 
than limiting our attention to the 19 municipalities that make up the Brussels Capital 
Region, we have opted for a ‘relational approach’. In such an approach, it is assumed 
that migration patterns, everyday racism and inequalities in one place are affected 
by processes elsewhere. On the one hand, it is clear that many decisions made in the 
European institutions or NGO headquarters located in Brussels have repercussions all 
over the world. On the other hand, it is also obvious that the political situation in Syria, 
droughts in Africa, protests in Paris, op-eds in Flemish newspapers or decisions taken by 
the Minister of Education in Namur may all have an impact on the Brussels reality. For 
this reason, we have refrained from excluding opinion pieces that deal with Flanders, 
Wallonia, Belgium, the European Union or other parts of the world. In all opinion pieces, 
lessons can be drawn to improve the lives of Brussels’ current and future citizens. 
Overview of the book
This book is divided into 4 main sections. 
The first section talks about the relationship of ‘humanism’ − the guiding philosophy of 
our university − to the topics of the book. Two papers show that humanism, in a manner 
different to what is often perceived, is not a straightforward and ready-made answer in 
the strife towards more just migration policies and more equality for immigrants and 
minorities. The first paper, by Gily Coene, shows how humanism is hard to define, and 
has inclusionary as well as exclusionary features. She argues for humanism ‘as a praxis of 
criticism’ that invites academics working on migration and minority issues to keep on 
refining their 'techniques of making trouble' and 'to continue to engage in resisting the 
common sense’, a practice that reflects well the central mission of this book. The second 
paper is written by Mariska Jung and Sophie Withaeckx. In the wake of humanism as a 

























caution’. The authors warn the reader to be ‘mindful of the fact that the racial, gendered 
and colonial underpinnings of the human (in humanism) need to be better understood 
before we can reimagine the human’ and thus contribute to a more just world for migrants 
and minorities. Drawing on these ideas, we consider the remainder of the book to be an 
exercise in humanism as a praxis of criticism or a ‘technique of trouble-making’, in the 
words of Edward Saïd.5
In the second section, the authors take a critical look at dominant conceptions of migrants 
and refugees, migration policies and migration debates. They question common sense 
ideas that tighter border controls (Giacomo Orsini; Angela Tacea and Laura Petrache Le 
Gern ; Anna Simola) and cooperation with migrant sending countries (Philipp Stutz and 
Ahmad Wali Ahmad Yar) are efficient tools to govern migration; or that all refugees want 
to come to Europe (Israa Sadder and Hanna Schneider), and that their dream life starts 
once arrived (Lena Swinnen, Omar Cham and Geertrui Serneels) or that a humanitarian 
discourse on refugees is the best of all moral options (Eline Severs). Other authors in this 
section demonstrate how 19th century pseudo-scientific ideas still linger on in migration 
debates (Soumaya Majdoub and Patrick Deboosere) and how the capitalist market logic, 
governing news media, lends a helping hand to the radical right by the way in which 
migration is covered in the media ( Jonas Lefevere). Migration is governed not just by 
one political authority only − the EU, or the state (Belgium) or the regional or local level. 
The papers by Nette Nöstlinger and Florian Trauner demonstrate that neither the EU 
nor the city are the holy grails to just migration policies, but that some policies can be 
better governed by the more global institutions, and other better by the local authorities. 
The third section sketches a portrait of the inequalities migrants and minorities face 
in different societal spheres (education, employment, care etc), and authors propose 
thought-provoking solutions to address these. The first papers in this section focus 
on education. Emery, Laurijssen, Boone and van Noord show how the complexity of 
the Belgian education system creates a severe disadvantage for pupils with migratory 
roots. The authors argue for, among other things, greater transparency, and propose the 
postponement of educational tracking in order to foster equal opportunities. Christil 
Asamoah, Sophie Withaeckx and Iman Lechkar showcase their ideas on how to foster 
equality for marginalized groups in the university. Their insights show how to ‘do’ and 
‘not-do’ decolonization. Decolonization is far more than just ‘replacing white with black 
or non-Western authors’, (Asamoah) or ‘happy diversity talk’ (Withaeckx) but to ‘reshape 
and question power structures that determine what knowledge is’ (Asamoah), ‘make 

























The papers on housing and employment show that solutions to address inequalities 
must have the courage to move beyond classical public policies. Hala El Moussawi 
demonstrates, for instance, that good and well-located housing for asylum seekers is 
quintessential for starting a new life in Belgium. She argues against dispersal policies 
that send asylum seekers to all corners of the country and pleads for more structural 
assistance in the quest for housing once refugees leave the asylum centres. Moving to the 
labour market, Amy Weatherburn and Paul de Hert question the common sense idea that 
exploitation is mainly happening with undocumented workers, and that giving a legal 
status to migrant workers would end their exploitation. This is not so, as many legally 
staying EU migrants are also victims of labour exploitation. To end this injustice, they 
plead for a multi-faceted policy with a more central role for the social inspections, which 
should be done in collaboration with relevant authorities, NGOs and raising greater 
awareness in the general public. Ilke Adam and Billy Kalonji continue with a questioning 
of all too classical policies for fostering labour market participation of Afro-Belgians. 
They try to explain to the president of the European Council and former Belgian Prime 
Minister Charles Michel (who seemed not to understand) how apologizing for colonial 
atrocities is one tool among many for fighting the underemployment of Afro-Belgians. 
Five papers in this section also expain how to improve inequalities in access to care: health 
care, elderly care and foster care. They are written by medical doctors, a philosopher, a 
historian, educational scientists and psychologists. Ann Roex, Rita Vanobberghen and 
Hakki Demirkapu plead for more diverse care teams in Brussels as a way of improving 
the quality of care. Dirk Lafaut and Marjolein Schepers argue for (self-)awareness raising 
on implicit bias and selectivity among health care providers in their decisions on ‘who 
deserves care’. Saloua Berdai-Chaouni, Ann Claeys, Sylvia Hoens, Honghui Pan and Ann-
Sophie Smetcoren criticize the exaggerate focus on ‘culture’, in the explanation of difficult 
access to care of elderly migrants. They show how racism and ageism are overlooked as 
barriers in access to care and need to be taken into account if we want to work towards 
accessible services for all older adults. Frank Vanholen and Johan Vanderfaillie and Liesbet 
De Backer examine how to improve life chances for unaccompanied minors, migrant 
or refugee children who have been separated from their parents. Both advocate a more 
personalized care than that provided through the current accommodation centres, through 
appointing guardians and buddies with well-aligned roles (De Backer) and by due support 
for foster care families (Vanholen and Vanderfaillie). 
Inclusion and equality also happen through culture and sports. Elisabeth Bekers and Ilke 

























lion has a voice, the tales of the hunt will only be those of the hunter’. If we only read 
stories from the standpoint of Western dominant groups, our horizon is limited, and we 
miss out on innovative literary techniques and creative conversations. Eva Swyngedouw 
questions the underrepresentation of ethnic and racial minorities in the cultural sector. 
She calls for quotas and diversity action plans, the eradication of the current precarious 
working conditions for artists and for ending the distinction between the socio-cultural 
and cultural sectors, as made by policymakers. Marc Theeboom questions the all too 
easy assumption that sports can help to include marginalized youngsters on the pretext 
that it would ‘automatically’ lead to the acquisition of well-valued competences like a 
sense of responsibility, communication skills, problem-solving skills etc. However, 
argues Theeboom, acquiring these competences does not come automatically. It needs 
to be explicitly organized, and sports coaches need to be trained to teach not just sports 
skills but also personal and social development skills. 
Several authors in this book also move off the beaten track with their proposals on how 
to foster equality in the politics and policy sphere. What if every person in Brussels had 
access to all basic services, irrespective of their migration trajectory or legal status? The 
papers by Bas van Heur et al. and by Ronald Crouzé et al. are inspired by the conception 
of citizenship of Hannah Arendt. She considers citizenship not as a legal status, but as 
acting and creating together as human beings. The authors favour a city open to all. 
Whilst they admit that this might seem utopian in the current political climate, where 
would we be if academics practised self-censure in possible ideas for a future that is 
hopefully better than the present? Karen Celis’ innovatory paper shows how to improve 
the representation of ethnic minorities in the Brussels politics. Many might ask what 
can be still be improved on that front in Brussels Region, as there is no greater diversity 
in any other parliament in the world than that seen in the Brussels one. Celis pleads for 
institutional innovation that fosters more co-creation of public policies by legislators and 
concerned citizens, including those who are least well-off and even marginalized. Deniz 
Ay continues on the track of institutional innovation, pleading for an empowerment of 
cities to foster more inclusive and efficient immigrant integration policies. 
The last part of this book’s section on (in)equalities focuses on the role of religion. Filip 
van Droogenbroeck, Bram Spruyt and Jessy Siongers attempt to nuance the dominant 
knowledge on the relationship between religion and attitudes of tolerance towards 
LGBTIQs. They show that it is not so much religion as such that fosters less tolerant 
attitudes but the absence or presence of a religious ‘quest orientation’. This is a difficult 

























Public authorities, they argue, can invest in nurturing this religious quest orientation. 
Shilpi Pandey and Stefaan Smis, in a second paper on religion, question the European 
approach to secularism, as it seems incapable of accommodating diversity. 
The fourth section of the book puts the spotlight on racism − a strong hurdle that 
migrants and minorities face in the long road towards equality −, but also on their 
identities and sense of belonging. Identity, as famously defined by the late sociologist 
Stuart Hall, is a coin with two sides: recognition and belonging. It is only when a person 
feels recognized that he or she can feel ‘belonging’.6 Racism is more than prejudice; 
we talk about racism when racial prejudice is combined with the power of a dominant 
group to reinforce racial prejudice. Yet, there are different types of racism. Exclusion, 
inferiorization, subordination and exploitation have indeed specific characteristics for 
different groups because of different social and historical contexts (see for example 
the papers of Adam and Kalonji, and D’Agostino). In this book we consider the term 
racism in the plural – as racisms – to emphasize and further reflect on such multiplicity. 
The papers under this section show that “there is not a unitary system of signification 
that can be labelled racist nor is there a unitary perpetrator or victim”. 7
The first four papers of this section analyze racism, the next three focus more on possible 
solutions. The paper by Géraldine André, Safaa Charafi, Laura Westerveen and Dounia 
Bourabain sets the scene. In their paper ‘Brussels is Tarred with Racism’ they go against 
the dominant flow regarding the perception of Brussels as the most tolerant region in 
Belgium wherein ‘racism does not exist’. They confront the reader by questioning the 
all too individualist conception of racist acts as ‘individual and conscious acts by bad 
individuals’. They point to implicit and hidden kinds of racism that are systemic, and 
which are embodied by institutions. It is because of this form of racism that migrants 
and minorities have fewer chances to land good jobs, to pursue educational tracks of 
higher value and thus find good housing even in diverse and seemingly tolerant cities. 
Mariska Jung, in the next paper, explains how the politicization of ritual slaughter in 
Belgium and elsewhere cannot be explained by reference to animal ethics alone, but 
should also include racism. She shows how animal ethics, from the British empire to 
Nazi propaganda, have historically functioned in the establishment of racial hierarchies 
and oppression. Serena D’Agostino’s paper immediately follows, illustrating the 
relevance of talking about racism in a plural form, as racisms, by showing how a specific 
form of racism, anti-Gypsyism, is sometimes considered as legitimate and reasonable. 
Discrimination and racism do not only impact on equal chances to a good life, but also 

























public sometimes criticize the fact that Muslim Belgians do not feel Belgian enough, but 
then they also have to realize that identity comes with a feeling of recognition, which is 
difficult when you do not feel welcome or are discriminated against. 
With the papers of Dounia Bourabain et al., Tundé Adefioye and Pieter-Paul Verhaeghe 
we move towards possible solutions to counter racism and discrimination. Bourabain 
et al. kick off with a ‘yes we can’ attitude and recommend fostering steered positive 
intergroup contact as well as positive action in employment and education. Adefioye 
calls upon the university (yes why not VUB?) to create a bachelor or master programme 
in ethnic studies, similar to Black Studies taught in the US and the UK. He sees this 
as ‘a crucial tool of liberation’. Such an initiative would not only map and archive the 
reality of Black, Moroccan, Turkish and other people of colour in Belgium and Europe 
and study their important contributions to the arts and humanities. It would also 
document, valorize and help to spread understanding of their struggles for equity and 
liberation. Pieter-Paul Verhaeghe, as the next author in line, advocates why efficient 
anti-discrimination policies need to be equipped with the set-up of ‘situation tests’ , a 
field experiment in which candidates with similar relevant features (except for possible 
grounds of discrimination like ethnicity, race, gender, etc) apply for similar jobs or 
advertised housing rentals. 
The last five papers of the book all touch upon issues of identity and belonging, albeit in 
very different ways. The paper by Petrus te Braak et al. shows how the Brussels identity 
is an inclusive identity to which young people, with or without a migration background, 
feel more connected than they do to being Flemish, Walloon, Belgian or belonging to 
whatever other country or region. They call upon Flanders, Wallonia and Belgium to 
learn from Brussels on how to make their identities more inclusive. Lena Imeraj and 
Tuba Bircan warn against the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ logic of current diversity policies. They 
plead for a recognition of ‘diversities’ in a way that recognizes the diversity within the 
diversity. Only in this way will we recognize people ‘for who they truly are’. Gabriel Zohar 
demonstrates the effects that the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ logic can exert on the life chances of 
minorities. Ethnicity, together with class, are both regretfully powerful predictions of 
educational and employment opportunities, and this is particularly strong in Belgium. 
Zohar pleads for ‘a shift in the collective mindset to one of greater recognition of the 
fact that it is possible to belong to any ethnicity without being automatically located 
somewhere at the fringes of society as outsiders’. The two last papers of this book 
demonstrate how, even after living a lifetime in Belgium or even after a presence of several 

























Kristel Beyens show that, even if you have lived your whole life in Belgium, if you commit 
a crime, you are punished doubly. Or, using the words of the French rap group Zebda: 
‘je suis celui qu’on a puni deux fois, ici et puis là-bas’. Over 20 years of campaigning in 
Belgium had successfully led to the suppression of this double punishment for most 
categories of foreigners, but in 2017, under the administration of Theo Francken, it 
was reintroduced. Contrary to official discourse, Marijke Van Buggenhout, Nadia Fadil 
and Els Dumortier argue in the final paper that the Belgian children in Syrian detention 
camps are indeed ‘paying for the sins of their parents’. A state of exception is at play where 
a violation of human rights is justified because these children are born out of parents that 
are considered public enemies: not only are they paying for their parents' mistakes, they 
are also paying for their ethnicity, as their parents are increasingly being stripped of their 
nationality.
The 44 papers in this book clearly show that humanism, in its sense of promoting human 
rights as liberty, solidarity and equality, is far from being guaranteed for all. Migrants and 
minorities do not have equal opportunities to live a good life. They face inequalities in 
many areas, including housing, education and employment. The authors in this book 
have practised humanism as a ‘practice of trouble-making’, as a ‘praxis of criticism’. They 
dare to question common sense ideas and say what has gone or is going wrong. But they 
have not stopped there. The authors also offer hope and put forward a very diverse set of 
solutions for a more just future for all. 
1	 Ajayi, F., & Westerveen, L. (2020). Covid-19: Amplifier of Racism and Inequalities. Commentary: Institute for 
European Studies: Vrije Universiteit Brussel. https://www.ies.be/content/covid-19- amplifier-racism-and-ine-
qualities
2	 Boubout, Y. (2020) In Europe We also can’t breathe. So why are we protesting policy prutality in the US but not 
at home?. Politico. 3 June 2020. https://www.politico.eu/article/in-europe-we-also-cant-breathe-black-lives-
matter-anti-racism-protests-george-floyd-police-brutality/
3 De Haas, H., Castles, S., & Miller, M. (2020). The Age of Migration. London: Red Globe Press-Palgrave, p. 4.
4 IOM (2015). World Migration Report. Migrants and cities: New partnerships to manage mobility. Geneva, 
Switzerland: IOM. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/wmr2015_en.pdf 
5	 Said, E. (2004). Humanism and Democratic Criticism. New York: Columbia University Press.	
6	 Hall, S. (1996). Who Needs ‘Identity’? In: Hall, S., & Du Gay, P. Questions on Cultural Identity. London: Sage 
Publications. 
 7	 Anthias, Fl., & Yuval-Davis, N. (1993). Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the 

























Towards a Radical Politics  
of the Human
by Gily Coene
“(…) humanism [is] a usable praxis for intellectuals and academics 
who want to know what they are doing, what they are committed to as 
scholars, and who want also to connect these principles to the world in 
which they live as citizens.” 
(Edward Saïd)1 
Humanism is hard to define. The term is applied alternatively to historical movements like 
Renaissance humanism, to contemporary philosophies of life (like secular humanism), 
to specific areas of study and approaches (like the humanities) and to legal-political 
frameworks like human rights law or humanitarianism. Although humanism can refer to 
a variety of ideas and beliefs about what human beings are, what they are morally entitled 
to, what kind of moral or knowledge ideals they should strive towards and so forth, it has 
nevertheless been rightly attacked for a number of reasons, including its exclusionary 
and elitist asumptions – bourgeois, androcentric, white, heterosexual or eurocentric. 
Humanism therefore seems to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it signifies 
ethical and democratic ideals that inspire people to struggle against grave injustices in 
the world, to create solidarity across national, ethnic and other divisive social boundaries 
and to criticize unequal power relations and oppressive structural forces. This 
inclusionary side is, for instance, powerfully reflected in the activist slogan ‘no human 
is illegal’, which strongly condemns the criminalizaton of migration and dehumanizing 
treatment of refugees and immigrants. On the other hand, the development of the 
humanist paradigm is historically entangled with violent oppression, colonization and 
exploitation. This darker side, to borrow Walter Mignolo’s2 phrase, can also be witnessed 
today, for example in assimilationist discourses that urge immigrants to adapt to ‘more 

























that human rights – widely regarded as the moral cornerstone of Western Enlightenment 
– are the rights most violated within Western countries with regard to the treatment of 
immigrants and asylum seekers. 
The quotation by Edward Saïd that heads this chapter stems from Humanism and 
Democratic Criticism, the last and posthumously published work of this widely known 
author of monumental works like Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism. Throughout 
his life in exile and his critical intellectual work, Saïd was very much aware of the 
entanglement of humanist ideals with colonial and racist projects. However, in reflecting 
on how to engage with the complexities and conflicts of a post 9/11 world, he also 
affirms humanism as a critical practice. For Saïd, humanism refers to a “technique of 
trouble-making” that is found among different traditions and contexts around the world.
Critical post-colonial writers like Sylvia Winter3 discuss in-depth how the fundamental 
ambivalence of the Western humanist paradigm already comes to the surface in the early 
manifestos of the Renaissance, including the famous 15th century Oration On the Dignity 
of Man by Pico della Mirandola. In this manifest, man is described as an indeterminate 
creature that has been given the opportunity by God to form and determine himself 
according to his own desires and judgment. Next to this liberating idea, God explains 
to Adam in the manifest that he is “free” either to “degrade” into the “lower” forms of 
life, those at animal level, or to “rise” to the “higher” forms at divine level. The new 
paradigm served to legitimate social hierarchies between those who believe that they 
tend towards the higher level (being transcendental, spiritual, rational, autonomous, 
moral, enlightened etc) and those who are perceived to tend towards the “lower” or 
“animal” level – and by extension being natural, physical, dependent, irrational, immoral, 
feminine, infantile, etc. The later modern idea of humanity, expressed in the 18th century 
declarations on the rights of men, was no less touched by such ambivalence. Although the 
proclaimed ideal of human equality was important to the liberatory struggles of slaves, 
women, workers and colonial subjects, it equally served to legitimate their very exclusion 
from the political realm of the abstract rational individual. For this reason, Leopold 
Sédar Senghor talked about the 20th century ‘Convention of European Rights’ instead 
of the ‘European Convention of Human Rights’ because the rights of this convention 
did not apply to the subjects of colonial states.4 This ambivalence did not stop in the 
20th century. Feminist lawyers like Catharine MacKinnon concluded that, more then 50 
years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, women are still not considered 
as fully human beings by contemporary international human rights standards. Although 

























constitutes a violation of basic human rights, it is still not specifically adressed within the 
framework of refugee law.5 Like the Greek and Roman ideals of humanitas, the modern 
idea of human dignity seems to apply first of all to the already privileged. 
Hannah Arendt demystified the idea of humanity in probably one of the most 
penetrating ways when she commented on the situation of refugees and displaced 
persons in the first half of the 20th century, concluding that “the world found nothing sacred 
in the abstract nakedness of being human.”6 The paradox of the refugees’ plight was not that 
their human rights were violated, writes Arendt, but that they – in being nothing more 
than human – were deprived of their very “right to have rights”.7 The human rights paradox 
that Arendt refers to is somehow inherent in the democratic organization of states where 
the principle of “we, the people” implies boundaries and criteria for citizenship that 
are inclusive for some and exclusive to others. Yet, although Seyla Benhabib8 regards 
such boundaries and criteria as inevitable, they should respond to universal principles 
and remain subject to continuous democratic iterations. Admission and citizenship 
can therefore not be refused or attributed on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion or 
language, since this would contradict the very principles that liberal democracies adhere 
to. However, criteria based on skills, or qualifications of means and income are acceptable, 
according to Benhabib, because they do not ‘formally’ exclude people on the very basis 
of their identity. Yet, the current shift in migration policies to ‘selection by merit, not by 
origin’ in the global race for brains, skills and talents is no less problematic in creating 
exclusionary global hierarchies and unequal opportunities. As Ayelet Shachar9 remarks, 
migration regimes in the West may officially appear to be colour-blind, also race/gender- 
or national origin-blind; but their new market-oriented boundaries of membership and 
belonging are no less exclusive for those who cannot easily sell themselves as a ‘net 
benefit’ to the new society. 
The deadly consequences of today’s migration regimes can be witnessed on an almost 
daily basis. They clearly illustrate that human rights are still empty boxes for the world’s 
underprivileged. Yet it would be hard to imagine how to improve their situation just by 
consigning all humanist ideas and concerns to the dustbins of history. Different scholars 
therefore attempt to rethink humanism in a more criticial and inclusive way, sometimes 
under headings such as post-humanism, post-human humanism, critical humanism 
and so on. The critical queer theorist Judith Butler10, for instance, has called for a ‘new 
humanism’ that asserts our common physicality and shared vulnerability, while political 
theorists like Anne Phillips argue that a more radical sense of ‘politics of the human’ 
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Press. 
beings, but would refuse to attach hierarchical significance to them.11 The radical politics 
of the human thus become first and foremost a fight against inequality and discrimination 
that does not require people to conceal their particularities and differences in order to be 
recognized as fully human. 
I believe it is very hard to be critical of current migration practices without making any 
reference to humanist concerns. Humanism seems to be part of both the problem and 
its solution. As Saïd explains, humanism should not signify a shared set of characteristics 
or ideas that one is supposed to embody or represent, but rather refer to a “paradoxal 
mode of thought (…) always restlessly self-clarifying in search of freedom, enlightenment, 
more agency.”12 Humanism entails a sceptical attitude that breaks with widely accepted 
common sense ideas and discourses (doxa), but in a constructive way, driven by a search 
for better knowledge and greater justice for those who have been oppressed, neglected, 
marginalized, excluded and silenced. This resonates with Bourdieu’s negative philosophy 
and his call for a “permanent enlightenment of the enlightenment.”13 Bourdieu criticizes a 
moralistic abstract universalism that mystifies existing inequalities and thereby serves 
to justify relations of domination and social exclusion. Although Saïd and Bourdieu 
are both highly critical of the oppressive ideas and projects that have been proclaimed 
under the banner of humanism, reason or enlightenment, they also stress that, without 
reference to critical arguments or universal values, one would not be able to challenge 
such ideas and practices as false, hypocritical and in need of radical change. 
As a critical mode of thought, humanism invites academics concerned with migration 
and minority issues to keep on refining their “techniques of making trouble” and to 
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Questioning ‘the Human’  
in Humanism
Mariska Jung & Sophie Withaeckx1
In its meaning of ‘human-centredness’ and of foregrounding values of autonomy, liberty, 
equality and sovereignty, humanism has become an appealing ideal for people and 
communities around the globe. With humanity as the common denomination uniting 
us all, humanism holds out the promise of surpassing boundaries between humans based 
on gender, race or religion, which have served for centuries to consolidate a social order 
based on fundamental inequality, oppression and exploitation. This promise has, however, 
not been delivered. Discourses of equality, solidarity and human rights often remain an 
empty shell, in which differentiations among humans exclude certain categories of people 
from the rights and recognition accorded to others. Moreover, humanism produces ‘the 
human’ as a superior kind of living creature, installing a hierarchy that legitimates the 
oppression and exploitation of animals, nature and the environment.
In this contribution, we present perspectives on humanism which find that the problem 
of exclusion is inherent to the particular notion of ‘the human’ centralized by humanist 
thought. Feminist and postcolonial perspectives have pointed out that this exclusion 
is not the result of a ‘wrong’ application of humanism, but the logical consequence of 
the concept of ‘the human’ that lies at the heart of humanism. Solving this problem 
therefore requires something different from applying humanism in the ‘right’ way. 
It involves inquiring into the genealogies of the concept of ‘the human’ by adopting a 
critical position towards the power relations among ‘humans’, and between ‘human’ 
and the ‘non-human’. For some, such rethinking can lead to a reinvention of humanism 
purged from implicit notions of superiority. Others question the desirability of human-
centered humanism at all, and theorize about a code of ethics that moves beyond human 
exceptionalism. Whether or not humanism should be abandoned or reimagined, we 
argue that it is imperative to question carefully the notion of ‘the human’ and to challenge 

























The human is overrepresented
One of the intellectuals who has famously taken ‘the human’ as a central object of inquiry 
is Sylvia Wynter2, a Caribbean literary critic who builds on the work of anticolonial 
writers such as Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire. She interrogates the idea of ‘the human’ 
by thinking through humanism in relation to colonization, race and gender. According to 
her, the idea of ‘the human’ is an overrepresentation of one specific conception of what 
it means to be human, which violently blocks out alternative modes and possibilities of 
being. 
In her seminal article Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards 
the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation – An Argument, Wynter traces the roots of 
this overrepresentation back to the Middle Ages and into the present. The encounter 
of Western imperialists with the non-Western, indigenous ‘Others’ in the Americas was 
conditional for the overturning of a previous theocentric worldview and gave rise to 
what she called Man1: the early renaissance worldview in which ‘the human’, rather than 
the divine, became the centre of the world. This centering of ‘the human’ was enabled 
by installing new standards of what constituted ‘humanity’. The capacity for reason first 
complemented and later replaced the previous standard of adhering to the true religion 
(Christianity) as a distinguishing mark of who is or is not ‘human’. The indigenous 
populations of Africa and the Americas were assumed to be lacking first ‘a soul’ and 
later also ‘reason’. In this way they became excluded from humanity and could ‘justly’ 
be expropriated, enslaved and exploited. With the advancement of biological science 
and the prominence of Darwinian thought in the 19th century, the idea of ‘the human’ 
became firmly grounded in secular scientific knowledge and gave rise to Man2: not only 
was ‘the human’ now considered to be the sole species capable of reason, ‘the human’ 
was now also the one who was ‘naturally selected’ to become an exploiter and consumer 
of natural resources. Inequality and structural oppression, strongly induced by colonial 
violence and exploitation, thus became re-interpreted as the apolitical outcomes of 
natural selection and deselection. 
These conceptualizations of the human eliminated the conceivability of other ways of 
being human and instead overrepresented the ‘Man-as-Human’. Only by positioning 
himself in opposition to non- or not-quite-human beings, could Western Man become 
installed as the centre of the world. The figure of Man is thus premised on the negation of 

























The human is white
The constitutive role of race in producing the dynamic of Self/Other and its reflection in 
the relationship colonizer/colonized has been famously described by Franz Fanon in his 
book Black Skin, White Masks.
“Dirty nigger!” Or simply, “Look, a Negro!”  
I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my 
spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I 
found that I was an object in the midst of other objects.3
In this passage, Fanon describes how the look of ‘the white man’ reduces him to a thing, 
a projection, an object. The insight comes as a shock, when Fanon suddenly realizes that 
he, who had always thought of himself as a human in the midst of other humans, is not 
recognized as human being but only as ‘a Negro’. He is thus not an autonomous creature 
with his own independent identity, but an element in the historical-racial scheme drawn 
up by white colonizers. In this scheme, the black man, the colonized, the ‘negro’, does not 
stand for an individual subject, but for a body, a ‘race’, a counterpoint against which the 
white subject can identify himself as a human being. 
Fanon powerfully expresses how Western thought has normalized the connection 
between humanity and race. He is famous for putting into words what this means for 
those who become aware of their exclusion from this humanity. For Fanon, and other 
postcolonial thinkers, this process of gaining consciousness is a painful but necessary 
first step in shaping a ‘new human being’, a step which would allow both colonized and 
colonizer to free themselves from the harmful dynamic in which ages of oppression have 
positioned them. However, for Fanon, this ‘new humanism’ would only be envisageable 

























The human is male
Gender has also played a pivotal role in consolidating a particular image of ‘the 
human’, by associating universality and humanity with male bodies and characteristics. 
Feminist analyses have demonstrated how gender has served to mark ‘woman’ as 
man’s Other in terms of her ‘lack’ of male qualities, and as man’s inferior mirror image.4 
This split has been much influenced by Descartes’ body/mind distinction and 
his definition of rationality as a form of pure thinking through introspection and 
disembodiment, as opposed to emotionality and embodied knowledge. Thus 
entrenching longstanding notions of female inferiority, the male/female-binary and its 
associated opposing characteristics (reason/purity/disembodiment versus emotion/
impurity/embodiment) became ‘scientifically’ grounded and legitimated the exclusion 
of women from academic and political life.5 In a dynamic similar but not identical to the 
construction of the colonial Other, ‘woman’ would come to be perceived as a ‘lack’ and 
hence inferior version of the male standard. 
Feminists of colour – both in the West and in the global South – together with later 
postmodern and queer scholars, have further pointed out how the category of gender 
is also entangled with constructions of race and sexuality. This has done much more 
than merely dividing ‘humanity’ between ‘men’ and ‘women’. Maria Lugones’ concept 
of ‘the coloniality of gender’ is crucial to understanding how the category of gender has 
equally played a central part in the process of dehumanizing the colonized.6 Through 
its articulation of ideals of masculinity and femininity, modelled on the ideal of the 
European bourgeois colonizer, gender has functioned simultaneously as ‘a mark of 
the human and a mark of civilization’. Due to the ‘irrationality’ and ‘bestial sexuality’ 
ascribed to the indigenous colonized peoples, they were not seen as conforming to these 
ideals of masculinity and femininity. Instead, they were constructed as non-gendered 
beings, excluded altogether from the categories of men and women, and thus from the 
category of ‘the human’. Placed on a par with animals, colonized people became marked 
not by (human) gender, but by (animal) sex only: ‘Colonized people became males 
and females. Males became not-human-as-not-men, and colonized females became 
not-human-as-not-women’. The perception of the indigenous populations of Africa and 
the Americas as oversexualized and promiscuous has become a recurrent expression in 
both ‘scientific’ and popular discourses and has thus contributed to marking them as 

























The human is not an animal
This categorization of indigenous peoples as animal-like and therefore not-quite-
human, illustrates how much of Western thought, including Enlightenment humanism, 
is premised on an ontological distinction between humans and animals. Posthumanist 
scholars such as Cary Wolfe7 theorize that the differentiation and hierarchization 
between humans and animals is constitutive of the idea of the human itself. That means 
that ‘the human’ does not exist without a self-defining story that disavows animals and 
animality. This narration can be traced back to the Old Testament and Roman and Greek 
philosophers, and fundamentally shapes Western understandings of humanity, of the 
world at large, and of science and knowledge production more broadly still. 
The humanist discourse of species, in which the human is distinctive from and superior 
to animals, becomes concrete in what Wolfe calls the institution of speciesism. The 
institution of speciesism is the general ethical acceptance of violence against animals on 
the basis of their classification as ‘animals’. Moreover, it means that the narrative of ‘the 
human’ necessitates the sacrifice of the animal and animality.8 One of the consequences 
of this discourse is that it will “always be available for use by some humans against other 
humans” (p. 8) through marking them as animal or animal-like. Indeed, this happened 
for example during European colonialism when black people were compared to apes 
and with 20th century Nazism when Jews were equated with rats. Yet within academia 
and in the fields of humanism and posthumanism in particular, questions concerning 
the relations between humanity, animality, race and blackness loom large.9 Thus, while 
we cannot think of the human without disavowing the animal, as posthumanism teaches 
us, neither can we think of the human without racial superiority, as decolonial and black 
feminist intellectuals demonstrate. 
Where to go from here? Does this mean we have to abandon humanism? In his acclaimed 
text from 1955 Discours sur le colonialisme Aimé Césaire fundamentally critiques 
humanism yet does not do away with it all together.10 He aspires to “a humanism made 
to the measure of the world”. A radical idea that we have yet to reach, especially given 
the ways in which movements for emancipation continue to be co-opted when the 
pie of liberal humanism is enlarged on the one hand while restrictions are entrenched 
on the other. This is epitomized for example in the violent work done by naming and 
categorizing people, with categories such as ‘refugee’ and ‘economic migrant’. This 
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asylum centres and streets. We thus approach humanism with caution, as we are mindful 
of the fact that the racial, gendered and colonial underpinnings of both ‘the human’ as 
well as ‘the animal’ need to be parsed and put into conversation with each other before 































Open Borders to (better) Govern 
Migration
by Giacomo Orsini
Most decision-makers these days are convinced that the best policy – perhaps the 
only effective policy – for curbing unwanted migration is to close the national border. 
In recent times, national and European authorities began implementing a range of 
repressive measures designed to erect additional barriers against undesired foreigners. 
Yet, contrary to what one might expect, the reports on what actually happened at the 
borders demonstrate that restrictions of this kind have little or no effect on increasing a 
country’s capability to control unwanted migration, let alone place limits on it.
Opening borders, on the other hand, can resolve most of the tensions that nowadays 
arise around unauthorized migration. As studies have shown, allowing people to migrate 
legally, by authorising foreigners to enter a national territory via regular legal channels, 
will in practice enhance the capacity of national authorities to manage immigration.
Since the nineties, the European Union has adopted a consistent approach to controlling 
migration, taking an increasingly hostile stance towards unwanted migrants attempting 
to enter Europe. To this end, the EU and its member states have signed several agreements 
with neighbouring countries on controlling unauthorized migration into their territories. 
One of the latest of these agreements is the (in)famous deal concluded with Turkey. 
Similarly, national authorities have also been introducing new and far more restrictive 
visa requirements for non-EU citizens wishing to access the Schengen Area. At the same 
time, entire portions of the EU’s external border have been fenced off and equipped with 
state-of-the-art surveillance technologies.1
Advocates of closed borders justify their position to their followers by claiming that 
opening the borders of Europe would lead to “a flood of millions of desperate Africans”.2 
But where is the data to support this scenario? Figures on migration in the African 
continent reveal the same trend as elsewhere in the world: when deciding to emigrate, 




























of origin. In 2019, almost 90% of the total number of international African migrants 
migrated to another country in Africa. None of them travelled as far as Europe or North 
America.3
This trend holds true whether people are migrating from the countryside to the city 
or simply moving to another country with a healthier economy. If there are no 
restrictions to crossing borders, migrants in Africa and Europe will usually stay on the 
same continent.4 Enough data on real migrant flows is available to prove that there is 
no justification for assuming that opening borders will automatically lead to a spurt in 
emigration out of Africa. On the contrary, there is sufficient evidence to show that, at 
least in the case of the EU, closing borders does little or nothing to stem the flow of 
unwanted migration.
While the EU’s efforts to close its borders date back to the late nineties, available research 
figures reveal that during the same time there was no significant decrease in the number 
of unauthorized foreigners entering or setting up home in Europe. Indeed, studies show 
that most undocumented migrants to the EU arrive with a valid visa, then stay on in that 
country after their visa expiry date. Hence the most likely place to look for unauthorized 
migrants is not the national border.5
This argument is strengthened by the fact that the majority of undocumented migrants 
who enter the EU by crossing its external border without a valid visa do actually have the 
right to some form of international protection within the EU. Whether arriving via the 
Mediterranean or the overland Balkan route, legally speaking, and perhaps also morally 
speaking, they thus have the right to access the EU.
Rather than facilitating control, “closing” borders deviates migrants’ journeys away 
from safer routes into less patrolled but more dangerous alternatives. There, people 
often put their destinies in the hands of smugglers, consequently increasing business 
opportunities for criminal organizations – and insecurity for both migrants and the 
host societies. More generally, reducing legal options to migrate makes it harder for 
law enforcement to keep track of foreigners. After all, when successful, unauthorized 
migration goes undetected.
In contrast, by keeping borders open and verifying the identity of every person making 
the border crossing, national authorities are able to make use of the more complete 




























public order. Therefore, if governments really want to control who enters and who exits 
their country, their authorities must keep the border open and provide more, not fewer, 
opportunities for legal migration.
Efficiency in controlling migration is not the only benefit afforded by an open border. 
The removal of obstacles to legal migration will also lead to a series of other positive 
effects for both migrants and the host countries. These effects can be seen clearly in the 
labour markets, for example.
Maintaining the competitivity of European job markets fuels another argument 
frequently advanced in support of closing national borders. It is claimed that if no 
restrictions are put in place, European-born workers will suffer from unfair competitive 
advantage if employers use non-European workers. It cannot be denied that in several 
parts of Europe the less attractive jobs are frequently taken up by migrants. However, the 
availability of foreign labour is blamed for the general degradation of workers’ rights and 
a generalised drop in wage levels. Many people believe this is because migrant workers 
are less demanding than local workers. The truth is that, when borders are closed, 
undocumented migrants are all too easily recruited to the informal labour market. 
No ethnic or national group has any ‘natural predisposition’ to accept being overexploited 
at work. But, in the absence of residence and labour permits, migrants will accept even 
the most precarious working conditions in order to hang onto both their jobs and the 
right to remain in the country.6 
Thus, the degradation of labour markets should be laid at the door of closed borders 
rather than blamed on immigration per se. If borders are open, allowing migrant workers 
to enter legally, this makes them less vulnerable to exploitation because their living 
situations are less precarious. It also reduces the risks of unemployment for locals and 
the aggregated pool of available workers makes it easier to get a good match for supply in 
relation to demand in job markets, so they function better.
The EU provides a good example here. Since Europeans are given equal rights across 
national labour markets, the costs of hiring a native or an EU migrant are the same – 
making it eventually more convenient for employers to hire locals who, for instance, 
already know the local language. However, a specification is necessary here since many 
supporters of closed borders conflate the effects of posted work with those produced by 




























Within the European common market, companies are entitled to operate in any other 
EU member state. Their employees may then work in the host country until their 
contracted work is finished but the conditions for their employment are governed by 
national contracts. It can happen that their national contractual working conditions 
might be of a lower standard than those valid in the host country. This often results in 
‘social dumping’, and can lead to a degradation of labour conditions for the entire job 
sector. National companies may be forced to lower their own employment standards in 
order to stay competitive.
Setting posted work aside, legal migration is best for matching supply to demand in 
the local job markets. Unemployed migrants are free to search for a new job in another 
country if they are able to move without having to face excessively harsh legal and 
administrative costs for migrating. Portugal provides a good example of this. During the 
recent economic crisis, non-EU migrants established with relatively secure legal status 
in Portugal were better able to ride the wave of economic hardship than undocumented 
foreign workers. Migrant workers whose documents were fully in order were able to 
migrate to search for jobs elsewhere anywhere in the EU.7
In conclusion, for any country wanting to control illegal migration, closing its borders is 
the least effective policy. Not only is it inefficient, it also generates numerous human and 
financial costs affecting migrants and the host country alike. In contrast, if the country 
opens its borders, this policy is more intelligent as it opens the way for legal migration, 
which enables national authorities to control and manage immigration. Allowing foreign 
workers to become properly documented is another means of relieving further tensions 
that tend to arise over irregular migration. To see how successful this policy can be in 
action, look no further than those labour markets which have accepted a successful 
injection of legal migrant workers.
1  Brigden, N., & Mainwaring, C. (2017). Matryoshka Journeys: Im/mobility during Migration. Geopolitics 21(2): 
407-434.
2 Samuel, H. (July 7, 2017) . 'Millions of Africans' will flood Europe unless it acts now, warns European chief, as Paris 
evacuates huge migrant camp. The Telegraph. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/07/
millions-africans-will-flood-europe-unless-acts-now-warns-european/ [Accessed on April 17, 2019].
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5  de Haas, H. Vezzoli, S., & Villares-Varela, M. (2019). Opening the floodgates? European migration under 
restrictive and liberal border regimes 1950-2010. International Migration Institute Network.
6  Lewis, H., & Waite, L. (2019). Migrant illegality, slavery and exploitative work (pp. 219-242). In: G. Craig, A. Balch, 
H. Lewis, & L. Waite (eds.), The Modern Slavery Agenda: Politics, Policy and Practice in the UK. Bristol: Policy 
Press. 
7  Pereira Esteves, A. I., Cruz dos Santos Fonseca, M. L., & da Silva Macaísta Malheiros, J. (2018). Labour market 
integration of immigrants in Portugal in times of austerity: resilience, in situ responses and re-emigration. 




























When Border Enforcement 
Backfires, Alternatives Exist
by Angela Tacea and Laura Petrache Le Guern
Rawan, a 12-year-old boy who fled from Aleppo in Syria, told us: 
‘We’re now refugees. People don’t like us. No one is loyal, everyone lies. I 
was a kid before. I am older now. I know more.’
Faced with constant public and political pressure, the European leaders are favouring 
tighter border controls over more integrationist measures. But tighter border control 
policies do not stop immigration. While restrictive regulations may curb illegal 
immigration, they are also undermining humanistic values such as understanding, 
tolerance, acceptance of foreign customs and ideas, openness. They also nurture a public 
vision of irregular migrants as illegitimate beneficiaries of fundamental rights.
In the context of mixed public opinion on immigration and the rise of anti-immigration 
political parties, EU member states seek to protect their national sovereignty against 
migration inflows, mainly by reinforcing their border controls. Of course, debates 
about migration should not be reduced merely to the dichotomy between ‘open’ versus 
‘closed’ borders, nor is any country systematically the most or least restrictive towards 
immigration. In fact, some countries have been simultaneously opening and closing their 
borders even before the coronavirus pandemic.
However, research shows that border controls designed to secure the national 
territory (e.g. surveillance, detention) have been constantly reinforced over the 
years at the level of both individual nation states and the EU. Based on a selection 
of data for nine countries between 1999 and 20081, the Immigration Policies in 
Comparison dataset shows a clear upward trend of border and land control policies.2 
The same trend can be observed if one looks at the European budget allocated to 




























reinforced every year from 6 million EUR in 2005 to 420.6 million EUR in 2020, a 34.6% 
increase compared to 2019. At the same time, 41% of the Home Affairs EU funding 
is spent on the Internal Security Fund compared to 33.5% on Asylum, Migration and 
Integration. The EU is not only better equipped to control its external borders, but has 
also started to externalize its borders by creating buffer zones around external borders, 
acting in transit countries and establishing agreements with the countries of origin of 
migrants in which they control the departure of people from their own coasts.
But how efficient are tighter border controls? 
When immigration policies become more restrictive, immigration flows may still 
increase. Despite Europe’s massive investment in external border controls, people 
continue to arrive in the continent. This does not mean that restrictive immigration 
policies do not matter. More restrictive regulations, namely tighter border controls, 
do lead to lower migration flows. But, while the EU is implementing extensive border 
controls to prevent illegal immigration, its action indirectly pushes unauthorized 
migrants (including those that might qualify for asylum) into the hands of smugglers or 
even to their deaths. 
In January 2019, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated 
that since 2017, 2,700 people are believed to have died or gone missing while crossing 
the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. On 19 June 2018 a wooden boat carrying an 
unknown number of migrants capsized off the coast of Libya. As UNHCR reported, 
‘Out of the estimated 100 passengers, only five survived.’ The same day another boat 
sank at a different location off the Libyan coast. ‘Seventy people are believed to have 
drowned in this incident’. Many deaths, like those described above, occur frequently in 
the Strait of Sicily and in other coastal areas of the Mediterranean, making it the ‘most 
deadly stretch of water for refugees and migrants’ in the world. Death is the most extreme 
negative consequence of tighter border controls. However, travellers who manage to 
survive their long journeys between different countries, different political systems and 
legal frameworks, also continue to face different forms of violence and fundamental 
human right infringement. 
Mahathi, a 15-year-old unaccompanied Afghan minor living in the Moria camp in Lesbos, 
describes his life in the refugee camp as ‘a prison. I thought that European countries were 




























Khaled, a 29 year-old Syrian migrant, whom we met in the Migrant Integration Lab4 said:
‘After all the death that we saw in Syria,  
as a person, when you go out and survive,  
when you can cross borders and reach a safe place,  
you start to feel that being human (alive) is  
the most precious element that you ever had.’
European policies that prioritize border controls and security issues over more 
integrationist immigration policies encourage a vision of ‘irregular migrants’ as non-
legitimate beneficiaries of the fundamental rights such as health, education and 
housing.5 Indeed, narratives portray migrants in irregular situation as liars, social benefits 
abusers or people stealing the jobs of nationals. The criminalization of migration 
through establishing an ‘offence of solidarity’ against those who try to assist migrants by 
providing minimum access to shelter, food and healthcare creates a climate of suspicion 
and rejection among those who provide social services. It is hardly surprising then 
that the police or other agents in charge of fighting ‘the illegal migration’ might have 
difficulties in recognizing a migrant as a victim of human rights violations in need of 
protection. 
To mitigate and halt the negative consequences of tighter border controls, comprehen-
sive innovation and a paradigm shift are needed. European countries need to raise public 
awareness to address the media, community leaders, policymakers and people in the 
public eye. Political leaders should craft a positive public discourse of migration and 
consider sustainable integration systems that would eliminate hate-speech, intemperate 
language and provocative actions that exploit fears and uncertainty within our societies. 
Immigration can be regarded as politically, socially and economically positive, on 
condition that migrants can be sustainably integrated into the receiving communities. 
Awareness and Informative Campaigns, social cohesion and open dialogue tools, such as 
social events aimed at connecting locals and newcomers, can help to develop sustainable 
communities and favour intercultural dialogue. Social innovation and capitalizing on 
newcomers’ talents can be strengthened through entrepreneurial education and training, 




























It could be a solution, for example, to create an entrepreneurship-friendly environment 
for both migrants and the native–born population and help migrant entrepreneurs 
through access to credit.
It is vital to develop longer-term policies that promote intercultural dialogue. There is an 
urgent need to develop sensitive policies of inclusion, welcome and solidarity. However, 
we believe that part of the rejection of migrants by local host communities comes from 
the fact that integration policies produce a specific category, that of migrants. In order 
to prevent the rejection of integration policies and to combat the rise of extremism, the 
integration of migrants and their access to employment must not be handled outside the 
integration of specifically involved national groups. The integration process should be 
done simultaneously for disadvantaged and vulnerable groups like second- and third-
generation migrants, also unemployed nationals, demoralized and disenfranchised 
groups, in a way that encourages dialogue, knowledge and joint projects. It is thus a 
question of defining comprehensive and lasting integration policies for all individuals 
and populations in disarray who need to rediscover their identity through social and 
professional integration via common projects.
Thinking about ‘borders’ is not going to help in the construction of a sustainable future. 
In today’s uncertain international environment we should seize the opportunity to 
advance human dignity through a revitalized response. As we stand at a key junction, we 
should attempt to rectify the world’s inclination to adhere to closed borders (an attitude 
that damages human lives) and should work together towards a shared and better future.
1  IMPALA Database, https://www.impaladatabase.org/ 
2 Schmid, S. D., & Helbling, M. (2016). Validating the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) Dataset. WZB 
Berlin Social Science Center, SP VI.
3 de Kervasdoué, C. (2019). Le reportage de la Rédaction. A Lesbos, des milliers d’enfants pris au piège de la 
politique migratoire européenne. France Culture [Retrieved from https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-
reportage-de-la-redaction/a-lesbos-des-milliers-denfants-pris-au-piege-de-la-politique-migratoire-europeenn
e?fbclid=IwAR02RFjFOGa9ITwifXmqt_FKFYHfCOeBfHezTgF1Q20eSA0IDHn3Vimo_1c
4 The “Migrant Integration Lab” is a holistic device of newcomers’ sustainable integration designed and 
implemented by B1-AKT in 7 countries. For more info: http://migrantintegrationlab.mystrikingly.com
5 Carrera, S., & Parkin, J. (2011). Protecting and Delivering Fundamental Rights of Irregular Migrants at Local 





























Malthusian Fears in Current 
Migration Debates
When the Pseudo-Science of Numbers is 
Used Against Humanity 
by Patrick Deboosere and Soumaya Majdoub
Why is it important to analyze Malthus more than two centuries after he published his 
essay  ‘on the Principle of Population’? First, because his population theory still looms 
over the migration debate and, second, because he fought the Enlightenment by using a 
‘scientific’ discourse. 
Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), a cleric of the Church of England, is best known 
for his population theory. Simply stated, Malthus argues that human population would 
always grow more rapidly than food supply if population growth were not restrained 
by what Malthus called “preventive checks”. The poor are poor because of their own 
behaviour and uncontrolled reproduction. It makes no sense, according to Malthus, to 
help the poor, because then they will reproduce in high numbers. Scarcity, he believed, 
helps to maintain a balance between natural resources and the humans competing to 
consume them. 
Malthus was popular among the ruling classes in 19th century Britain because his theory 
was helpful in creating a cheap and willing workforce for the industrial revolution. By 
abolishing poverty relief in the countryside, the poor were forced to rejoin the industrial 
workforce. His population theory also claimed to reveal the deep causes of the spiraling 
poverty crisis in late 18th century England. ‘Science’ justified why charity and helping 
the poor were not only unnecessary but even counterproductive, thereby liberating the 




























Malthus was very clever in combining old prejudices (like the idea that that poverty exists 
by the will of God) with scientific argumentation and the use of statistics. He replaced 
God by the laws of nature. Just as Newton had used the laws of physics to explain the 
movements of the planets, Malthus introduced his ‘law’ of population to explain poverty. 
His first trick was to present an idyllic past with an equilibrium between food production 
and population (a historical claim without any empirical evidence). Next, he pointed to 
the paradox that  ‘notwithstanding the immense sum that is annually collected for the poor 
in England, there is still so much distress among them’.1 Then, he comes to the reason for 
this increasing poverty: population growth had outpaced available resources and the 
fundamental cause of this was that helping the poor creates more poverty by inciting the 
poor to reproduce in the absence of scarcity. The theory of population allowed Malthus 
to invert cause and effect and at the same time point to the vanity of utopian socialists 
who believed that it was possible to change the world by human laws. He argued that 
well-meaning people contributed to the poverty crisis by supporting institutions for 
poor relief, not realizing that opposing a natural law is pointless. The success of Malthus’s 
ideas lies in ‘naturalizing the social’. 
Malthus walked in the footsteps of Edmund Burke, who wrote ‘Thoughts and Details on 
Scarcity’. ‘We the people’, Burke wrote, ‘ought to be made sensible that it is not in breaking 
the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God, that we 
are to place our hope of softening the divine displeasure to remove any calamity under which 
we suffer, or which hangs over us’.2
Malthus’ population theory proved to be wrong and the law of population totally 
baseless. Already during his lifetime, couples in England were starting to control their 
fertility and the birthrate began to decline. The industrial revolution changed the 
economic landscape. Technology increased agricultural yield. Malthus had neglected 
the inventiveness of mankind. At the end of the 19th century his population theory was 
largely abandoned. However, the roots of negative attitudes towards migration can be 
traced back to this period, when population growth first came to be viewed as a threat. 
 
Malthus’ popularity revived in the decades of rapid population growth after the Second 
World War when ‘neo-Malthusians’ recycled Malthus ideas on population growth and 
scarcity of resources and applied these to the world system.  By then,  population was 
no longer thought of and addressed within nations, but across them on a global scale, 





























There is indeed an evident tension between population pressure and available resources, 
but neo-Malthusianism has overlooked what alternatives exist to cope with this tension. 
Most importantly, by presenting the challenge as a natural law with dire consequences for 
humanity, neo-Malthusianism has introduced a fundamental and erroneous pessimism 
concerning our common future. The fear of overpopulation has dominated our world 
view for decades and has shaped our way of looking at the Global South. 
However, there has been no massive starvation on the scale predicted, and no real 
shortage of natural resources. After a peak growth of 2.3% annually in the late 1960s, 
yearly population increase has slowed down to around 1%. Total fertility has fallen 
markedly in many countries. So much that today close to half the world’s population 
lives in a country where lifetime fertility is below 2.1 births per woman, which is roughly 
the level of zero population growth.4 The main drivers contributing to this reversal are 
playing out in all areas of the world, ending population growth in the coming decades. 
Meanwhile, food production has been increasing much faster than population growth. 
Remaining food shortages are mainly related to distribution problems, not to scarcity. 
Global poverty is still a tremendous challenge. But for the first time in human history, 
absolute and relative poverty have been decreasing for over twenty years. 
The neo-Malthusian ideas on population growth are still extremely influential in the 
current migration debate. The idea of an ever-growing world population is reinforced by 
the almost daily images of refugee streams and overcrowded boats in the Mediterranean. 
This helped to forge a fear of invasion in the richer countries of the world. The Malthusian 
fear of overpopulation and scarce resources is reemerging with force, not least because 
some political parties hope to gain extra votes by stirring things up.
Today Trump’s immigration policy  is inspired  by the publications and the ideology 
of strong anti-immigration lobbies such as the  Federation for American Immigration 
Reform (FAIR), the American Immigration Control Foundation and the  American 
Border Patrol. All of them have been founded by John Tanto and financed by Cordelia 
Scaife May, one of the heirs of the immensely rich Mellon Scaife family in the US. FAIR, 
for instance, received $56.7 million for the fiscal years 2005-2017. Cordelia Scaife May 
was strongly influenced by neo-Malthusianism and financed many organizations for 
birth control such as NumbersUSA. 
It is striking that some commentators have linked the refugee crisis to overpopulation, 




























Most people prefer not to migrate and the huge numbers of Syrian refugees in Europe in 
2015 were the consequence of a brutal conflict and not of overpopulation.
Very early in the refugee crisis, Malthusian ideas popped up again with what we have 
now come to know as the  ‘counter-intuitive solution’ – namely, that the best thing 
to do about misery and poverty is to do nothing, for  anything  that is done will only 
exacerbate the problem.5 Helping refugees is considered to create a ‘pull-effect’. Hence it 
is not the war that is creating the refugee crisis but the NGOs, through their assistance to 
refugees. The NGO’s assistance to refugees in the Mediterranean is deemed responsible 
for their deaths, not the decision of the EU to force airlines to control visas and punish 
them financially when accepting refugees on board. 
These parallelisms are not by chance. It is crucial to understand that Malthus wrote his 
essay against the ideas of Godwin and Condorcet, and more generally against the ideas 
of the French revolution and the values of  ‘freedom, equality and solidarity’. Malthus’ 
population theory is deeply entwined with his resistance against these ideals. He provided 
a ‘scientific’ demonstration that human nature cannot change and that the ideals of the 
French revolution are not feasible.   He developed a theory that justified the ongoing 
inequality in Britain, a theory that helped to ignore the inequal access to political and 
economic power and to the most elementary resources to survive. His ideology was an 
ideology of inequality. The poor were not human beings with equal rights to the rich. 
Since the end of the Second World War, with Fascism defeated, the fundamental idea 
that all humans are equal was enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948. 
Article 1 establishes the link between equality and solidarity, Article 2 the entitlement to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration. In addition, Article 2 emphasizes 
that ‘no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international 
status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, 
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty’. Finally, Article 14 introduces 
the right to asylum. 
The refugee crisis was for N-VA president Bart De  Wever  the perfect leverage for his 
ongoing fight against the values of Enlightenment. De Wever’s offensive against the 
basic references of international law and against ‘Gutmenschen’  refers directly to the 
Malthusian criticism of the naïve well-meaning people who help the poor.  According 




























put at risk “our” social welfare state.6 ‘Gutmenschen’, with their humanist approach, 
are, for De  Wever,  feeding the intolerance against migration. This is a contemporary 
adaptation of the classical anti-Enlightenment thesis of the conservative Edmund Burke. 
It reflects the idea that these damned ‘philosophers’ with their ‘damned human rights’ 
are destroying the nation.7 
The migration debate, more specifically the way we handle the refugee crisis, is more 
than ever intrinsically linked to the defence of humanism and the values of freedom, 
equality and solidarity. We need to deconstruct the neo-Malthusian world view on 
population growth and on poverty alike by using data-driven analysis that opens the way 




1 Malthus, T., (1798). An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society 
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Caught in a Trap 
Refugees: Neither Man nor Animal
by Eline Severs
There is no reason to call the intentions of humanitarians into question. But it is 
important to realise that their discourse may, unwittingly, reproduce unhelpful 
representations that deny, overlook or otherwise undervalue the equality of refugees. 
Their emphasis on a shared humanity paradoxically re-affirms the much-rehearsed 
binary opposition between ‘saviour’ and ‘victim’ and, by extension, between the 
Enlightened West and the barbaric Other.1 This locks refugees into a permanent trap of 
subordination: while animalist discourses deny their humanity outright, humanitarian 
discourses make refugees’ humanity conditional upon victimhood, or their readiness to 
being reduced to an object of aid from benign Western states. 
A politics of ‘fearism’2
Since the summer of 2015, it has become commonplace to deploy the term refugee 
crisis as a way of referring to the increased numbers of people arriving in Europe via 
illegal channels. In 2015, the United Nations recorded over a million refugees reaching 
mainland Europe by sea. Although this signalled a vast increase from previous years 
and, in this sense, constitutes a real political event, the crisis terminology is not without 
criticism because it obscures whose crisis it is. The concept primarily draws attention to 
the difficulties hosting countries experience as the result of the increase in newcomers. 
It draws attention away from the traumatic experiences of the displaced people 
themselves.
Critics have in this regard pointed to the politics of fearism (that has pervaded reporting 
and policymaking on refugees). The use of animalistic or inanimate collective terms 
(such as ‘swarms’, ‘flocks’ and ‘tidal waves’) immediately dehumanizes and 




























as almost identical members of harmful collective gatherings they constitute a plague to 
be contained or, at worst, eradicated. 
The logic behind dehumanisation
The disquieting figure of the refugee and the politics of fearism it provokes have been 
thoroughly theorised by Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben. In the context of 
World War II, Arendt3 was one of the first to describe the processes of subjectification 
that stripped Jews in exile from their identities. In Germany, they were perceived as 
Untermenschen. Yet their flight out of the country did little to upgrade their status. On the 
contrary, it turned them into voluntary prisoners (shut up in camps for their protection) 
or enemy aliens (as citizens of a hostile nation, they were liable to be apprehended and 
forcibly removed). Arendt powerfully demonstrated how the figure of the Jew became 
the subject of state discourse, and how recognition of their humanity was subordinated 
to political agendas. 
Agamben elaborated on the reasons why we tend to refer to refugees as ‘animals’. 
The root of the problem, according to Agamben, lies in the rival concepts of universal 
humanity (extending rights to all) and national sovereignty (attempts to restrict 
entitlements to specific groups of people). Agamben argues that refugees expose the 
incompatibility between these two concepts, and in so doing they are the cause of mental 
discomfort for people who hold both values dearly. 
How does Agamben arrive at this conclusion? Having fled their home countries, he 
argues, refugees find themselves in a state of exception.4 Of course they are still human, 
but they are no longer citizens able to call upon their states for protection. The same 
holds for receiving countries: they do not automatically grant refugees citizenship status. 
Hence, refugees enter a state of exception: while their humanity is not necessarily called 
into question, their ability to receive humane treatment becomes conditioned by the 
national goals of receiving countries, and the extent to which the refugee in question 
aligns with the national aims of stability, order and security of the receiving country. 
The figure of the refugee, in this sense, exposes the myth of human rights. It reveals how 
human rights enter into competition with notions of state sovereignty. More concretely, 




























their capacity to declare a ‘crisis’ or state of emergency, allowing them to suspend human 
rights in order to secure national aims, such as safeguarding domestic systems of social 
security.
The politics of fearism may, in this context, be conceived as the by-product of cognitive 
dissonance. Cognitive dissonance refers to the mental conflict that occurs when a person 
holds two beliefs that contradict each another. Confronted with rising refugee numbers, 
we desperately seek to believe two mutually contradictory propositions: humanity 
(the rights that humans enjoy as a simple fact of birth) versus state sovereignty (the right 
to exclude people to achieve a better fit with national aims). The tensions between both 
propositions create mental discomfort. A discomfort which we attempt to resolve by 
referring to refugees in animal terms.
Only by magnifying the potential threat which refugees pose to the state can the 
suspension of human rights be justified. The use of metaphors, such as tidal waves, floods 
and swarms, suggest an invasion with a collective purpose, unknown at present, but with 
the clear effect of destabilising a state, its public order and social security. Construed as 
a ‘problem amenable to a solution’,5 refugees become less than human. A subject of state 
discourse. A thing to be handled.
Similarly, descriptions of refugee camps as jungles (Lesbos, Nord-Pas-de-Calais) depict 
refugees as ferocious, anti-social individuals, ready to devour our communities, if given 
the chance. The refugee camp becomes, as Agamben argues, a demonstration of the 
inhumanity of refugees. Its poor living conditions and the miserable conditions that 
refugees endure become testimony of the ‘life not worth living’.6 Dehumanization, in this 
vein, becomes an instrument to justify the state’s rejection of refugees’ humanity and to 
treat them accordingly. 
The return of the human
In their attempts to provide a counter-discourse, NGOs, international relief organizations 
and left-wing politicians have turned to the Enlightenment and its universal premises, to 
human rights in particular. Their arguments for a more humane treatment of refugees 
are often accompanied by a plea for open borders and a criticism of the right of nation 




























individual freedom and self-determination to argue that the freedom of movement 
across borders is a human right and a just means for redistributing wealth between the 
Global North and South.7
It is not difficult to see the parallels with the work of Peter Singer, the renowned animal 
rights activist and philosopher. While defending animal rights, Singer stated that ‘equality 
is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact’.8 Rather than describe an actual sameness 
among humans, equality is a prescription of how we should treat humans. He rejected 
the assumption that factual differences in ability between people (such as strength or 
intellect) justify differences in how we treat them. It is precisely the opposite, Singer 
argued: when we invoke the concept of equality, we make abstraction of people’s factual 
differences and, instead, emphasise their shared capacity for suffering, making them 
worthy of our consideration.
Obviously, Singer primarily sought to expose the arbitrariness of speciesm, or the routine 
differences drawn between animal and human life. But his argument for conceiving 
equality as a moral ideal (not as a descriptive reality) is also central to discourses that 
seek to counter refugee dehumanization. Statements such as ‘no human is illegal’ seek, 
for instance, to undo the everyday criminalization of refugees and to distract from the 
factual differences between refugees and people with citizenship status. And this, in an 
attempt to render refugees’ claims of sameness (more specifically, their entitlement to 
humane treatment) more acceptable.
The reproduction of neo-colonial power relations
Yet, despite their best intentions, humanitarian discourse is not without criticism. 
Like animalist representations, it locks refugees into a subject position. The emphasis 
on the moral obligation of receiving countries to treat their fellow man as human 
paradoxically reinforces neo-colonial hierarchies between the Global North and South. 
Receiving countries are presented as morally superior, who are called upon (as the result 
of their colonial legacies and burdens) to act responsibly. This notion of superiority 
in turn reinforces the regulatory authority of receiving countries whose right to 





























Refugees, at the other end of the spectrum, are scripted into a particular subordinate 
position that impairs their capacity to act and formulate demands vis-à-vis the 
international community. As recipients of aid, the recognition of their humanity (and 
therefore of their identity as right-bearing individuals) depends crucially on their 
willingness to accept and perform the role of victim. Refugees’ humanity is never ‘natural’ 
or unconditional. Instead, it depends on their acceptance of the ‘state of exception’ in 
which receiving countries place them. 
This insight is crucial: it shows how prevailing political discourses structure refugees’ 
experiences and testimonies in ways that cancel out and render invisible the diversity 
of their life experiences and talents. Clearly, receiving countries also lose out by failing 
to recognise and grasp the economic advantages of talented newcomers. Yet, the cost is 
strongest for refugees who find themselves perpetually locked in a trap of subordination. 
Always the subject of discourse, too rarely the maker.
1 Shivji, I.G. (2007). The Silences in the NGO Discourse: The role and future of NGOs in Africa. Nairobi: Fahamu.
2 Subba, D. (2014). Philosophy of Fearism. Life is Conducted, Directed and Controlled by the Fear. Bloomington: 
Xlibris.
3 Arendt, H. (1976/1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt.
4 Agamben, G. (1995). “We Refugees” [Trans. Rocke, M]. Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Literatures, 
49(2): 115.
5 Gatrell, P. (2013). The Making of the Modern Refugee. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5.
6 Holohan, S. (2019). ‘Some human’s rights: neocolonial discourses of otherness in the Mediterranean refugee 
crisis’. Open Library of Humanities, 5(1): 7.
7 Carens, J. (2013). The Ethics of Immigration. New York: Oxford University Press.
8 Singer, P. (1989). All animals are equal (pp. 148-162). In: T. Regan & P. Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human 

























































EU Migration Cooperation with 
Third Countries: A Flawed 
Approach 
by Philipp Stutz and Ahmad Wali Ahmad Yar
The European Union’s current approach to cooperation with third countries on 
migration and development is flawed. It is flawed due to the EU doing too little to take 
into account the demands of developing countries, as its cooperation with Afghanistan 
shows. Instead, its objective is to curb unwanted migration by transferring border 
control instruments to the countries of migrants’ origin or transit. However, while 
the EU approach is meant to reduce migration, it can actually achieve the opposite. 
A broader approach to migration governance that addresses the needs of people in these 
countries, enhances trade relations and development cooperation, or includes education 
programmes, would be more effective.
The case of EU-Afghan migration cooperation 
We look at the EU’s migration cooperation with Afghanistan to illustrate how the 
EU is interacting with countries of migrant origin and transit. The EU concluded the 
‘Joint Way Forward on migration issues’ ( JWF) with Afghanistan during the 2016 
Brussels Conference, which brought together representatives from 75 countries and 
26 international organisations to discuss the foreign aid and development plans for 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan was promised €5 billion extra and a reintegration package for 
returned Afghans. The EU’s main objective was to increase the number of returns. As 
it turned out, the JWF did not help either with development in Afghanistan or with an 




























One of the reasons why these agreements do not yield the expected results is the EU’s 
overarching focus on one area of migration governance – the return of irregular migrants 
and rejected asylum seekers. This is a questionable priority, since the percentage of 
undocumented Afghans who actually left Europe after receiving an order to do so was 
never higher than 21%, with the exception of 2016. Another reason why this policy is 
so flawed is due to the weak and ineffective coordination between the EU, the different 
Directorate-Generals, the EU member states and the people of developing countries. 
This leads to development projects that are often run directly by the EU without local 
expertise. Or they suffer from mismanagement of funds by corrupt government officials 
as, according to Transparency International, Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world. Crucial research is lacking on the root causes of migration from 
Afghanistan in order to find out what its people need. 
The EU’s focus on return
To facilitate returns, the EU concluded 18 Readmission Agreements, mostly with the 
EU’s neighbouring countries. Interestingly, the cooperation partners also commit to 
take back third country nationals from countries other than their own if those people 
had transited through their country. This is highly controversial, but the EU insists on 
it – even though it is rarely used. In addition to these agreements, more recently the 
EU concluded six informal arrangements that should boost return with countries that 
were previously unwilling to readmit people, including Afghanistan, while other partner 
countries are situated in Asia and Africa. Increasing the number of returns has not proved 
successful for the EU in recent years, either with Afghanistan, or beyond.1
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Since 2016, more than 85,000 Afghans have received an order to leave, with the EU 
returning almost 16,000 of them forcefully. This corresponds to a return rate of 11.6% 
for 2018 (2014: 3.9%), compared to an overall EU return rate of 35.6% in 2018 (36.3% 
in 2014). Only a small fraction of these people were returned by Frontex, whereas most 
have been sent back bilaterally without the involvement of the EU. Another 8,200 left 
the EU for Afghanistan voluntarily during the same time period. However, in practice 
the EU sends back about 50% of returned people on a voluntary basis – which raises 
questions about the EU’s focus on enforced return and migration management beyond 
Europe. Returnees are promised reintegration and social support, but critics say these 
promises are scarcely kept once people are back in their country of origin. Many only 
receive assistance on arriving, mostly provided in collaboration with the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR, but get no further reintegration 
support. Instead, return should be accompanied by offering short-term vocational, skills 
or language training, to give people the means to re-establish their lives in their country 
of origin. The difficulty for returnees to reintegrate in their country of origin is often 
underestimated because of the stigma of ‘people having failed to make it in Europe’. With 
such training the stigma could be vanquished. 
Was it worth it to convince the Afghan authorities with €5 billion of development 
assistance to accept its returnees? The return figures did not increase beyond the one-off 
figure of 2016 and were probably only higher in 2016 due to the high number of Afghans 
who had already arrived in the EU in 2015. The more people that arrive, the more 
people can be returned (also voluntarily), since their expectations about Europe may 
prove deceptive. The situation of returnees has not improved, given that unclear election 
outcomes, the withdrawal of the international community and the partial return of the 
Taliban have together created greater instability and more unfavourable conditions for 
return. Moreover, the EU, being so focused on return issues when concluding the JWF, 
had not installed safeguards for its funding. Several international watchdog organisations, 
like the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, report that billions 
in financial assistance were lost in widespread waste, lax oversight and endemic 
corruption. Criticism has also arisen regarding the ‘voluntariness’ of the voluntary return 
programmes, since migrants may feel pressured to return.2 Furthermore, the focus on 
people’s voluntary cooperation is a one-way street: returning people – especially if they 
are willing – is easier, but looking at family reunification in Europe, there is often little 




























Ignoring the needs in partner countries
The EU ignores what people in Afghanistan actually want and need, and mostly relies 
on short-term fixes by convincing politicians to sign agreements on return in exchange 
for financial support. This approach may have the opposite effect from what the EU 
intends. It can increase rather than decrease migration.3 It can create or exacerbate 
situations in which potential migrants have even greater incentive to migrate to Europe 
or just have to flee. In countries which are safer, opportunities for legal migration may 
reduce irregular migration,4 but with countries like Afghanistan, the hiring of seasonal 
workers and establishing circular migration schemes is, by contrast, unrealistic due to 
the lack of security. Regional cooperation would be a better solution, for instance by 
helping to improve the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where many 
Afghan refugees live. The EU could also resettle Afghan migrants from Pakistan instead 
of returning them there.
The situation in Afghanistan has been unstable and unsafe since the installation of 
the new government by the US in 2001. The EU and its member states have been 
active in investing in social development projects and providing financial, peace and 
security assistance, as they are the second biggest military and financial supporter of 
Afghanistan after the US. But when it comes to political developments, negotiations, or 
the withdrawal of troops, the EU has always relied upon the US to take the lead. After 
almost two years of negotiations between the US delegation and the Taliban, in February 
2020 an agreement was concluded that allowed the Taliban to form a new government 
with other Afghan parties. However, despite playing an important role in Afghanistan’s 
development since 2001, not one single EU delegation nor EU representative was 
involved in the negotiations. All of this reveals a pattern by which the EU follows the 
priorities of the US rather than coming up with its own evaluation of the situation and 
taking an independent position. In the elections of 2014 and 2019, the international 
community contested the results due to widespread fraud; on both occasions the EU had 
backed the US-favoured candidate who was accused of corruption. Besides, considering 
the ethnic and demographic complexities, favouring one candidate over another easily 
leads to civil unrest. 
Rather than contributing to these unfavourable situations for the Afghan population, 
international actors, especially the EU, should be focusing on working together with 
local politicians, political parties and authorities from different ethnic backgrounds. 




























funds. Instead of having to flee, Afghans could find jobs regionally if job matching were 
implemented or a domestic migration law developed. 
The EU’s objective in cooperating with third countries, especially with Afghanistan, is 
the return of persons and migration control, mostly by concluding agreements that do 
not take into account the social and economic realities present in a country. In so doing, 
international actors neglect what people need and ignore the fragility of the security 
situation, when they should be focusing on supporting democracy and human rights 
with broad long-term commitments. The one-sided EU engagement, together with 
mismanagement of funds, compels citizens of third countries to undertake the dangerous 
journey of illegal migration. 
Conducting research to figure out what people, local institutions and also migration 
organisations define as a social problem would be a first step in remedying this situation. 
This research would create an added value for EU migration cooperation – beneficial to 
the EU, partner countries and, of course, to potential migrants. But it would entail a shift 
in EU policy from focusing on control to engaging in actual development cooperation. 
In particular, the EU’s approach to potentially corrupt third country governments has 
proved ineffective, as it has not resulted in improved situations for people, nor has it 
eliminated the root causes of migration. The EU’s recent ‘New Pact on Migration and 
Asylum’ follows in the footsteps of previous policies – which gives us little hope that the 
EU is willing to end this flawed approach.
 
1 Stutz, P., & Trauner, F. (forthcoming). The EU’s ‘Return Rate’ with Third Countries: Why it is a Poor Indicator for 
Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU’s Readmission Policy.
2 Kuschminder, K. (2017). Taking Stock of Assisted Voluntary Return from Europe: Decision Making, Reintegration 
and Sustainable Return – Time for a paradigm shift. In: EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2017/31. Florence.
3 Adepoju, A., Van Noorloos, F., & Zoomers, A. (2010). Europe's Migration Agreements with Migrant-Sending 
Countries in the Global South. A critical review. International Migration, 48(3): 42-75.
4 Alcidi, C., Laurentsyeva, N., & Ahmad Yar, A. W. (2019). Legal Migration Pathways across the Mediterranean: 






























Not all Refugees Want to Come 
to Europe
Most Stay Close to Home 
by Israa Sadder and Hanna Schneider
In 2015, the arrival of around one million people on European shores and 1.2 million first-
time asylum applications in EU member states created the so-called ‘European refugee 
crisis’. For several weeks, large groups of refugees arriving by boat and walking through 
South Eastern Europe dominated public news and debates. For the European public, 
it seemed that the whole world was trying to seek shelter here. Years later, local media and 
policymakers still often portray Europe as the primary destination for people on the move. 
Yet, taking a look at the numbers of refugees displaced world-wide, we see that most 
refugees stay outside Europe. In 2015, 13.9 million refugees (out of a total number of 
16.1 million refugees world-wide) were hosted in developing countries. Thus, 
developing countries hosted 86% of the world’s total refugee population in 2015.1 
In 2018, the refugee population had risen to 20.4 million people. 84% of all refugees 
were still hosted in developing countries.2 Thus, the vast majority of refugees stays close 
to home – at least as long as they have enough resources and possibilities to live their 
lives in dignity and peace. These resources and possibilities include access to education, 
medical services and the labour market as well as a secure legal status. 
The situation of people fleeing the war in Syria merits particular attention, since Syrian 
refugees made up half of all refugees who arrived in Europe during the ‘European refugee 
crisis’.3 In fact, over half the Syrian population has been displaced since the beginning of 
the war in spring 2011. In the first two years, most people endured the conflict at home 
or within the Syrian borders, but since 2013 the number of Syrian refugees who crossed 
the borders in search of protection has been growing fast.4 However, it was only two years 
later that people started arriving in large numbers on European shores. Where did they 




























They went to where the majority of refugees goes – to their neighbouring countries. 
In the Syrian context, this means that people predominantly fled to Turkey, Jordan and 
Lebanon, where the refugee population has risen dramatically since 2013. As a result, 
Turkey has hosted the largest number of refugees world-wide for the last five consecutive 
years. Germany was the only European country figuring among the five main countries 
of asylum in 2018 (Pakistan, Uganda and Sudan ranked second to fourth). 
Importantly, this ranking does not consider the size of the host country and it includes 
mostly the large countries. When taking into account the host country’s national 
population, Lebanon comes top as it currently hosts the largest number of refugees 
relative to its population size: in 2018, one person in six in Lebanon was a refugee. Jordan 
ranked second, with one person in 14 being a refugee, and Turkey third in 2018, with 
one person in 22. That said, in 2015 many Syrian refugees decided to move on from the 
country they first sought protection in and tried to make the journey to Europe. What 
had triggered these decisions? 
Having fled their own country, refugees have to establish new lives – often with minimal 
resources and limited possibilities to fulfil basic needs. These include the need for safety 
as well as physiological needs such as food, water, warmth and rest. Once these basic 
needs are fulfilled, people seek to fulfil two other categories of needs: psychological 
needs and self-fulfillment. Psychological needs refer to ‘belongingness’ through 
emotional relationships with family and friends and a feeling of accomplishment. Self-
fulfilment needs refer to the possibility of achieving one’s full potential.5 
Without access to education, medical services and the labour market, it is very difficult 
for anyone to fulfil all listed categories of needs – and sometimes the denial of access to 
these services and opportunities makes it even impossible to secure one’s basic needs 
for safety and sustenance. While many people in the world are scrambling to fulfil their 
basic needs, refugees are often faced with even higher barriers to integration as well as an 
insecure legal status that is subject to change, depending on the political circumstances 
in the host country. 
In the years following the beginning of the war in Syria, the number of Syrian refugees 
in neighbouring countries rose exponentially. In the first years of the war, host countries 
such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon adopted a welcoming stance towards refugees. But 
their economies became heavily impacted by the Syria crisis and the influx of people. 




























of donor funds, the living situation for Syrian refugees has become increasingly difficult 
(albeit to different extents) in their first countries of asylum. Since the prospects of 
returning to Syria were – and still are – very slim in 2015, many refugees decided to make 
the dangerous journey to Europe because they could not see any future for themselves 
and their families in a neighbouring country. 
Still, one should keep in mind that the European Union struggled in 2015 to handle 
1.2 million first-time asylum applications (with Germany and Sweden receiving almost 
50% of all asylum applications). In the same year, Turkey alone was hosting 2.5 million 
refugees in its territory. This also constituted an increase of 900,000 refugees compared 
to 2014, which had to be managed by one country alone. In the European Union, 
28 member states could have shared the financial burden between them. Instead, no EU 
member state wanted to be the first (and therefore presumably the only) one to receive 
refugees in its territory, for fear of creating a ‘pull factor’: according to this logic, opening 
the doors to some refugees would attract many more to try their luck as well. 
A common tactic of EU member states was – and still is – to call for a European solution 
instead of national initiatives (often coupled with the action of doubling the numbers 
of their own border guards). Unsurprisingly, such appeals generally lead nowhere. 
The ‘burden’ of receiving and hosting refugees is yet again pushed onto those countries 
who find themselves geographically nearest to the area of conflict. 
This perception that refugees are, and forever will be, a burden on host countries is 
a strong driver of deterrence. But this perception fails to recognise the potential that 
refugees bring with them: since demographics in Europe are changing and societies are 
ageing, new labour forces are needed in many EU member states. As the example of 
Germany shows, refugees may fill at least some of those gaps.6 Maybe not in a few weeks 
or months after their arrival in a new host country – and sometimes not even after a few 
years – but eventually many refugees are able to contribute to the prosperity of their 
new host country. Although this should not be the declared reason for accepting people 
who have fled war and persecution in the first place, it could change the perception of 
refugees as being a burden on a host country in the long run. 
Of course, countries which currently host the majority of the world’s refugees do not have 
time to wait for the long run. Instead, governments that are faced with rising public debt, 
conflict near their borders as well as extreme refugee numbers (as is the case in Lebanon) 




























from the labour market, often make it impossible for refugees to provide for themselves 
and to contribute to their host countries. 
This creates a vicious circle where refugees are not allowed to integrate. They are 
thus forced to rely on assistance from their host society, which in turn leads to more 
deterrence instead of integration. This forces refugees to move on to different countries 
(if at all possible), where once again they are not allowed to integrate. 
To break this vicious circle of short-sighted solutions, it is important that countries which 
are not hosting a comparatively high number of refugees – as is the case for almost all 
EU member states – should provide adequate (financial) assistance to the current major 
refugee-hosting countries. This could literally buy time for host countries to find long-
term solutions for their refugee populations. It cannot be denied that refugees will need 
financial assistance in the beginning. They will also need time to become acquainted 
with a new culture and language, and to find employment or establish a new business. 
But if there are no barriers to education or the labour market, they will be able to fulfil 
their own needs. And if they have access to medical services and a secure legal status, 
they will be able to take sustainable long-term decisions and thereby contribute to the 
prosperity of their host country.
1 UNHCR. (2016). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2015. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/
statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html
2 UNHCR. (2019a). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2018. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/
globaltrends2018/
3 UNHCR. (2016). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2015. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/
statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html
4 UNHCR. (2019b). Syria Regional Refugee Response. Retrieved October 15, 2019, from https://data2.unhcr.org/
en/situations/syria
5 Maslow, A. H. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4), 370-396.
6 Deutsche Welle. (2019). Germany: Refugees integrated into labor market “quicker than expected.” Retrieved 





























COVID-19: Political Will is 
Needed to Safeguard the EU’s 
Asylum Policy
by Florian Trauner
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, EU member states differ more and more in how they 
receive and deal with asylum seekers. This threatens the common European asylum 
policy, which has been an EU objective for the last twenty years. The EU and its member 
states need strong political will to prevent the system from failing and to maintain the 
right of asylum across the European Union. 
When the coronavirus arrived in Europe, not all EU member states reacted in the same 
way. Many states have maintained their asylum standards. A few have even increased the 
rights of asylum seekers. A case in point is Portugal, which has provided asylum seekers 
(and other migrants) with temporary access to citizenship rights. This allows them to 
use the country’s healthcare facilities in about the same way as the native Portuguese 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
More restrictive practices have become more frequent. This starts with how migrants 
seeking international protection are now allowed to enter Europe. Given strict border 
controls and restrictive visa practices, it was already very difficult for refugees to enter 
the EU legally. One exception has been the resettlement programmes often run by the 
UN’s Refugee Agency (UNHCR). They allowed a number of refugees (such as Syrians 
having fled to Turkey or Jordan) to come into the EU in a regular and controlled manner. 
Once the coronavirus spread, these operations were suspended. 
Border controls have also been tightened for migrants arriving in a spontaneous and 
undocumented way. Italy and Greece have been the countries receiving most of these 
migrants. In April 2020, Italy opted to take the unprecedented decision to declare its own 




























with undocumented migrants from landing. The Greek-Turkish border has been sealed 
against Syrian refugees and other migrants since late February 2020. At that moment, 
the Turkish President had urged them to leave Turkey and go to the EU. Among the 
measures taken by Greece was a temporary suspension of applications for asylum. 
Consequently, the number of asylum applications in the EU has been heading towards 
a record low. In March 2020, 18,515 new asylum applications have been counted in the 
EU. This is less than one third compared to the same month a year earlier.2 
Greece and Italy have long held particular responsibilities. According to EU’s Dublin 
system for asylum seekers, the first EU member state that enters into contact with the 
migrant is responsible for his or her asylum application. This system puts considerable 
pressure on the asylum systems of Greece and Italy as the two key EU border states. In 
early 2020, more than 38,000 migrants found themselves in overcrowded refugee camps 
on Greek islands. They were not able to practise either self-isolation or social distancing. 
A group of seven member states, including Germany and France, agreed to relocate 1,600 
vulnerable migrants, mostly children, from these places.3 Other member states, however, 
refrained from cooperating. Their main concern was that a relocation would create a ‘pull 
factor’ for other migrants to cross the Aegean Sea towards Greece. Although beneficial 
for the lucky individuals concerned, such relocation would also fall short of emptying 
the camps and reducing the risk for the remaining migrants.
An uneven distribution of asylum seekers across the EU has already posed a central 
challenge for many years. In 2019, one in four asylum seekers arriving in the EU had 
applied in Germany. France, Spain, Greece and Italy closely followed while many other 
member states, notably in Central and Eastern Europe, had very low numbers. Slovakia 
ranked lowest with 39 applicants per one million population, Hungary had a ratio of 48.4 
States with higher numbers of asylum seekers have long called for greater solidarity from 
their EU partners – yet often in vain. 
A few EU member states may be using the COVID-19 pandemic as an argument for 
diluting the right of asylum more permanently. In March 2020, Hungary announced 
an ‘indefinite’ entry stop for migrants based on the argument that there would be ‘a 
clear link between illegal migration and the coronavirus outbreak’.5 Already before the 
pandemic, it was very difficult to get access to asylum in Hungary. In the wake of the 
migration crisis of 2015 and 2016, the country has installed a 175 km steel and barbed 




























to asylum procedures. Due to COVID-19, other countries have also tightened up their 
border controls and closed down administrations in charge of asylum procedures. A total 
of 17 Schengen states have reintroduced internal border controls and tightly restricted 
movements. 
Looking back at how states reacted in history to different pandemics reveal that borders 
tend to remain closed for a relatively long period of time.6 The reduced access to asylum 
rights and the suspension of the Dublin system both risk to become semi-permanent. 
Greece, Italy and other EU border states may find it convenient to refer to health 
concerns when refusing to accept Dublin transfers from northern member states. These 
transfers concern migrants who have left the EU’s border states and gone further north. 
The responsibility for dealing with asylum seekers changes after six months. This implies 
that the state in which they are currently living takes over responsibility from the state in 
which they first arrived. In plain language, most asylum seekers who recently arrived in 
Belgium, the Netherlands or Germany can no longer be sent back to Italy or other border 
countries once the coronavirus triggered lockdowns. Up to 6,000 asylum cases are likely 
to be affected by this shift of responsibility in the first months after the outbreak of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.7 
The EU needs to pay more attention to what is happening in the field of asylum. If 
EU member states make it impossible for persecuted people to find shelter in the 
continent, Europe will lose its credibility as a promoter of human rights abroad and at 
home. The right of asylum is a central human right. It implies that persons persecuted 
in their home countries for reasons such as race, religion or political opinion can find 
shelter in another state. It is possible to safeguard and even to improve the common 
European asylum system. The European Commission gave a list of practical tips on how 
to conduct asylum procedures during a pandemic. For instance, authorities may allow 
the lodging of asylum applications online and conduct virtual interviews with migrants. 
The institution has also announced a new proposal on how to reform the Dublin rules 
and ensure a fairer and more harmonised asylum system. Member states need to be 
incentivized to work together to ensure a fair distribution and common standards. New 
health measures are now likely to be added to any reform of the EU’s asylum system. 
They could include mandatory vaccinations, health screenings and checks, possibly even 
standard quarantines. 
The COVID-19 pandemic will leave its mark on European societies. The way we deal 




























1 The Guardian (2020). Italy declares its own ports ‘unsafe’ to stop migrants arriving, 8 April 2020.
2 Eurostat (2020). Asylum and first-time asylum applicants – monthly data, Luxembourg (accessed 23 April 2020).
3 See Wallis, E. (2020). Who will be on the list of 1,600 refugees relocated from Greece? InfoMigrants.net (accessed 
23 April 2020). 
4 Eurostat (2020). Asylum in EU Member States. Press Release 48/2020, 20 March 2020. 
5 See Daily News Hungary (2020). Orbán: There was a clear link between illegal migration and the coronavirus, 
11 March 2020. 
6 See Politico.com (2020). Pandemics Close Borders – And Keep them Close, 25 March 2020. 
7 European Commission (2020). Covid-19 – Guidance on the implementation of relevant EU provisions in the area 
of asylum and return procedures and on resettlement, C/2020/2516, Brussels. 
those seeking to arrive. With good will, they will ensure the safety of both the newcomers 
and the rest of the society. Let us ensure that health concerns will not become the pretext 




















































































Short-Sighted Policies Drive 
Young EU Migrants into 
Precarious Jobs 
by Anna Simola
Following its political objective to improve Europe’s competitiveness and productivity, 
the European Union (EU) encourages young people to be mobile. Intra-EU mobility 
is viewed as an excellent means for enhancing their ‘employability’. Brussels, which 
promotes itself as the Capital of Europe, is one of the key destinations for European-
minded young professionals. They typically move there in search of international job 
opportunities. However, the real situations young EU migrants face in Brussels can 
differ radically from their expectations. For example, Brussels’ attractiveness produces 
intense competition for qualified jobs, which exposes young migrants to unemployment 
and precarious conditions of work. Furthermore, the Belgian state is currently targeting 
EU migrants with policies seeking to restrict their access to legal residence and welfare 
rights. These policies particularly affect unemployed migrants, as well as those in 
insecure, temporary and irregular jobs.1 These policies, I argue, are in many ways short-
sighted. Perhaps unintentionally, their inevitable outcome is the emergence of a growing 
group of EU citizens living in Belgium with insecure legal status and/or without access 
to social protection. Not only is this likely to have adverse effects on the lives of young 
EU migrants in precarious work positions, it is also prone to increase the supply of EU 
migrant workers ready to work under precarious conditions, therefore undermining the 
labour conditions in the market as a whole.2 
The popularity of nationalist and xenophobic parties has brought the control of 
migration into the mainstream of Belgian politics.3 Hence, following a more general 
trend in various EU countries, the Belgian state has increasingly sought to select the 
‘freely-moving’ EU citizens it wants to receive. To this end, Belgium has made full use 
of the vagueness of the EU legal framework: It has restricted the conditions for social 




























of EU citizens to legal residence as a means of stopping them from claiming social 
protection. In 2011, a system of data exchange was established between the social 
security administration and the Belgian immigration office. Since then, their officers 
have issued orders to an unprecedented number of EU citizens who had lost their jobs 
and/or received social assistance to leave the Belgian territory.4 At the same time, the 
initial conditions laid down for residence registration have also become stricter. This 
makes it difficult for EU migrants to obtain a registration certificate with a national 
registry number without proof of continuous employment.5
I conducted interviews with young university-educated EU migrants and analyzed their 
experiences in the context of these policies. The participants of the study had arrived in 
Brussels from southern Europe or the Nordic countries with the intention to work, but 
experienced periods of unemployment at some point of their stay. None of them was 
inactive, but even when not employed, they were all engaged in different types of unpaid 
work and training while feverishly searching for paid employment. Moreover, they all had 
experiences of precarious jobs, ranging from short-term projects, internships, temporary 
agency work and involuntary self-employment in highly-skilled sectors, to low-paid, 
‘on-call’ and often informal work in sectors such as food, hospitality and care. Their work 
contracts and working conditions were characterized by insecurity, temporariness and 
low (or no) pay, which made it very difficult for them to establish a livelihood in Brussels. 
This financial insecurity was further reinforced by their exclusion from social protection 
in Belgium. What is more, many of them had not been able to register as residents in the 
municipalities of Brussels, as their employment histories were not considered adequate 
to provide grounds for long-term residence in the country. 
One example is the story of Paula, from Spain, who had come to Brussels through 
the Erasmus student exchange programme for the last year of her studies. After her 
graduation, she saw no professional prospects in her field in Spain and decided to stay 
and search for work in Belgium. In the interview she described the intimidating manner 
in which she had been treated when dealing with the local authorities in Brussels. She had 
applied for the professional insertion benefit meant to buffer the initial job search period 
of recent Belgian graduates in a similar situation. However, as Paula had not graduated 
from a Belgian university, the benefit was not granted to her. Instead, the officer handling 
her case called her a ‘social parasite’. Afterwards, she accepted several parallel short-term 
and low-paid jobs to survive. Despite the fact that she was effectively working, when she 




























‘I never had a contract longer than three months and that was not good 
enough. … they gave me a paper saying, “If by this and this date you 
haven’t found work, [that means] expulsion from the Belgian territory.” 
And then I didn’t return.’ 
Paula’s story shows how the Belgian practice of expelling citizens has pushed young EU 
migrants into marginal and even ‘illegal’ positions. Indeed, an outstanding feature of this 
policy and its bureaucratic implementation has been its inexplicit, insidious and even 
randomized nature. In fact, the Belgian government has not offered information to the 
general public or to the persons directly affected regarding the exact grounds on which the 
expulsion orders are issued or their legal or economic consequences.6 In addition to the 
insufficiency of the information provided, the randomized bureaucratic implementation 
of the policy has led to a general confusion and the circulation of rumours about other 
EU migrants’ experiences. The consequences of the insecurity produced are reported 
in the interviews: many of the participants had considered it safer not to register their 
residence or, if they had nevertheless started the registration process, not to make claims 
for social protection entitlements. They were thus living and working in the country 
outside all the formal structures and protections of the state. 
The interviews further reveal some of the effects of the reinforced insecurity on young 
migrant workers’ lives, their careers and their wellbeing. Often it critically increased 
their dependency on employers. They not only relied on them for their income, but 
sometimes also for their legal status. This limited their room for manoeuvre in the 
competitive labour market and hampered their chances of obtaining better jobs and 
work contracts.7 Depending on the alternative resources within their reach, as well as the 
work opportunities available for them outside Belgium, some of them decided to leave 
while others stayed, despite the hardship they faced.8
Alicia, another young Spaniard, had not found professional paid work after the initial 
internship that had brought her to Brussels. Over several years, she combined unpaid 
professional work to develop her ‘employability’ with low-paid ‘survival jobs’ in 
restaurants, shops and private homes. Her story illustrates how financial insecurity can 




























‘The truth is that I don’t know anything about my rights here … 
I know from other people that I shouldn’t get into bureaucratic hurdles 
… Even though I feel very attached to this city... I don’t have money to 
live for the next month or the one that follows… Or I need to do work that 
takes away my time and energy and has no prospects, only to continue 
living here. … But I’ve got to the point where I cannot continue ... I’ve 
decided I will return to Spain at the end of the month ... because I need to 
rest ... I want to invest in my vocation but here I can’t because I’m always 
depending on money and on time and I have neither.’
To be sure, the effects of these policies that reinforce the insecurity of precarious EU 
migrants are not limited to inactive ‘welfare tourists’ whose alleged prevalence has been at 
the heart of the public and political calls for a more stringent control over EU migration. 
Nor are they limited to the lives of the migrants who become subject to these policies 
when seeking to establish their professional careers in Belgium. Arguably, they also 
increase the employers’ opportunities of finding qualified workers who are ready to work 
under poor conditions. This way they encourage increasingly precarious employment 
practices at both ends, top and bottom, of the Brussels labour market, which is far from 
the original objective of these policies. It also shows up the political negligence on the 
part of the EU in allowing its member states to implement policies that so clearly conflict 
with its aim to foster a genuinely intra-European labour market where all EU citizens can 
compete on an equal footing. 
 
1 O’Brien, C., Spaventa, E., & De Coninck, J. (2015). The concept of worker under article 45 TFEU and certain non-
standard forms of employment, Brussels: European Commission. 
2 Simola, A. (2018). Lost in administration: (Re)producing precarious citizenship for young university-educated 
intra-EU migrants in Brussels. Work, Employment and Society, 32(3): 458-474.
3 Gsir S., Lafleur, J-M., & Stanek, M. (2016). Migration policy reforms in the context of economic and political 
crises: the case of Belgium. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42(10): 1651-1669.
4 Lafleur, J-M., & Stanek, M. (2016). Restrictions on access to social protection by new Southern European 
migrants in Belgium. In: J.M. Lafleur & M. Stanek (eds.), South-North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis. 
Basel: Springer: 99–121. 
5 Simola, A. (2020). EU citizenship as precarious status for precarious workers: Implications of national 
policies restricting EU citizens’ rights for young university-educated EU migrants in Brussels. In: S. Mantu, 





























6 Simola, A. (2018). Lost in administration: (Re)producing precarious citizenship for young university-educated 
intra-EU migrants in Brussels. Work, Employment and Society, 32(3): 458-474.
7 Simola, A. (2018). Lost in administration: (Re)producing precarious citizenship for young university-educated 
intra-EU migrants in Brussels. Work, Employment and Society, 32(3): 458-474.
8 Simola, A., & Wrede S. (2020). Young EU migrant citizens’ access to financial independence in conditions of 




























Transit Migration: Brussels Does 
it Better
by Nette Nöstlinger and Florian Trauner
‘Transit migration’ (also seen as ‘transmigration’) is the term used to describe the 
situation where migrants get marooned in one European Union (EU) member state 
while seeking to reach another member state. This situation is governed by EU asylum 
law. According to the EU’s Dublin regime,1 a migrant is allowed to submit only one 
asylum application for entry into the EU, and this is usually done inside the first EU 
country of entry, most often Greece or Italy. Most migrants do not want to – or simply 
cannot – stay in either of these countries, so they move onwards. Many of them find 
themselves stranded in Brussels while hoping to cross over to the United Kingdom 
(UK), their final destination. 
Transit migration poses a challenge to all Europe, yet no European solution is on the 
horizon. Since 2015 the city and the people of the Brussels Capital Region have been 
proactive, adopting a robust approach that is far more hands-on and constructive than 
that of the Belgian federal government. The Brussels region therefore deserves not only 
to have a bigger say on transit migrants but also to receive more substantial financial and 
logistical support. 
Transit migrants in Brussels
Greece and Italy have been struggling since 2015 with overcrowded reception centres 
and painfully slow asylum procedures amidst fierce public controversies. This chaotic 
situation has prompted many asylum seekers to abandon these two Southern EU 
‘frontier states’ even if such a move is prohibited by the Dublin rules. The UK is a 
particularly attractive destination for many migrants arriving from outside European 
because its official language is English, the presence of diaspora communities, and it 




























However, given that the UK is now applying strict entry controls, many migrants trying 
to get to the UK (often with the help of smuggling networks) will end up as transit 
migrants in places such as Brussels. 
The situation in Brussels intensified after France’s dismantling of the ‘Calais Jungle’ in 
October 2016. Sheltering up to 3000 migrants, this encampment in the North of France 
had served as a main springboard for transit migrants seeking to enter the UK. Most 
Jungle migrants were relocated within France, yet its clearance also prompted many of 
them to view Brussels as an alternative. 400-500 migrants turned up and started sleeping 
in the Maximilian Park in Brussels, with numbers going up to 700-800 in later years.2 
At the outset, the Belgian federal government made no undertaking to protect or inform 
these migrants, arguing that, since they had not submitted their asylum application 
within Belgian borders, they were in theory ‘unknown’ to the Belgian State.
The municipal elections in 2018 caused ‘transit migration’ to become a hot topic 
of political debate, despite the fact that it falls within the competence of the federal 
government. Several mayors complained about the presence of transit migrants tucked 
away in harbours and on railway car parks in their communal territories. There were 
strident calls from the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) led by Theo Francken, then State 
Secretary for Asylum and Migration. His party portrayed migrants – particularly asylum 
seekers – as a cultural and economic menace posing a security threat to the Belgian 
welfare state and society, especially if they happened to be ‘Muslim and male’.3 
Francken and Jan Jambon (N-VA), who was then the federal interior minister, put 
together a ‘9-point plan to tackle transit migration’. They proposed a number of repressive 
objectives for controlling migration.4 The police implemented a range of actions 
designed to halt ‘illegal transit movements’. In May 2018, during one of these actions, 
a two-year-old Kurdish girl named Mawda was shot dead, caught in the crossfire after 
police had opened fire on a van carrying migrants. Eleven people were later charged with 
human smuggling and participation in a criminal organisation. However, the criminal 
trial was criticised as a ‘trial against solidarity’,5 since four of the accused were Belgian 
citizens who had offered housing to transit migrants, while the seven others were 
undocumented migrants trying to reach the UK. This trial highlighted the ambiguous 
approach adopted by the Belgian federal government: first, refuse to acknowledge 
the presence of transit migrants in Belgium, then get rid of them via security-oriented 




























Civil society organisations lost no time in taking up their positions at the opposite ends 
of the political response spectrum. Immediately after 2015, two civil society NGOs 
took the lead in providing practical support for this group of migrants: the ‘Citizens 
Platform for Refugee Support’ and the ‘HUB Humanitaire’. 
Since 2017, the Citizens Platform has been creating links between undocumented 
migrants and residents in and around Brussels who offer to host these migrants for 
one or more nights. One year later, the same NGO opened its Porte d’Ulysse shelter 
which provides temporary accommodation for up to 350 people. By May 2019, some 
8000 Brussels residents and smaller numbers in Flanders and Wallonia had each hosted 
a transit migrant for at least one night. 4000 volunteers had offered other forms of 
assistance. Over 50,000 people had followed the citizens’ platform actions via social 
media such as Facebook. 
The second key NGO is the HUB Humanitaire, initially based at the Brussels North 
rail station and now established in a building at the Port of Brussels. Set up in October 
2017 as a joint initiative of several established organisations, including Doctors without 
Borders and the Red Cross,6 the HUB Humanitaire brings together the expertise of 
different civil society actors to meet specific migrant needs. The NGO provides medical 
services (with particular emphasis on mental health), collects and hands out clothing, 
and helps trace family members lost during the long migratory trek. Where possible, 
the Hub helps migrants to contact their families back home and provides practical help 
with resolving social and legal issues (e.g. navigating Belgium’s asylum procedures). 
Strong relationships have been forged between these civil society NGOs and politicians 
at local and regional level. The Brussels Region was instrumental in helping the NGOs to 
set up the HUB Humanitaire and the Porte d’Ulysse shelter by providing financial grants 
and logistical assistance. In contrast, the Federal government’s repressive approach has 
met increasing opposition in and around Brussels and has been challenged by local 
politicians. One example of this was the campaign against search warrants. Municipal 
officials in Brussels and Wallonia pressed their local politicians to condemn the federal 
law that allowed house searches of the homes of ordinary citizens suspected of hosting 
undocumented migrants. (In Flanders, however, this campaign faltered due to the absence 
of support from any municipality.) Thanks to Belgium’s federal set-up, the Brussels Region 
was able to act independently on this issue. As it holds substantial autonomy at regional 




























In fact, it has already done so by including humanitarian assistance towards transit 
migrants in its agenda for helping homeless people.7
Urban empowerment: a humanist approach
In Europe and the US, repressive migration policies put forward at federal level often 
find resistance at local and urban community level. This comes as no surprise. Federal 
politicians often feel pressure from their electorates, who are assumed to oppose further 
migration. This leads them to bring in repressive measures for controlling ‘irregular’ 
migration. At local level, however, residents get to know undocumented migrants, making 
their acquaintance through their children going to the same school, or living in the same 
neighbourhoods. As a result, daily interactions turn the abstract concept of ‘migrant’ into 
real people who are not just migrants but also ‘individuals’ whom local people care about. 
Several cities in Europe and the US have proactively positioned themselves against the 
repressive approach of their national governments. The underlying idea is that irregular 
migration – in whatever form – will not disappear quickly, but will become entrenched 
in today’s immigration systems. Providing dignified living conditions and according 
basic rights to migrants not only benefits the migrants themselves but also strengthens 
social ties within the community.
All the above holds true for transit migration in Brussels too. A long-lasting solution 
can only be possible if the EU Dublin rules for migration are reformed. Although the 
European Commission has proposed a permanent relocation mechanism for 
distributing asylum seekers more fairly across Europe, there is stalemate in the 
negotiations at EU level. Given the absence of a pan-European solution, another way for-
ward is to empower the local level. Here the Brussels Region has already taken important 
steps. In 2020, the Brussels government granted €2,785,000 to the NGO ‘Bxl Refugees’ 
and €1,090,000 to ‘Doctors of the World’. 
Brussels can do even more. But as long as migration is a federal competence, 
the region will need to obtain more support from the Belgian federal government and 
authorities. This could be done in three ways. First, the Brussels region should receive 
financial compensation for its efforts. Second, migrants should be provided with 
correct and objective information about procedures such as voluntary return, relocation 




























understand. According to MYRIA, the Belgian Federal Migration Centre, ‘public 
authorities cannot hide behind NGOs and citizens’ initiatives when it comes to their obligations 
to protect fundamental rights.’8 Third, federal officials are urged to share more information 
from the Eurodac database (containing fingerprints of asylum seekers) with regional 
officials. 
Many transit migrants are genuinely afraid of the EU Dublin rules. All too often, it is 
difficult to understand the reasons underpinning Belgian federal government decisions 
to apply or to waive the Dublin rules. As a result, a transit migrant is forced to dwell in 
uncertainty whether or not he or she will be allowed to stay or will be forced to return 
to another EU member state. It is unacceptable that transit migrants should find them-
selves incarcerated, through no fault of their own, in a refugee shelter somewhere in the 
middle of Belgium for months or even years, only to be repatriated to Athens or Rome 
and forced to start over. 
Transparency and proactive engagement on the part of the authorities will lead to trust. 
This trust will empower transit migrants to make informed decisions on how to end their 
uncertainty and take control of their lives.  
1 See Regulation (EU) 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 (referred to as Dublin-III-Regulation).
2 Number estimated by ‘The Citizens Platform for Refugee Support’ (oral communication)
3 De Cleen, B., Zienkowski, J., Smets, K., Dekie, A., & Vandevoordt, R. (2017). Constructing the ‘refugee crisis’ 
in Flanders. Continuities and adaptations of discourses on asylum and migration (pp. 59-78). In: M. Barlai, B. 
Fähnrich, C. Griessler, & M. Rhomberg (eds.), The migrant crisis: European perspectives and national discourses. 
Berlin: LIT Verlag.  
4 Bruggeman, F. (2018, September 10). Francken en Jambon stellen 9-puntenplan voor in aanpak van trans-
migratie: dit zijn de maatregelen. VRT NWS.
5 MYRIA (2018, November 7). Start van een beladen proces over mensensmokkel (persbericht). Retrieved from 
https://www.myria.be/nl/publicaties/start-van-een-beladen-proces-over- mensensmokkel-persbericht
6 The full list is: Doctors Without Borders (MSF), the Red Cross, the Citizens Platform for Refugee Support and 
Doctors of the World
7 See in more detail Nöstlinger, A. (2019). Where is the Belgian state? The (non-)occurrence of interaction on the 
issue of transit migration in Brussels, (MA Thesis, VUB, Brussels).






























Towards a Society that Heals
by Lena Swinnen, Omar N Cham, Geertrui Serneels
A growing number of human rights groups highlight the extensive psychological trauma 
migrants and refugees undergo as a result of their arduous journey to reach Europe. 
It is not unusual for this journey to be haunted by experiences such as (sexual) violence, 
torture and imprisonment or abduction by armed militias. As a result, many newcomers1 
suffer from mental illnesses such as post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety or depression. 
When this trauma is left untreated, it may influence the migration and acculturation 
process, leaving newcomers in a vicious circle of struggling for survival. 
Research shows that lengthy asylum procedures and stays in centres are detrimental 
to mental health.2 This is something we see daily in our clinical practice. Many 
trauma patients with stories of bombing, human trafficking and persecution are more 
concerned, however, with not being able to work because they do not yet have full 
mastery of the language, or having to share a one-bedroom apartment with seven people, 
or with loneliness, than they are with the horrors they have experienced in their past. 
The pressures of migration and acculturation often constitute a more acute cause of 
stress than personal traumatic experiences.
For us as trauma therapists, it is clear that many newcomers deal with vulnerabilities 
that cannot be addressed by therapists alone. Migration and acculturation must not be 
considered per se as causing mental illness needing therapy in the first instance. This 
kind of stress can most effectively be alleviated by the host society through social and 
healthcare services. Newcomers can be supported, for instance, through establishing 
social networks that foster integration. An integration-centred approach considers 
connectedness with the host society as a foundation of mental wellbeing. By not 
responding adequately to the issues concerning a newcomer’s place in society, we fail 




























Upon arrival in Europe, newcomers in need of psychological support are confronted 
with many obstacles. These obstacles include a lack of basic security, also linguistic, 
cultural and financial barriers, insecurities regarding asylum procedures and a lack of 
the right expertise within the regular services for dealing with the specific problems that 
migrants face. Taboos and misconceptions about mental illness and therapy live on in 
many cultures. Lack of awareness about mental health and access to different health care 
services can prevent newcomers from finding their feet in the host society and becoming 
mentally healthy too. 
This is illustrated by Bakary’s story. Currently living and studying in Brussels, he 
talks about his childhood friend who, like many young Gambians, came to Europe to 
continue his education. His friend travelled through Libya, where every day new stories 
of atrocities committed against migrants come to light. Given the traumatic nature of the 
journey, the absence of adequate mental health care after arrival, and the long duration 
of the asylum procedure, Bakary says his friend is not doing well. He experiences angry 
outbursts, flashbacks, hyper-arousal and lack of concentration. He is nervous and 
forgetful. All of these constitute signs of post-traumatic stress disorder. What is more, 
Bakary says, the situation of his childhood friend is deteriorating as he also has other 
problems, such as not being able to secure employment due to his legal status. Without 
any decent income, it is also hard to find adequate housing. In fact, Bakary’s friend 
has no means for making plans for his future, or for living in a safe and secure manner. 
This prevents him from fostering new hope that could enable him to cope with the 
difficulties of acculturation. These aspects are just as detrimental to his psychological 
health. Bakary is convinced that his friend does not have access to mental health care 
because of his legal status, although actually he is entitled. This is an example of how 
newcomers are prevented from receiving proper treatment by not being made aware of 
their rights.
In order to care for the mental health of people arriving in our countries, the stress 
and difficulties related to the migration and acculturation process should not be 
individualized but rather be treated at their source, in other words, within society. Both 
migration and acculturation are psychologically intense. The acculturation process 
means that people have to start rebuilding their lives in a new environment in which 
they do not understand the language or the cultural code. Migration means leaving 
behind everything and everyone you know. Hence, it entails a major mourning process: 




























While complex or frozen grieving does require treatment, a normal mourning process 
should not be treated therapeutically, as this runs the risk of leaving the person worse off 
than if there had been no therapy. First, a mourning person needs people who encourage 
him or her to continue daily life. The role of professionals who foster integration is of 
primordial importance in this respect: they have a privileged (because for them practically 
and culturally more natural) working relationship with newcomers. Integration fostering 
support not only helps reduce the migration and acculturation stress, but also allows for 
early detection of post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental illness and to treat this 
effectively in the context of specialized trauma therapy. We cannot expect psychotherapy 
to solve newcomers’ stress levels and despair due to bad housing and lack of security. 
Instead, we as trauma therapists need newcomers to hope and believe in a new future so 
they can find the courage in therapy to face their background war traumas. 
In this respect, we need to educate both professionals and newcomers about mental health 
in a culturally diverse community. Trauma therapists should work broadly, involving 
and mobilizing the social systems in which newcomers find themselves. In Belgium, 
organisations such as the non-profit organisation Solentra actively work and advocate 
for access for newcomers to qualitative mental health care provided (using interpreters) 
in their native language, regardless of their legal status. New approaches such as the 
PACCT methodology3 emphasize cooperation between primary social and integration 
services on the one hand, and specialised mental health care services on the other hand. 
This creates the conditions necessary for newcomers’ wellbeing. By not recognizing the 
problems newcomers face upon arrival in Europe as a societal responsibility, we fail to 
acknowledge our active role in their mental health and wellbeing and deny them a fair 
chance to start rebuilding their life.
If the EU were to recognize its active role as a society in newcomers’ wellbeing, it would 
be able to seize the opportunity to foster integration on a far more profound level. 
The dominant societal discourse we often hear is not one of hope but rather of alarmist 
views claiming that we cannot carry the burden newcomers put on our social security 
systems, or that Europe will not survive but disintegrate. Newcomers, on the other 
hand, show great resilience in their hope as well as in their determination to rebuild their 
lives after the hardships they have endured. The very definition of the word ‘refugee’ 
embodies the idea of hope: if you do not trust that it will be better or safer somewhere 




























Could Europe perhaps learn from refugees? By reacting to the refugee crises with 
a stronger focus on the opportunity and the human potential that newcomers bring? 
This means choosing to be a society that heals instead of a society that harms the 
people seeking safety inside our borders, to be a society that fosters hope and believes 
in humanization. If connectedness is the basis of mental wellbeing, how can newcomers 
re-establish their faith and hope in others within the framework of trauma therapy when 
the dominant societal rhetoric regarding newcomers deprives them of such hope and 
fails to offer them a safe space to rebuild their lives? Offering trauma therapy is vital, 
considering what newcomers have endured in their country of origin and during their 
migration journey. Such therapy can only be truly successful, however, if we can offer 
them the opposite of what they were running from: a welcoming and stable basis to start 
anew. 
1 We define ‘newcomers’ as both refugees and migrants (once arrived in country of destination), as both groups 
face trauma and similar migration and acculturation stress effects.
2 Laban, C.J., Hajo, B.P.E., Gernaat, M.D., Komproe, I.H., van der Tweel, I., & De Jongh, J.T. (2005). Postmigration 
Living Problems and Common Psychiatric Disorders in Iraqi Asylum Seekers in the Netherlands. The Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease, 192(12): 825-832.
3 The PACCT methodology (Psychiatry Assisting the Cultural diverse Community in creating healing Ties) is a 
stepped care model to effectively address war trauma and to ensure newcomers’ human right to accessible, 
effective and qualitative mental healthcare (Serneels et al., 2017). On the one hand, this model consists of 
an outreaching, capacity building program that mobilizes natural stakeholders, and prevents or detects 
mental health problems early on in order to alleviate psychosocial suffering, help bridge the gap with the new 
society, and foster resilience. On the other hand, it offers highly specialized transcultural consultations with an 
interpreter and with awareness for the social, legal and cultural context.
 Serneels, G., O’Driscoll, J. V., Imeraj, L., Vanfraussen, K., & Lampoo, A. (2017). An intervention supporting the 




























Migration and the Radical Right: 
A Catch-22 for Journalists
by Jonas Lefevere
In the 2019 European parliamentary elections, populist radical-right parties enjoyed big 
wins across Europe. Examples include the wins by the extreme-right Flemish Interest 
(Belgium), the Forum for Democracy (Netherlands), Af D (Germany), and Victor 
Orbán’s Fidesz (Hungary). Their hard migration stances and populist rhetoric were key 
elements for achieving these successes. However, research also points to the media as a 
crucial enabler of their success. Not only do radical right parties have substantial media 
savvy, their core issues of migration and crime are appealing to journalists, creating a 
situation whereby increased media coverage of such parties acts as a catalyst for their 
success. The result is a catch-22 for journalists: they need to cover these parties, given 
their political and societal relevance, but at the same time journalists should be wary 
of their role in propagating the success of such parties, by acting as a catalyst for their 
success.
Migration has dominated the public debate in the wake of the 2015 migration crisis, but 
it is far from a new issue. In 1995, Freeman noted a disconnect: although the public did 
not support increased migration, governments tended to allow more migration.1 In the 
90s, the radical right leveraged this disconnect and pushed migration on their national 
political agenda. Their identity-based ideology casts immigration and globalization as 
threats to national identity. This forced mainstream parties to take position on the issue, 
often leading them to take stricter stances on migration to fend off the challenge posed 
by the radical right. In a recent book Cas Mudde, a prominent researcher on the radical 
right, calls this the ‘mainstreaming’ of radical-right viewpoints.2 This mainstreaming 
further raised the prominence of migration as a key issue worthy of political attention. 
Issues that feature prominently on the political agenda tend to become more important 
for the public at large as well. In recent years, the public salience of migration further 
increased in Germany, the Czech Republic, the UK, Sweden and Poland, although its 
importance remained stable or decreased in other countries.3 This evidence supports 




























of immigration: the countries witnessing an increase in public salience tended to have 
successful radical right-wing parties, for example Af D (Germany), Swedish Democrats 
(Sweden), Law and Justice (Poland), Dawn/SPD (Czech-Republic) and the Brexit party 
(UK).
Media and journalists played a crucial role in spurring the rise of the migration issue. 
In short, politics is mediated: what the public knows about politics, it knows through 
media. Although social media are becoming more important, legacy media are still a 
dominant source of information for the public at large. In covering politics, journalists 
saw increased political attention to migration and began increasing their coverage of the 
issue. In turn, this signaled the issue’s importance to the public, which then pushed the 
issue even higher on the political agenda. Media coverage therefore creates a feedback 
loop between migrations’ political relevance and the public importance of the issue. 
Of course, media had to cover migration because it became politically relevant. However, 
research has shown that media coverage is a crucial enabler of the success of the radical 
right, and nowhere is this clearer than in their coverage of migration. To begin with, the 
rising public importance of the migration issue also caused it to play a bigger role in 
people’s vote. Because many people are opposed to further increases in migration, the 
radical right stands to gain from increased immigration coverage. As people’s opinions on 
migration have a bigger effect on which party they vote for, they tend to vote for the party 
that has similar opinions as their own. Furthermore, the radical right has a dominant 
reputation on immigration. Research by Henrik Seeberg demonstrates that the European 
public considers radical right parties to be best able to handle immigration by a substantial 
margin. In fact, journalists and media often offer an (unwitting) helping hand here: 
coverage on immigration often includes the radical right, as they are quick to capitalize on 
media opportunities linked to one of their core issues. In comparison, mainstream parties 
were, for a long time, more hesitant to pay the issue much attention. This has allowed 
many radical right parties to establish themselves as the prototypical ‘immigration’ party, 
compounding the electoral gains offered by media’s attention to migration. A case in 
point: a large-scale study in 11 EU member states shows that exposure to media coverage 
on immigration increases the odds of voting for the radical right.4
This creates a dilemma for media: journalists know that immigration coverage 
disproportionally benefits the radical right. This is problematic as it challenges media’s 
role as an independent intermediary: media become an integral part of the mediatization 
of immigration. The dilemma is worsened by the way in which media covers the issue. 




























audience, and journalists are keen to cover it since it helps them attract an audience. 
The fragmented media landscape pushes journalists to maximize the attractiveness of 
their news items by highlighting problems and conflict since audiences are more attracted 
to negative news. Immigration coverage ticks these boxes with ease, as there is ample 
political conflict on the issue, and the issue is easily cast through a negative lens. However, 
this negative lens resonates disproportionally with the viewpoints of the radical right. In 
Austrian newspapers coverage of the 2015 immigration crisis, for example, emphasis lay 
on negative and conflictual elements such as security threats and economic implications, 
while the less conflictual humanitarian considerations were less prominently featured.5 
Moreover, the radical right itself is an attractive source of information for journalists. 
This is partly due to their continued electoral success, but also because journalists know 
that the radical and confrontational rhetoric of these parties attracts an audience. 
So, journalists face a catch-22 that is difficult to escape. Should they follow audience 
preferences at the risk of disproportionally advantaging the radical right, or approach the 
issue through diverse coverage, at the risk of losing their audience? The perils created by 
this catch-22 are obvious: journalists need to cover immigration because it is a key issue, 
but economic forces push journalists to cover migration in ways conducive to the success 
of the radical right. 
Is there a way out of this dilemma? My proposed solution is simple but difficult. 
The media need to provide more balanced reporting on migration, with greater attention 
to its upside, the humanitarian implications, and present the full spectrum of viewpoints 
on the issue. However, this requires that journalists push back against the mounting 
pressure to produce content that attracts audiences but fails to inform.6 Moreover, 
journalists need to refrain from their tendency to provide a podium for the radical right. 
When Cas Mudde was asked what he thought of a Belgian journalists’ interview with an 
alt-right politician, he said this:
 ‘I would not have done it. … It [the alt-right] is mainly a media 
phenomenon, and they know it. My problem with such interviews is that 
you make them bigger than they are. But anyway, left wing media are 
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I tend to side with Mudde’s skepticism: media are prone to be riled up by the radical right 
– to their own detriment. Still, I hope to be proved wrong: especially in countries with 
strong journalistic traditions, journalists may escape their catch-22 by disregarding and 






























The Opacity of the Education 
System Creates Disadvantages 
for Pupils with Migration 
Backgrounds
by Laura Emery, Ilse Laurijssen, Simon Boone and Jochem van Noord
Despite many attempts from policymakers to reform secondary education in the 
Flemish community, including their careful use of vocabulary to suggest otherwise, the 
educational system is hierarchically structured with the general track being regarded as 
the most prestigious track and the vocational track being seen as the least prestigious 
track; in between we find the artistic track and the technical track. Although this 
hierarchy between tracks is actively denied in official educational discourse, it is inherent 
in how the education system is organised and pupils act upon it when making their study 
choice. Not all pupils act in the same way, however. Pupils with a migration background 
are having a hard time finding their way in the education system and this is partly caused 
by hampered access to strategic information. 
Previous research shows that working class and immigrant pupils have a less 
heterogeneous social network and are less efficient at obtaining knowledge about the 
educational system.1 Other research on newly arrived migrant students shows the 
importance of formal and informal knowledge of the education system for uncovering 
the complexities inherent in the educational structure.2 One of those complexities is the 
hidden tracking that already confronts pupils in the first grade of secondary education. 
Officially, the first grade is said to offer a common curriculum to all pupils. In reality, 
this common curriculum accounts for only 27 hours per week. The remaining five hours 
are devoted to optional courses. Indisputably, there is a hierarchical ordering among 
the optional courses, Latin is generally seen as the most demanding option, while 
technology and arts are seen as the least demanding options and modern sciences are 




























schools offer the same optional courses. Pupils have to obtain information not only on 
the educational system, but also on the specific curriculum in different schools. 
The hierarchical logic continues through the other grades with the system of certificates. 
At the end of each school year pupils receive a certificate which guides them in their 
educational choice for the next school year. With an A-certificate, pupils can move up 
to the next grade. With a C-certificate they must repeat their grade. With a B-certificate, 
pupils can move up to the next grade, but are excluded from certain study options as 
specified by the teachers’ advice. In that case, they can choose to stay in one of these 
study options, but then they must repeat their year. Often, the B-certificate redirects 
pupils from general to more vocational education, and it does this rather elegantly, i.e. 
without pupils having to suffer grade repetition.4 This makes changing from the general 
track to the other tracks easier than changing from the vocational track to the other 
tracks. In practice this last scenario almost never happens. The general track seems to be a 
well-guarded fortress with a one-way door. Under the pretext of safeguarding the chance 
for good students to excel, students who do not immediately fulfil the rigid academic 
requirements are directed to other tracks. This undermines the perceived value of the 
other tracks and demotivates students in those tracks.5 
This is in contrast with how ambitious pupils with migrant backgrounds often are. 
Initially, they are attracted to the prestigious general track. However, these pupils often 
have less insight in capacities needed and existing thresholds for enrolment.6 Teachers 
more often recommend a vocational trajectory to migrant pupils, regardless of their 
academic potential. They often reason that pupils with little academic support from 
parents and who do not speak the language of education at home will not manage to be 
successful in more academic tracks. Of the pupils in the general track, 12% do not have 
Dutch as home language in school year 2017-2018. In the vocational track this means 
22% of the pupils. The differences are even larger with regard to the educational level of 
the mother. In the general track 11% of the pupils’ mothers have little education, while 
in the vocational track the figure is 43%.7 
Pupils who receive advice on a vocational study often do not know how small the 
chances are for upstreaming. Thus seemingly ‘leaving the door open’ makes it difficult 
for immigrant students to understand the actual consequences of their educational 
choice. Given their limited sources of strategic knowledge they more often follow the 
advice of teachers, while other pupils mostly disregard their teachers’ advice.8 After a few 




























boy puts it: “Sometimes things get in the way and teachers don’t always see what is in you. 
They said I could always learn more later, but I’m not sure.”
Another example of seemingly leaving the door open can be seen in the transition to 
higher education. In theory, all four tracks in secondary education will grant access to 
higher education (although for vocational education, this comes only after 7 instead of 
6 years). The chances of succeeding in higher education, however, differ greatly between 
pupils who have graduated from different tracks.9 Pupils from the vocational track are 
not prepared to go on to higher education. The fact that this option is open to them 
stimulates unrealistic aspirations. It takes strategic insight to recognize this mismatch 
of skills and knowledge. More recently, efforts are being made to define which tracks 
in secondary education are meant to lead to higher education (general education) and 
which tracks are meant to prepare pupils for the labour market (vocational education). 
This higher formal transparency in educational tracks, however, is not realized to its full 
extent, as some tracks in technical education are described as primarily directed to labour 
market entry whereas others prepare for both labour market entry and higher education. 
To tackle inequality in the educational system, providing transparency regarding its 
structural hierarchy is an important first step. Otherwise it is tailor-made to suit Belgian 
middle-class educational decision-making. Furthermore, if we want to reveal more of 
the available potential, the current tracking system should be thoroughly reviewed. 
One way to eliminate hidden tracking, for instance, is to postpone the first selection 
and propose a common curriculum to all pupils during the first two years of secondary 
school. In the higher grades, steps should be taken to prevent the vocational track from 
becoming the inevitable place for students who are directed away from the other tracks. 
Choosing between tracks should be a positive and ambitious choice. That way we 
debunk the hierarchy and make the tracks true equivalents of each other. Downplaying 
the discriminatory realities embedded in the educational system does not make it more 
equal, it only creates more barriers against immigrant pupils trying to find their way.
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& Van Kerckhove, C. (2017). Is dat iets voor mij, juf? Leerlingen versterken in het keuzeproces van basis naar 
secundair. Leuven: Lannoo Campus.
2 Emery, L., Spruyt, B., Boone, S., & Van Avermaet, P. (2020). The educational trajectory of Newly Arrived Migrant 
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Belgian Universities: Decolonize 
Your Curriculum!
by Christil Asamoah
While Belgian student bodies are becoming increasingly diversified, the inclusion of 
non-Western1 perspectives in the academic curriculum2 remains a significant challenge. 
Up until today, university curricula have tended to exclude the perspectives of certain 
marginalised groups. The black and minority ethnic (BME) community, women, 
LGBT+ people, people with disabilities and non-Western scholars are still largely 
invisible in academic curricula. This invisibility is aggravated by the composition of the 
academic staff. It limits the range of topics and perspectives in education. It reproduces 
exclusionary Western world views.3 It also has the potential to discriminate against 
students from marginalized groups.
Hence the time has come for Belgian universities to decolonize their curriculum. 
Briefly, this calls for the enrichment of the curriculum with global perspectives and 
the inclusion of often ignored contributions from marginalised scholars in academia. 
This is particularly imperative for universities with an increasingly multicultural student 
population. The decolonization of academic spaces will have a positive impact upon the 
academic performances of students from marginalised groups. 
The purpose of decolonization is the renewal not of the canon, but rather of how global 
perspectives are taught. Until now, non-Western knowledge has been largely absent from 
university curricula. This reflects the dominance of Western theories and perspectives.4 
The parochial knowledge to which students are exposed limits critical scholarship and 
reproduces stereotypical ways of thinking.5 It is only by acknowledging this problem that 





























Time to rethink knowledge 
A great deal of misunderstanding exists with regards to what the decolonization of the 
curriculum entails. Decolonizing the curriculum is not merely about replacing white 
authors with black, foreign, or non-Western authors. Nor is it a matter of expelling 
white, male academics from the curriculum in their entirety. On the contrary, it is about 
confronting long-term preconceptions that constrain our understanding of politics 
and society, in order to broaden our intellectual vision and to offer a wider range of 
perspectives. An alternative curriculum would encourage critical thinking and trigger a 
debate leading to discussions on global topics that, although important in our society, are 
usually never taught in our education systems.
Decolonization is an act of resistance against structural inequalities maintained in place 
by power imbalances and knowledge systems. It involves reshaping and questioning 
power structures that determine what knowledge is, how it is produced and passed on. 
It makes us rethink who can be considered credible enough to produce knowledge. 
A decolonial approach to knowledge production and curriculum development enables us 
to evaluate critically where, how, why and by whom standards of knowledge are produced.6 
Decolonizing the curriculum also addresses the exclusion of topics that critical voices 
target. Think about topics such as race and racism, discrimination, implicit bias, white 
supremacy, white privilege, equity, cultural diversity and power struggles, to name just a 
few. Within political science, for example, a great deal of emphasis is placed on political 
thought, history and discourses about power. Lecturers fail to place this emphasis within 
a decolonial framework. Often, a more critical examination of power is neglected due 
to the shallow definition of what is regarded as valuable and fundamental knowledge. 
Despite the steady progress towards gender mainstreaming in the political sciences, 
many of the aforementioned themes are discredited, like postcolonialism, critical race 
theories, notions of othering, white privilege and allyship, etc. Tackling these themes 
would stimulate the responsiveness of all students to the interconnected world. 
University bodies also need to reflect more on the diversity of their student population. 
They should make sure that all students are able to see themselves reflected in 
the curriculum.7 This will serve as a tool to advance the academic performance of 
marginalized groups. As such, the decolonization of the curriculum is part of a call for 




























Based on these arguments, several universities have already reassessed their curriculum 
and reading lists. Across many countries, students have struggled for recognition 
of decolonial perspectives. A first movement was Rhodes Must Fall in South Africa. 
In this movement, students advocated for institutions to dismantle their statues of the 
imperialist Cecil Rhodes and other key landmarks related to the colonial era. A second 
movement is called Why is My Curriculum White? This is an initiative by students from 
the University College of London. They argue for a more inclusive curriculum. 
The need to decolonize the curriculum is not tied to a geographical location, however. 
No matter where we find ourselves, decolonial thinking requires us to navigate beyond 
traditional borders of knowledge. It is important that we, as students and lecturers, take 
the lead in this debate by manning deep-rooted biases through critical self-reflection. 
Martinez-Acosta and Favero state that ‘we have now reached a point where true reflection 
and assessment of inclusive practices on our campuses must be carried out so that we 
fully serve the needs of all of our students’.8
Decolonizing the curriculum: moving beyond 
borders!
Decolonizing the curriculum is not an uncomplicated process and may stir a great deal 
of controversy. Some critics denounce students’ demand for a multiplier of knowledge 
because they consider alternative perspectives to be subordinate to Western knowledge 
sets. Such uncertainty regarding the unknown (i.e. non-Western forms of knowledge) 
puts many off. It also asks lecturers to re-skill in curriculum design. As such, many 
academics have not yet taken this step on a voluntary basis. 
Those who oppose the decolonization of the curriculum should keep in mind the words 
of Ntokozo Gwabe, co-founder of Rhodes Must Fall at Oxford: 
“A lot of the time when people talk about colonialism  
they think of it as a past event that happened. They don’t think about it as 
something that manifests itself in everyday life  




























Now, this means to say that we need to build a curriculum that resists contemporary 
forms of coloniality. We are thus calling for a new and post-colonial era of higher 
education. Such an era necessitates a curriculum that attempts to counteract narrow-
minded thinking and stimulates willingness to go beyond our borders of knowledge.
1 ‘Non-Western’ refers to knowledge that does not derive from the Western world. I am referring not so much to 
a geographical location but more to the predominant spheres of influence and power.
2 Curriculum is defined as a planned learning experience and goes beyond the topics covered in a course. It 
encompasses the values, norms, world views and perspectives that are learned and unlearned, constructed and 
deconstructed.
3 MacIsaac, D. (ed.) (2018). The Under-Representation Curriculum project. The Physics Teacher, 56(7): 494-494.
4 Saini, R., & Begum, N. (2020). Demarcation and definition: explicating the meaning and scope of ‘decolonisation’ 
in the social and political sciences. The Political Quarterly, 91(1): 217-221.
5 Subedi, B. (2013). Decolonising the curriculum for global perspectives. Educational Theory, 63(6): 621-638.
6 Saini, R., & Begum, N. (2020). Demarcation and definition: explicating the meaning and scope of ‘decolonisation’ 
in the social and political sciences. The Political Quarterly, 91(1): 217-221.
7 Duarte, F. D., Lopes, A., & de Fátima Pereira, M. (2013). Curriculum: Mirror and reflection of the daily life of 
schools. In Future directions: uncertainty and possibility: European Conference on Curriculum Studies: 573-576. 
8 Martinez-Acosta, V. G., & Favero, C. B. (2018). A discussion of diversity and inclusivity at the institutional level: 
the need for a strategic plan. Journal of Undergraduate Neuroscience Education (JUNE), 16(3): A252-A260.
9 Rhoden-Paul, A. (2015). Oxford Uni must decolonise its campus and curriculum, say students. The Guardian 





























Decolonizing the University: 
From Happy Diversity To 
Uncomfortable Dialogues
by Sophie Withaeckx
Diversity and decolonization have become focal points in higher education policies 
worldwide. Interest in diversity prolongs, and also replaces, a previous point of concern 
over equal opportunities in higher education initially focused on gender. As a general 
rule, the new diversity discourse encompasses not only gender but also other markers of 
differentiation such as ethnicity, disability, religion and sexuality. While the popularity 
of diversity and decolonization indicates a genuine intention to eradicate the effects of 
racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination, I argue below that the way in which 
these concepts are deployed in higher education may contribute to a reproduction of the 
status quo, rather than present a genuine challenge to the current gendered and racialized 
power hierarchies in higher education. 
One indication of this can be found in concrete figures that report gender equality in 
universities: despite decades of gender equality plans and a higher influx and graduation 
rate of female students in comparison to males, there is a blatant underrepresentation 
of women in post-doctoral and tenured positions.1 Although this cannot (always) be 
blamed on the ‘conspiracies’ of macho males deliberately aimed at excluding women, 
the mechanisms behind this structural sexism – such as implicit bias, stereotype threat, 
‘glass ceilings’ and ‘sticky floors’ – have been known for decades but appear difficult to 
overcome. Moreover, the introduction of more drastic measures, such as quotas, is often 
vehemently opposed. 
What about the representation of ethnic minorities? In comparison to other 
countries, the influx of students with ethnic minority background into Belgian higher 
education is relatively recent, which might explain their relatively low numbers.2 




























the precise numbers of ethnic minority students who enroll and who finish their 
studies. Nevertheless, the increasing visibility of these students in higher education 
often engenders expectations that it will be just a matter of time before some of 
them will enroll in academic careers as PhDs and end up as post-doc researchers and 
professors. However, findings from abroad prove otherwise. A recent study3 compared 
the representation of ethnic minorities in universities in Canada, the US, the UK and 
Australia and came to similar conclusions across these contexts: despite a considerable 
presence and even overrepresentation of ethnic minority students, as graduates they are 
underrepresented in stable and tenured positions, and overrepresented in precarious 
jobs such as caterers, cleaners or safety staff. The authors conclude that ‘minority students 
end overwhelmingly as recipients of, and not participants in, knowledge creation’ in such 
countries.
So why this lack of change? While a ‘deficit’ paradigm has been identified that blames 
marginalized groups themselves – for example by pointing to women’s lack of 
competitiveness, or the ‘culture’ of minorities perceived as incompatible with correct 
study attitudes –, others point to a more fundamental problem in the form of a deep-seated 
resistance to diversity that is ingrained in Western higher education. Based on her research 
among diversity workers in the UK and Australia, Sara Ahmed describes the resistance 
her respondents experienced as ‘banging your head against a brick wall’.4 This resistance 
may be deep-seated: post-colonial and feminist scholars have found that ‘the foundational 
structures of the Westernized university are epistemically racist and sexist’,5 as universities 
were first founded in close conjunction with the expansion of imperialism, the subjection 
of non-Western people and the eradication of their ways of producing knowledge. 
Universities therefore became spaces suitable only for specific kinds of knowledge and 
adapted to a particular type of ‘knower’ (disembodied, autonomous, rational) and 
therefore intrinsically inimical to ‘deviant’ forms of knowledge carried by types of persons 
seen as subjective, embodied and irrational (women, non-Western people). At least part 
of the ‘brick wall’ identified by Ahmed is thus constituted by invisible norms which define 
‘knowledge’ and ‘knower’, and which make the university into a space where ‘deviant’ 
ways of being and knowing are not appreciated. The mere presence of women and ethnic 
minorities will therefore not be enough to bring about change; there is a need for more 
profound engagement with the historical legacies carried by universities and deeper 




























Can diversity and decolonization save us?
Although diversity has been embraced as ‘a holy mantra across different sites’ which will 
make for ‘enriched multicultural societies’,6 diversity policies have been criticized for 
their ‘non-performativity’: merely having a diversity policy in itself can actually work 
against diversity, as ‘ticking the boxes’ for having a diversity plan, officer and committees 
can create an image of the university as already diverse while actually leaving structural 
racism and sexism unaddressed. Such processes can be reinforced by the omnipresent 
popular visual representations of diversity as mosaics of colours and happy faces, in 
which differences become represented as non-threatening and devoid of problematic 
‘unhappy’ inequalities.
With its roots in student activist movements – initiated by the South-African ‘Rhodes 
Must Fall’ movement and followed by similar actions in the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands – the notion of ‘decolonizing the university’ may offer a more trans-
formative paradigm for challenging inequalities. Post-colonial theorists like Quijano, 
Mignolo and Wynter have provided rich and complex definitions of concepts like (de)
colonization and (de)coloniality, which are not always clearly distinguished in current 
discussions. For example, it is important to distinguish ‘colonialism’ from ‘coloniality 
(of power)’: the first term refers to the historically determined period of occupation and 
colonization of countries in the global South by Western countries, while the second is 
a more encompassing concept referring to ‘a strategy of control and domination’ that 
also keeps on operating after the achievement of the colonial period. Coloniality of 
power refers to the historical and epistemological processes that have been constitutive 
of Western modernity: the simultaneous and interrelated processes of imperialism, 
capitalism, the exploitation of non-Western people and their land, the development of 
racism as a legitimating discourse and the dismissal of non-Western ways of knowing and 
being as unscientific and irrational.
‘Decoloniality’ in this context implies the criticism and dismantling of these oppressive 
structures. As Mignolo argues, it is indispensable that this criticism is formulated 
from the ‘exteriority of the colonial difference’:7 this means that people designated as 
‘other’, and relegated to the margins of power and knowledge production, should be 
the ones centralized in any attempt to challenge this system. People who know and 
experience what it is to be ‘othered’ are able to generate concepts and forms of knowledge 
directly informed by this experience, and therefore are more likely to challenge the 




























Therefore it is important to check who claims to be ‘decolonizing’, whose voices are 
speaking and are heard, and where in this process those ‘othered’ bodies are situated. 
‘Decolonizing’ higher education should thus be about more than merely adding non-
Western scholars to the curriculum or increasing the influx of students with migrant 
background. Crucial questions should be: How can we retain these students so that they 
can come to occupy stable and influential positions in the university? How do we avoid 
their becoming merely recipients of, and not producers, of knowledge? 
Uncomfortable dialogues and dangerous discourses
A first step towards decolonization is to depart from the ‘happy diversity’ imagery and 
to make room for those stories which are painful and likely to generate ‘moments of 
discomfort’.8 Accounts of the experiences of students and staff regarding discrimination, 
exclusion, harassment and hate crimes should not only be taken seriously but should 
be actively collected and serve as ‘counter-stories’ to the desired image of the university 
as a happy and already diverse institution. Not only could such stories convey the 
knowledge necessary to address the barriers faced by marginalized groups, they could 
also form the basis of ‘cross-difference dialogues’ where the impact of both processes of 
privilege and marginalization may be openly discussed among people occupying very 
different positions in society. Such conversations will therefore not be ‘tolerant, sensitive, 
affirming, homogenizing dialogues’ but will rather be ‘dangerous discourses’, in the sense 
that they challenge dominant narratives and expose the working and impact of ongoing 
inequalities in spaces of higher education. 
Of course, such dialogues do not imply that there are no happy stories at all to share: 
universities are also – and indeed should be – inspiring and empowering environments, 
a place where one can encounter exactly those theories that inspire critical thinking 
and enable personal and communal growth. But if we want it to function in this way 
for everyone, we should recognize the existence of internal resistance to equality and 
the way in which sexism and racism inevitably shape academic spaces. Going beyond 
painting pictures of ‘happy diversity’, universities should make room for those painful 
narratives that expose what goes wrong. Decolonization then becomes a process of 
listening to those uncomfortable narratives where racism and sexism are named and 
exposed, making room for complexity and reflexivity, centralizing the most marginalized 
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A Fatima Mernissi Chair Helps 
us Create a Pluriversity
by Iman Lechkar
Fatima Mernissi, a renowned Moroccan sociologist and one of the founders of Islamic 
Feminism, died in Morocco on 30 November 2015. Two Belgian-Moroccan alumnae of 
the Free University of Brussels (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, VUB), Saida Sakkali, Senior 
project coordinator King Baudouin Foundation and Yamila Idrissi, lawyer and former 
Belgian politician, recall the existential role Fatima Mernissi played in their lives and are 
committed to keep her legacy alive. A few days after Fatima Mernissi’s passing, Saida 
Sakkali explained in a newspaper article the role Fatima Mernissi plays in the lives of 
Muslim women: 
'Her books opened a whole new world for us. She reassured us by 
writing that our Moroccan background and our European future are not 
mutually exclusive. She also urged us not to remain passive by stating 
that “Either you keep silent and get humiliated, or you get up and claim 
your position".’ 1
Fatima Mernissi’s work shrugs off the powerless and revisits power structures with the 
intention of transforming them. Her work should therefore not only be included in 
university programmes, but also a Fatima Mernissi Chair should be created in order to 
decolonize our academic institutes and to transform a university into a ‘pluriversity’, an 
institute whose people (professors, students, researchers and personnel), infrastructure 
and knowledge are characterized by diversity. 
Since all of us young Muslim graduates trained in Belgium are products of Eurocentric 
knowledge production, we were not taught about Mernissi at the University. Therefore, 
after the publication of her op-ed in the newspaper, Saida Sakkali did not stand still. 
A few days later she approached the University hierarchy and told that she would 





























Soon afterwards, she was invited to a meeting. The enthusiasm of the Academic director 
prompted Saida Sakkali and Yamila Idrissi to write an official proposal for the creation 
of a Fatima Mernissi Chair. The proposal urged the university to play an important 
societal role by offering a space for non-Western scholars and knowledge. They argued 
that this was particularly important in Brussels, the capital city of Belgium and Europe 
where religions and cultures intersect. On 26 January 2017, the VUB Fatima Mernissi 
Chair was officially launched, with me, Iman Lechkar, a Moroccan Belgian anthropologist 
as the chair holder. 
One year earlier, on 5 January 2016, a Fatima Mernissi chair had also been inaugurated in 
Rabat at the Mohammed V University. Another Fatima Mernissi Chair was inaugurated 
in Mexico on 11 November 2019 by the National Autonomous University of Mexico 
(UNAM), in order to foster South-South relations with Morocco.2
A Muslim feminist and decolonial thinker
Fatima Mernissi was born in 1940 in Fes, Morocco, and was raised in a middle-class 
family. She studied political science at the Mohammed V University in the capital city 
of Rabat and continued at graduate school in Paris. She obtained her PhD in sociology 
at Brandeis University in the United States. Once she received her doctorate, she 
returned to Morocco and taught sociology at the Mohammed V University while also 
doing research at the Moroccan Scientific Research Institute, both in Rabat. Mernissi 
wrote many scholarly books on Islam, gender and power. The Veil and the Male Elite – 
A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam (1987) was internationally recognized 
as a masterpiece. 
Mernissi was committed to equality between men and women in the Arab and Muslim 
world. She was a vehement critic of patriarchy and male religious authority. She also 
denounced the unattained promise of democracy in the MENA (Middle East and 
North Africa) regions by nationalist movements. She further condemned the wrecking 
consequences of colonialism and coloniality. As one of the best-known Arab Muslim 
feminists, Mernissi’s influence extends beyond a limited circle of intellectuals. In Morocco 
she was a valued public figure who transformed her house into a meeting place for artists, 
intellectuals, activists and policymakers, and discovered many ‘new talents’. Her feminist 




























philosophy where Jadal (dialectic or debate technique) is predominantly used. Abroad, 
Muslim women found refuge in her work to reinforce themselves, as much within their 
own Muslim community as in the wider Western society.
Fatima Mernissi’s work debunks all normative and stereotypical views on Muslim 
women in both Islamic and Western contexts. As a Muslim female scholar, she also 
studied in the West, making frequent trips there. Elaborating on these experiences and 
insights, she shows that the idea of the powerless and submissive Muslim woman is a 
construct promoted by both Muslim and white Western men to consolidate male power. 
Mernissi provides us with more complex understandings of the role of the Muslim 
woman in power dynamics, both in the West and in the Muslim majority societies. 
By drawing on different his-/her stories, Mernissi offers frameworks and concepts for 
discussion, including intra-Islamic challenges and challenges related to Muslim women 
in Western societies.
A decolonial praxis making pluriversalist 
universities possible
Because of her insightful, critical, rich and layered work, Fatima Mernissi’s work should 
be included in all curricula in the human and social sciences. However, changing curricula 
content is not enough. The Fatima Mernissi Chair aims to bring about structural change 
and is aware that in order to decolonize universities far more needs to be done than 
merely changing their curricula. The Chair aims to achieve structural change by focusing 
on two pillars, academic and societal. 
The academic pillar of the Mernissi Chair focuses on education and research by 
introducing new knowledge, research questions and research fields. It also includes 
an equality policy in order to transform the university into a pluriversity. Three 
academic achievements of the Chair include the temporary assignment of a female 
Muslim Chair holder, the funding of research on Muslim men in prison and the 
creation of the course ‘Islam and Gender’, which has an extensive reading list in 
which only the works of scholars of colour are included. The course is part of a 
larger Masters degree on Gender and Diversity. These modest achievements aim 




























As the creation of a prayer room or offering halal food remain contentious issues, 
we realize that we are far from becoming a pluriversity where minority students can 
see the university, as Achille Mbembe puts it, as: ‘ … my home’ and where one thinks 
‘I am not a foreigner. I belong here’. Decolonization, Mbembe continues, should also 
involve changing ‘the systems of access and management and changing the buildings and 
the classrooms, as “a good university education is impossible without an extensive material 
infrastructure/architecture”’.4
The societal pillar of the Fatima Mernissi chair aims to unlock academic knowledge 
and make it accessible to different types of public. This pillar places the participation of 
different marginalized publics and the ‘democratization of access’ in a central position. 
Although university tuition fees are quite accessible in Belgium compared to many 
other European countries, the university remains a white space to which it is difficult 
for minorities to belong. To enhance access to underprivileged groups, the Chair is 
developing a programme in the city centre, far away from the inaccessible wealthy 
Eastern part of Brussels where the VUB is located, and is collaborating with a range of 
secondary schools. 
With our yearly programmes we aim to create spaces where marginalized groups of the 
European metropolitan capital are able to express their aspirations and frustrations, and 
where they can compare their experiences to other struggles against dominant, colonial 
and imperial structures. The Chair also aims to attract privileged groups in order to 
connect them to minorities and their voices and ideas. According to Walter Mignolo and 
Catherine Walsh, this type of decolonial praxis creates possibilities of living together in 
which the West is no longer the only reference. These are encounters where other modes 
of living are not categorized as reactionary, radical, underdeveloped or uncivilized.5
It is Fatima Mernissi’s decolonial ideas such as ‘forgotten queens’ and practices such 
as the ‘civic caravan’, that inspire us to develop yearly programmes exploring the 
(in)visible structures pushing women to the margins or the empowering effects of 
linking marginalized populations to artists and intellectuals using books, literature and 
slam poetry as glue between different groups. 
It seems clear from the above that the Fatima Mernissi Chair at VUB challenges the 
dominance of Western knowledge. The Chair continues the work and legacy of Fatima 
Mernissi by investigating the complex relationship between power, gender and Islam. 




























1 Interview of Saïda Sakali, S. in Vidal, K. (2015). Moslima’s eren rolmodel, De Morgen, 5 December 2015, p. 15.
2 Hekking, M. (2019). Mexican University Pays Tribute to Moroccan Intellectual Fatima Mernissi,  
https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/11/287175/mexican-university-tribute-fatima-mernissi/
3 Mignolo, W., & Walsh, C. (2018), On Decoloniality. Concepts, Analytics and Praxis. Durham: Duke University 
Press, p. 2.
4 Mbembe, A.J. (2016). Decolonizing the university: New directions, Arts & Humanities in Higher Education,  
15(1): 30.
5 Mignolo, W., & Walsh, C. (2018). On Decoloniality. Concepts, Analytics and Praxis. Durham: Duke University 
Press, p. 3.
6  Mignolo, W., & Walsh, C. (2018). On Decoloniality. Concepts, Analytics and Praxis. Durham: Duke University 
Press, p. 3. 
and frustrations of marginalized groups can be raised openly. In this spirit, the Chair 
aims to transform the structure of the university so that the university can become a 
pluriversity where underprivileged groups not only form the subject of study but can 





























Creating Legal Migration 
Channels Alone is Not Sufficient 
to Minimise the Risk of Labour 
Exploitation
by Amy Weatherburn and Paul de Hert
Exploiting the labour of others is, for many, an issue consigned to history because it no 
longer occurs in our modern world. When quizzed on the existence of modern forms 
of slavery, the focus is on situations many thousands of kilometres away and not on the 
bakery at the end of your street or the construction site you pass on your daily commute. 
Labour exploitation takes place in the formal labour market and can even include 
Belgians, but it predominantly impacts migrant workers who are often undocumented 
and working in low-skilled, low-paid sectors.
For some, a solution to this societal issue is to create legal migration channels. However, 
we suggest that this may be too simplistic, as there is more to it than meets the eye. 
As a result, the legal regulation of labour market compliance is extremely complex 
and requires engagement with a broad spectrum of criminal, labour and social-penal 
provisions. Providing access to the labour market through legal migration channels is 
simply the starting point when seeking to ensure decent work for all workers. 
Equal access to decent and safe working conditions for all workers, regardless of 
migration status, is enshrined in law (UN Convention on Rights of Migrant Workers). 
The existence of labour exploitation, however, shows that some workers are more 
vulnerable to unscrupulous employers than others. In particular, undocumented 
migrants who work in the informal labour market are often the target for those who wish 
to avoid paying wages, holiday pay and social security contributions or to provide safe 
and decent working conditions. One proposed solution to combating such exploitation 





























legal status opens the door to legal rights and legal enforcement mechanisms, and indeed 
encourages a fairer tax system. 
Research into the labour exploitation of EU citizens in Belgium shows that reliance 
on legal migration channels alone is only part of the solution. More is needed, as 
illustrated by the following three examples. The findings from a recent study on human 
trafficking in the EU revealed that ‘nearly half (44%) of registered victims were citizens 
of the EU. […] The top five EU countries of citizenship of the victims in 2015-2016 
were Romania, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Bulgaria’.2 Research into migrant 
workers’ perspectives on labour exploitation in the EU show that three-quarters of the 
third-country nationals had regular migration status at the time of exploitation.3 In 2018, 
Fairwork Belgium – a civil society organization for undocumented workers – received 
453 requests for assistance. The third most popular request referred to problems in a 
legal work situation.4 The three examples above illustrate that more needs to be done 
at local level to ensure that the working conditions of all workers are decent, safe and in 
compliance with labour standards. 
International labour standards must be reflected in national labour law. In Belgium, all 
workers, regardless of migration status, are entitled to the following rights: minimum 
wage (sector or general), right to safe working conditions and compensation for 
accidents at work, sick pay, holiday pay and observance of working hours (maximum 38 
hours a week).5 
Despite the legal and policy framework, labour exploitation requires further attention. 
Precise numbers of exploited workers are not available, but we do know that between 
2013-2016, 328 victims of human trafficking in Belgium were exploited in the 
hospitality industry (hotels, restaurants, other catering facilities) and the construction 
sector.6 Other sectors are affected, include agriculture, domestic work, nail salons, 
carwashes, bakeries and clothing recycling centres. In addition, an estimated 100,000 
undocumented workers in Brussels are at the mercy of unscrupulous employers 
who fail to respect the regulations on declaring workers, payment of social security 
contributions and payment of wages (including minimum wage, holiday pay and sick 
pay) and working hours. Bogus self-employment is also a means by which employers 
can exploit individuals in order to secure a financial gain;7 this fraudulent practice can 





























Regularization of migration status alone is not enough to ensure that workers’ rights are 
respected. Thus we propose three additional solutions that could – in combination with 
legal migration channels – tackle exploitation in the labour market: 
Collaborative monitoring of all aspects of the labour market would ensure decent 
working conditions for all workers, regardless of status. While the existing law provides 
a framework for such regulation, its implementation requires further consideration. 
Cooperation between public labour inspectorates and other third parties such as trade 
unions and civil society organisations, (e.g. Fairwork Belgium) is crucial. Collaboration 
between such actors ensures equality for all in the labour market, which could be 
enhanced further by making joint inspections the standard operating procedure. 
A collaborative approach to labour market regulation would further ensure equal 
recognition of workers’ rights. 
Enforcement of social penal code and access to justice would require mutual recognition 
amongst the different actors. In Belgium, for example, a significant change in operational 
practice between the labour inspectorate and the immigration office means that 
undocumented workers are now no longer automatically ordered to leave the territory 
when found to be working illegally; this means they have more opportunities to 
obtain redress for violations of their labour rights.8 The adoption of such an approach 
provides labour inspectors and law enforcement with more time to investigate potential 
exploitation, enabling access to justice for those who are victims, even if they are in an 
irregular situation. Furthermore, where there has been no criminal activity, cooperation 
with trade unions and civil society can ensure compensation/remedy through civil 
procedures. 
Public vigilance and a zero tolerance of exploitation by the general public as consumers 
and co-workers would ensure that labour exploitation is kept to a minimum. 
Currently, the emergence of high-risk sectors that are very much face-to-face with the 
public (e.g. nail salons) highlights the trend that exploitative working conditions are 
usually tolerated. In certain instances, jobs like these are considered too dangerous, 
dirty or demeaning for the native population. However, it is also significant that the 
emergence of the gig economy, which relies upon independent, flexible and temporary 
workers to provide services on-demand (often through online platforms and temporary 
employment agencies), places precarious workers side-by-side with colleagues who are 
perhaps in a more secure job situation. Only with a sense of solidarity and respect for 






























The need to ensure a fair and equitable labour market for all migrant workers is not just 
a fundamental human right but also key to the sustainability of the EU member states’ 
national labour markets, where significant labour market shortages are forecast right 
across the European Union. Taking into account the global nature of the labour market, 
further efforts must be made to minimize labour exploitation. In the EU, the recently 
adopted Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions, together with the 
Resolution establishing the European Labour Authority, are significant developments 
following the proclamation of the EU’s Pillar of Social Labour Rights. In the Brussels Capital 
Region, migrant workers represent a third of the local population. As a result, politicians are 
now focusing on their contribution to the labour market and socio-economic development 
of the region, as well as the obstacles that leave migrant workers unemployed and at risk of 
falling victim to unscrupulous employers on the black labour market. 
In order to secure decent work for all, a multi-faceted solution must be embedded in 
any initiatives to tackle exploitation – a solution that includes, but is not limited to, the 
regularization of the status of migrants.
1  La Strada International (2018). Report of the Final Conference: Rights at Work Tackling labour exploitation in Poland, 
Bulgaria, Romania and the Netherlands. Available at: http://lastradainternational.org/lsidocs/3245-Report%20
final%20conference%20Rights%20at%20Work%20-%20Tackling%20labour%20exploitation%20in%20Poland%20
Romania%20and%20Bulgaria%20-%2028%20September%202018.pdf [last accessed 27 August 2020]. 
2 European Commission (2018). Data collection on trafficking in human beings in the EU 2018, p. 13. Available at: https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20181204_
data-collection-study.pdf [last accessed 27 August 2020].
3 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2019a). Protecting migrant workers from exploitation in 
the EU: workers’ perspectives, p. 26. Available at: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/ fra-2019-
severe-labour-exploitation-workers-perspectives_en.pdf [last accessed 27 August 2020].
4 Fairwork Belgium (2018). Rapport Annuel 2018, p. 26.
5 Fairwork Belgium (2014). Rapport Annuel 2014, p. 54-61.
6 GRETA (2017). Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings by Belgium - Second Evaluation Round, p. 7.
7 Myria (2017). Rapport annuel 2017: traite et trafic des êtres humains en ligne, p. 85. Available at: https://www.myria.
be/ files/RA-TEH-17.pdf [last accessed 27 August 2020].





























Yes, Mr Charles Michel, 
Apologizing for Colonial 
Atrocities is One of the Tools 
to Combat Underemployment 
Among Afro-descendants
by Ilke Adam and Billy Kalonji 
“There is clear evidence of racial discrimination in Belgium… The root 
causes of these present-day human rights violations  
lie in the lack of recognition of the true scope  
of the violence and injustice.”
These are the stark conclusions of a study into racism experienced by people of African 
descent living in Belgium that was conducted in February 2019 by the UN Expert 
Group on People of African Descent. The UN experts made several recommendations 
for ending racial discrimination, including this one, ‘To issue an apology for the atrocities 
committed during colonization.” 
When this study came out, President Michel, you were still the Prime Minister of 
Belgium. During an interview on Flemish TV1 you described this request for an 
apology as “heel raar (very weird)”. Perhaps you did not understand the connection 
between 21st century racial discrimination and issuing an apology for past atrocities 
committed in the colonial era. But in this you are probably not alone. In recent years, 





























(Zwarte Piet), a black-faced persona in a traditional festivity for children in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. More recently however, in the follow-up of the 
Black Lives Matter protests of 2020, the Belgian King Philippe and the European 
Commission seem to have understood the link between the colonial past and 
present-day racism. The Belgian King recognized the historical sources of racism 
when he expressed his deepest regrets for past colonial atrocities. The European 
Commission does also, for the very first time, in its new Anti-Racism Action Plan, 
and pleads for remembrance as part of the strategy to encourage inclusion. Thereby 
it followed-up on the recommendations of the European Parliament Resolution of 
26 March 2019 on the Fundamental Rights of People of African Descent. This 
Resolution encourages EU institutions and member states to “officially acknowledge 
and mark the histories of people of African descent in Europe, including of past and ongoing 
injustices and crimes against humanity, such as slavery and the transatlantic slave trade, or 
those committed under European colonialism.” The EP Resolution follows the same path as 
the UN Delegation’s report in explaining the relationship between slavery, the colonial 
past and the present discrimination against people of African descent. It calls inter alia 
for past injustices to be addressed, in line with the steps already taken by several other 
EU member states.2 
In your new post as President of the European Council, we would not expect you to 
have much time free for in-depth research into the topic of racism, so allow us to set 
out below for you a number of inequalities that Afro-descendants, or people of African 
heritage or descent, are facing. We also explain why the recommendations of the UN 
Expert Group are far from “weird”. 
In 2017, with the help of other colleagues, we conducted a survey3 among a representative 
sample of 805 Afro-descendants living in Belgium. This survey was the first of its kind. 
Although a considerable number of Afro-descendants permanently settled in Belgium, 
very little research has been carried out on this segment of the population. 
One of our findings that caught the attention of the media was truly revealing: Afro-
Belgians are often far more highly skilled than other Belgians, yet they are four times 
more likely to be unemployed. We were not surprised by this, but journalists and 
ministers alike were bowled over. 
Why? None of them regarded people of African descent as being capable of being highly 





























this perception simply mirrored a long-entrenched colonial stereotype of black people 
possessing lower intelligence. 
The study also presented evidence that Afro-Belgians are as a rule far more interested in 
Belgian politics than other Belgians. Additionally, it revealed that more than half of them 
are employed in positions for which they are educationally over-qualified. Almost 8 out 
of 10 respondents reported that they had experienced racial discrimination, unequal 
treatment and even abuse as a direct consequence of either their skin colour or their 
country of birth. This kind of discrimination exercises a negative impact on many areas 
of life, including finding a job, finding a home, access to public spaces and interfacing 
with public authorities. The people surveyed told us about their earliest experiences of 
racism, often dating back to their primary school years. Insults like ‘dirty nigger’, ‘wild 
animal’, ‘monkey’, ‘slave’, ‘go back to your country’ and ‘I won’t shake your hand, cos you are 
dirty’ have marked and marred their childhood memories.4 
All recent labour market studies5 provide evidence pointing to a clear racial hierarchy 
in the labour markets in Belgium and elsewhere in Europe. West Europeans have easier 
access to the job markets than Central and Eastern Europeans, who in turn have it easier 
than people of Arab or Asian descent, while black Afro-Belgians are at the bottom of the 
heap, even though they might have superior educational qualifications. 
This racial hierarchy in the job market strongly reflects the racist attitudes of the past 
era in Belgian history which legitimised colonialism, an era that modern society has 
rejected. From the first-hand accounts of Afro-descendants detailing the types of insult 
hurled at them we learn that the long history of colonialism has carved deep grooves in 
our present-day culture, history, language and the way we regard ourselves and other 
people. Edward Saïd used the term ‘cultural archive’ to show that this knowledge is 
stored deep in our mind sets, making it almost impossible to eradicate. 
To make matters worse, Mr President, very little time is currently allotted to teaching 
colonial history in schools. Over 90% of people of African descent in Belgium are 
calling for this to be changed in order to raise awareness that colonial stereotypes still 
exist.6	New initiatives to further the teaching of colonial history in schools have now 
been proposed in the wake of the 2020 anti-racist protests in Belgium. Let’s hope they 
will be implemented soon. Professor Derald Wing Sue of Columbia University, a world 
authority on multicultural psychology and racism, demonstrated in his own research 





























The focus groups and interviews of Afro-Belgians in the study of Demart et al.8 reveal 
that it is useless to draw up classical policy recipes for anti-discrimination unless the 
colonial stereotypes are simultaneously eliminated. 
Mr President, it is staggering to realize that Belgian children are still being taught in 
school that Africans live in huts. The truth is, as you well know, that the vast majority of 
Afro-Belgians are born in urban environments and belong to the African middle class. 
Added to that, there is a constant stream of heavily biased media images broadcast from 
Africa that focus on misery and malnourished swollen bellies. These images might be 
useful for awakening a compassionate response to get viewers to donate to humanitarian 
campaigns, but they do nothing whatsoever to banish colonial stereotypes. They are 
almost certainly putting up obstacles to Afro-Belgians who are trying to gain equal 
access to job opportunities. Given that colonial-era representations of Africans are 
still omnipresent in everyday life, be this in racial slurs, schoolbook lessons or media 
reporting, is it then so ‘weird’ that they also exert a negative impact in the labour market? 
President Michel, as leader of the European Council, we hope that you now understand 
from our brief summary of the facts why apologising for colonial atrocities, teaching 
colonial history in schools and removing statues of King Leopold II are all actions that 
are far from ‘weird’ in the fight against racism. Indeed, they go hand in hand with our 
recommendations for fostering equal access to the labour market for Belgians of African 
descent. The 2020 anti-racist protests might also have helped your understanding, as the 
removal of the the statutes of King Leopold II and the teaching of colonial history in 
schools are clear revindications of the Belgian Network for Black Lives. 
We would also like to urge you, as President of the European Council, to take further 
follow-up action on the Parliament Resolution of 26 March 2019 on the Fundamental 
Rights of People of African Descent and the Commission’s proposals for new legislation, 
as proposed in its Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025.
Some modest first steps to address structural racism have first been taken by the 
government of the Brussels Region, which is where most Afro-Belgians live. More 
recently, because of the ani-racist protests of June 2020, the Flemish and Francophone 
ministers of education followed modestly. The new Brussels Government has undertaken 
to review the various symbols of colonialism that are visible in public spaces in Brussels. 






























President Michel, we very much hope that you will encourage your former Belgian 
federal government colleagues to further follow this path and to address as a matter of 
urgency the recommendations of the UN expert group on people of African descent, 
as well as those proposed by Belgian public institutions such as the Federal Ministry 
for Employment, Unia and Actiris (see endnote 4). We admit that the list of the 
recommendations is long. You might need some help in prioritizing, and expertise on 
how to implement agreed actions. Please call upon the expertise to be found among the 
many highly skilled of citizens of African descent living in Belgium and elsewhere in the 
EU. They should be given a seat at the decision-making tables. Do not just discuss about 
them, but with them. 
Finally, we would like to stress the importance of timely implementation of all the 
recommendations listed above. An incredible amount of talent is lost in Belgium and 
Europe, by not recognizing it. It is time to address this! 
1 VRT (2019). Premier Charles Michel vindt Congo Rapport ‘zeer raar’: ‘Zullen zeker onze opmerkingen doorgeven’, 
11 February. https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2019/02/12/premier-michel-vindt-congo-rapport-zeer-raar-zullen- 
zeker-onze/ 
2 COM (2020) 565:14.
3 Demart, S., Schoumaker, B., Godin, M., & Adam (2017). Les Belgo-Congolais. Belgo-Rwandais et Belgo-Burundais. 
Un portrait de nos concitoyens d’ascendance africaine. Bruxelles: Fondation Roi Baudouin. 
4 Demart, S., Schoumaker, B., Godin, M., & Adam (2017). Les Belgo-Congolais. Belgo-Rwandais et Belgo-Burundais. 
Un portrait de nos concitoyens d’ascendance africaine. Bruxelles: Fondation Roi Baudouin, p. 126.
5 Actiris (2019). Profiel en Traject van werkzoekenden in het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest. Monitoring volgens 
Origine. Actiris: Brussel; FOD WASO and UNIA (2019). Socio-economische monitoring 2019. Arbeidsmarkt en 
origine. Brussel: Federale Overheidsdienst Werkgelegenheid Arbeid en Sociaal Overleg & UNIA, Interfederaal 
Gelijke Kansen Centrum; OECD (2018). Settling In: Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2018. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
6 Demart, S., Schoumaker, B., Godin, M., & Adam (2017). Les Belgo-Congolais. Belgo-Rwandais et Belgo-Burundais. 
Un portrait de nos concitoyens d’ascendance africaine. Bruxelles: Fondation Roi Baudouin, p. 169.
































Better Beginnings, Better 
Prospects? 
Rethinking Dispersal and Housing Policies for 
Refugees in Belgium
by Hala El Moussawi
Refugees who have been forced to leave their country are faced with the challenge of 
starting their lives all over again. Interviews with Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Belgium 
have shown that the search for housing represents the main challenge for them. 
The process they go through turns out to be complicated and paved with insecurity. 
Without a decent place to live, it is difficult to move forward with their lives. How can 
one root oneself, build social networks and find a job without a stable home?
Upon arrival in Belgium, refugees are dispersed across the country in asylum centres 
to wait for the result of their asylum claim. This dispersal is done based on the capacity 
of these facilities, without focusing on the impact of such placements on the lives of 
refugees. Once they have been granted refugee status, individuals and families are asked 
to leave their asylum centres and find private housing. The challenging search for housing 
forces many of them to move repeatedly, sometimes from one end of the country to the 
other. Some even face the threat of homelessness. 
This insecurity has extremely negative effects on the wellbeing of refugees. A fixed 
domicile in a good location is a cornerstone for rebuilding their lives and rooting 
themselves in a new country.1 It is therefore essential to provide more structural assistance 
in the housing search and to rethink the modalities of dispersal. 
The story of Hany and Fida (pseudonyms) illustrates the type of problems refugee 
families confront during their first years in Belgium. Like many other Syrian families, 
Hany and Fida left their country because they feared persecution. They had also lost their 





























facilities were overcrowded. He was immediately sent to a temporary asylum centre in 
the surroundings of Bruges, where he was supposed to stay for fifteen days. Instead, he 
stayed there for nine months. 
He did not know anything about Belgium when he arrived. ‘I trusted that they would 
put me in the right place,’ he said, ‘but I did not expect to be sent far off into the countryside 
to live in poor conditions.’ Hany reports that the reception facility had only tents as 
accommodation, was overcrowded and cut off from the outside world. Despite these 
difficult living conditions, Hany started learning Dutch. He got to know the closest 
town, Bruges, made some friends and started making plans for a future life there with his 
family after leaving the asylum centre. 
When Hany received a positive answer to his asylum claim, he had to look for private 
accommodation. At that moment, he realised that there was no structural assistance for 
this step. ‘It was all left to luck,’ he said. Volunteers were coming daily to the centre and 
they helped Hany with his search, scouring websites and arranging visits. Just like many 
others, he received dozens of rejections from landlords, mainly because of his status and 
lack of job contract. As the deadline for leaving the centre was approaching, the centre’s 
administration told Hany that he would be put on the street if he did not find a place. 
Hany then expanded the search area. He was no longer looking only in Bruges but in the 
whole of Belgium. ‘I didn’t care any more. I needed a roof over my head to be able to start the 
family reunification procedure,’ he explained. 
Finally, he found a place in a village in the south-eastern part of Wallonia, 80 km south 
of Namur. But while he was waiting for his allocations from the local welfare office in 
order to pay the rent, the landlord decided to rent the place to someone else. Once again 
Hany was worried about being evicted. The social assistant at the welfare office helped 
him secure a temporary studio in the same area. She later also helped him find a house 
where he could bring his family once the family reunification procedure was completed. 
Resigned to starting all over again, Hany started French classes. 
When the family arrived, the kids started school and the parents were learning French. 
But the conditions were challenging: the village was remote, without public transport, 
access to medical care was difficult and there was no opportunity to build social networks, 
especially with Arabic-speaking communities. ‘We needed someone to converse with, and 
our French was still very bad. We also needed Halal meat, and there was none around us. 





























At that time, again by ‘a stroke of pure luck’, as explained by Hany, a fellow refugee he 
had met at the asylum centre put him in touch with an organisation that helps with the 
housing search for recognized refugees in Bruges and its surroundings. The organisation 
helped the family find an apartment in a town about 20km from Bruges. Hany and Fida 
first spent a couple of days making the apartment habitable, then the family moved in 
with the kids. A whole new phase in their life started now; the kids were moved to a 
Dutch-speaking school and the parents started Dutch classes. There was a glimmer of 
hope that they could start looking for work and settle down. 
However, as it soon became hard for this family of six to live in the two-bedroom 
apartment, they decided to look for bigger accommodation, maybe a house. With the 
help of a non-profit social rental office, the family found a four-bedroom house with a 
garden six kilometres outside Bruges. After three years of struggle with housing, Hany 
said that he was finally ready to move forward. ‘This is when I finally rested and felt some 
stability. I was ready for the next step.’ The whole family was now meeting people and 
building networks in Bruges. One year later, the landlord decided to sell the house. Once 
again, the family was faced with a deadline for finding a new place to live, this time having 
exhausted all the assistance they could call upon. 
The story of Hany and Fida highlights the instability many refugee families experience 
to find a secure place to live in, and the impact this has on their ability to start a new life. 
Neither Hany nor Fida were able to start working. Undoubtedly, many obstacles stood 
in their way, such as the recognition of previous degrees, adaptation to a new job market, 
learning the language, etc. But the challenge of finding a place to live played an important 
role as well. Because of the constant insecurity regarding their housing situation, they 
ended up moving many times and trying to learn two languages. In each place where they 
lived, they had to build up a new social network from scratch. All this delayed the search 
for a job. A better continuity in housing would have eased their inclusion in economic, 
cultural and societal spheres.
There is a serious lack of structural assistance for refugees to help them find a home 
in the housing market, hence that responsibility is left to volunteers or any friends that 
refugees might encounter. This gap is exacerbated by the structure of the Belgian housing 
market, as it is characterized by a major share of home ownership and a small share of 
social housing in the total housing stock. Waiting lists for social housing are very long, 
and many barriers are raised against vulnerable and precarious tenants who compete for 





























Their search for a rental flat or house can be more challenging because of discrimination, 
language barriers, and their unfamiliarity with the system and the rules.
To tackle this issue, it is important to raise the question of housing refugees to the top of 
the agenda as high priority. The state should provide a better structured and extended 
assistance system commanding greater resources. Another solution for smoothing the 
struggle for housing would be to invest more in transit accommodation, which covers 
the time between the stay in the asylum centre and finding a more permanent solution. 
Currently, there is already a wide network of local reception initiatives (LOI in Dutch) 
across Belgium. After leaving the asylum centre, most refugees are able to stay up to 
three months in a small-scale unit, sometimes longer in cases of medical vulnerability.2 
This is supposed to give them the time to look for a long-term housing solution. If the 
capacity of these local reception initiatives could be increased, the time spent in LOIs 
could be extended. This would then give refugees more time to find decent, stable 
accommodation and to start their lives in Belgium. 
More attention should also be given to the geography of these reception structures. Upon 
arrival in Belgium, asylum seekers are distributed across the country’s asylum centres. 
Many of these are situated in former military barracks in remote corners of the country. 
After leaving the centre, most end up in a LOI in another municipality, and this temporary 
accommodation can be located anywhere in Belgium. While the underlying logic of 
burden-sharing may make sense from a policy perspective, it does not match the long-term 
settlement needs of refugees.3 It forces many of them to start their lives in locations with 
poor public transport connections, a lack of ethnic services (such as halal food), few co-
ethnic groups and small chances of success in the labour market. Sending families to places 
without any consideration for their future prospects not only causes a great deal of distress 
to individuals, but also postpones the moment when they can start building their lives and 
livelihoods. Investing in LOIs in urban locations or well-connected municipalities would 
minimize the housing mobility of vulnerable people who are eager to settle down and rest 
after being displaced from their own home countries. In the long run, it would also enrich 
their social lives, improve their future work prospects and increase their chances of social 
mobility. 
1 Francis, J., & Hiebert, D. (2014). Shaky foundations: Refugees in Vancouver's housing market. The Canadian Geographer/ 
Le Géographe canadien, 58(1): 63-78.
2 El Moussawi, H., & Schuermans, N. (2020). From asylum to post-arrival geographies: Syrian and Iraqi refugees in 
Belgium. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie. Early view available on https://doi.org/10.1111/tesg.12469
3 Zetter, R., Griffiths, D., & Sigona, N. (2005). Social capital or social exclusion? The impact of asylum-seeker dispersal 




























Diverse Care Teams: The key to 
Improving the Quality of Health 
Care in Brussels
by Ann Roex, Rita Vanobberghen and Hakki Demirkapu
As the Brussels population becomes super diverse, care providers face enormous 
challenges in order to ensure delivery of quality of care to all. It is vital that all partners 
involved (governments, care organisations, hospitals, medical schools and care 
providers) take up their role in improving the quality. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines ‘quality of care’ as
“the extent to which health care services provided to individuals and 
patient populations improve desired health outcomes. In order to achieve 
this, health care must be safe, effective, timely, efficient, equitable and 
people-centred.”  1
The WHO shifts the focus of care from ‘treating diseases’ towards ‘managing the 
comprehensive needs of people and populations’. According to this new approach, it is not 
sufficient, for instance, to correct the sugar levels of all diabetic patients to normal; it also 
becomes essential to personalise patient treatment goals as well as management plans. 
This requires taking into account the individual patient’s medical status (other diseases 
also diagnosed), circumstances (e.g. living conditions), preferences (e.g. spiritual) and 
cultural background. While curative medicine still has room for improvement in this 
respect, even bigger challenges exist in the prevention of diseases. It is only possible to 
achieve higher levels of health and wellbeing in the population if goverments, society 
and individuals were to work more closely together and each played their part. This is the 




























on action across government and society for health and wellbeing. One of its key aims is 
to reduce health inequalities and strengthen public health in the European region.2
Unfortunately, qualitative care remains elusive in Brussels. Health inequities are 
considerable in its super diverse population with one third of its inhabitants living in 
poverty.3 The socio-economic gradient in health is strongly present and demonstrates 
current inequity of care. Even though the Belgian health system provides highly 
subsidised care, access to care is precarious for people living in poverty. In the Brussels 
region, almost half (46%) of people within the lowest quartile of income have 
postponed a visit to a doctor or dentist for financial reasons. Across Belgium, preventive 
programmes have the lowest reaction rate in Brussels. 
Without purposefully intending to, care and prevention programmes often discriminate 
against groups within the population. Different physical, cultural and socio-economic 
characteristics of people can be a ground for suppression, especially when different 
discriminating aspects intersect.4 For example, informative tools on diabetes, such as 
a leaflet or specialised website, provide dietary advice that is often written in language 
difficult to understand and based on an assumption that the patient has good financial 
resources and on a western type of diet. As a result, these tools cannot be used by ethnic 
minority groups with low levels of literacy and income or different cultural eating 
habits. 
The specific environment encountered in Brussels raises the question as to how the 
health care givers can organise themselves to provide its population with more effective 
and accessible person-centred care and more successful preventive actions. Hospitals, 
institutions and care organisations are faced with two major challenges. Firstly, they 
need to ascertain that the medical workforce is able to provide diversity-sensitive care. 
In order to do so, professionals need to possess the necessary knowledge about 
dimensions of diversity, cultural/gender sensitivities and access to care, skills in 
communication and working with interpreters, as well as attitudes as empathy and respect 
for others’ opinions and values. It has become common practice to include courses on 
diversity-sensitive competence in the curricula of medical and paramedical schools. 
Yet, transferring what is learned in the classroom towards the workplace is known to 
be very difficult and hindered by many interfering factors (e.g. low self-efficacy beliefs). 
This is also the case for diversity-sensitive competence. In other words, it is essential 
to offer caregivers ample training options and support during their professional work. 




























and poorly coordinated in Brussels. Organisations such as ‘Kenniscentrum vzw’, 
‘Cultures & santé’, ‘Vivo’, ‘Cultuursensitieve zorg’ and ‘Pigmentzorg’ put considerable 
effort into providing the caregivers with information and tools to implement diversity-
sensitive care. Nevertheless, these organisations are often unknown and insufficiently 
consulted by the general public. From a caregiver’s point of view, information is dispersed 
or overlapping, and also difficult to find in the complex and always changing organisation 
of care in Brussels. A central access point to all information, training modules and support 
tools for diversity-sensitive care could be really empowering to caregivers. 
Secondly, major efforts are required to make care teams more diverse. When a team 
consists of people with different ethnic, socioeconomic, cultural and religious 
backgrounds, the risks that the health care they provide is discriminatory are lower. 
Cancer treatment is a typical example. For instance, it becomes much more likely that 
a young woman with breast cancer who had recently migrated from Northern Africa 
would receive health care of better quality if the multidisciplinary oncology team 
includes a caregiver with a migration background. Diversity in care organisations is also 
key to innovation and a lever for change. A diverse team can identify possible grounds 
for discrimination more easily and is able to find creative solutions. Many care providers 
in Brussels make daily efforts to engage with their work teams, but are we sure that these 
teams are fully inclusive? Are the (para)medical schools training caregivers with a diverse 
socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, language, nationality, gender or religion? The 
results of a recent study by Roggemans and Spruyt5 shows that the students who succeed 
in passing the medical entrance exam across Flanders have very similar socioeconomic, 
linguistic and cultural backgrounds. In other words, considerable efforts are still required 
to empower students with diverse backgrounds to engage and succeed in (para) medical 
training and to participate in care teams. 
The ‘Diversity 3.0. Framework’ issued by the American Association of Medical Colleges 
(AAMC) guides medical educational institutions on how to advance inclusion and 
diversity in their student population.6 They describe how a climate of inclusion is a 
prerequisite for the composition of diverse teams or schools. This is an environment 
in which every individual feels respected, and in which every member engages herself 
towards the team and the community. In such a context, caregivers are evaluated on 
their engagement in care delivery and not on their personal characteristics. Creating 
such a climate requires targeted action at various levels. Legislation and procedures can 
be implemented in the policy arena to ensure that students with different backgrounds 




























These schools can also contribute to a more inclusive education – for instance, by 
implementing Human Resource policies designed for diverse teaching teams, through 
the adoption of diversity-sensitive professional dress codes and by offering extra support 
for students with limited social networks. Finally, administrators, faculty, professional 
staff and students are able to contribute to an inclusive climate by committing to the 
new policies (e.g. guiding students towards extra support) and reorienting their services 
towards a more diverse student population (e.g. diversity-sensitive communication 
skills). 
Brussels’ super diverse population presents challenges for the organisation and delivery 
of health care. In order to attain an acceptable quality of care in all its dimensions, people 
at different levels of health care education and health care support must be motivated 
to take up this challenge. Creative, well thought-through and consistent actions are 
required to tackle the existing disparities in health care. Let’s not forget that it is precisely 
the diversity in our teams that will be instrumental for delivering qualitative care to a 
super diverse population. 
1 How do we define quality of care? World Health Organisation. Available at https://www.who.int/maternal_
child_adolescent/topics/quality-of-care/definition/en/ (Last consulted on 15 April 2020).
2 Health 2020: the European policy for health and well-being. Available at http://www.euro.who.int/en/ 
health-topics/health-policy/health-2020-the-european-policy-for-health-and-well-being (Last consulted on 15 
April 2020).
3 Observatorium voor Gezondheid en Welzijn (2019). Welzijnsbarometer. Brussels armoederapport. Brussel. 
4 Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-
discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum, issue 1, 
article 8. 
5 Roggemans, L., & Spruyt, B. (2014). Toelatingsproef (tand)arts: een sociografische schets van de deelnemers 
en geslaagden, Brussel: Onderzoeksgroep TOR, Vakgroep Sociologie, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. 
6 Nivet, M., Castillo-Page, L., & Schoolcraft Conrad, S. A. (2016). Diversity and Inclusion Framework for Medical 




























For Equal Access to Care, 
Awareness-Raising on Implicit 
Bias is Quintessential 
by Dirk Lafaut and Marjolein Schepers
In many European welfare states, the rights of migrants to social security are eroding 
or under pressure. This is also the case in Belgium. The new Flemish government, for 
example, proposed in its 2019 governing agreement to restrict migrants’ access to care 
and social support even further. Newcomers will only be able to access the Flemish Care 
Fund after ten years of residence, five of which must be uninterrupted. Asylum seekers 
will be exempt from child support grants in Flanders.  
Migrants have different rights to social support and healthcare than citizens, and they 
are also prone to be treated differently. Individuals with similar entitlements receive 
different treatment. This also refers to personal assessments of care providers. Decisions 
of care providers and health professionals are based on formal entitlements, but also on 
moral criteria and public representations about who deserves care, such as stereotypes 
represented in public media. Health practitioners and social workers undeniably have 
personal biases. These result in discretionary practices towards individuals based on 
social categories, such as being a migrant.
Different treatment of migrants by health professionals has also been demonstrated in 
a historical context. The care system has always left room for discretionary decision-
making, i.e. the freedom to decide what should be done in particular situations. While 
this discretion is crucial to decision-making in care, it causes barriers and inequalities 
in access to social support and healthcare. Hence, we need to raise more awareness of 




























Rights versus access today
In Belgium undocumented migrants can obtain access to health care which is regulated 
through a federal legal framework of medical cards. These cards provide a 3-month 
permit to access the regular public healthcare services. They can be obtained after 
meetings with a physician and the public social welfare office (called OCMW in Dutch 
and CPAS in French) in the municipality of residence. The law on Urgent Medical Aid 
states that social workers from the OCMW/CPAS must conduct a social inquiry before 
granting a medical card. This inquiry should confirm the insolvency or indigence of the 
undocumented migrant. The federal Public Planning Service (PPS) Social Integration 
subsequently covers the healthcare costs of undocumented migrants with medical cards.
 
Legislation on access to medical services for undocumented migrants in Belgium is 
currently poorly implemented.1 Although the law on Urgent Medical Aid provides 
equal health care rights to undocumented migrants and other Belgian residents, 
inequalities exist in practice. Both the utilization rate and the per-capita expenditure for 
undocumented migrants are far lower than those of other Belgian residents. Discretionary 
interpretations and decisions of clinicians and social welfare staff (OCMW/CPAS) 
largely determine whether urgent medical aid is granted to undocumented migrants. 
Children, for example, are granted care more readily, as their undocumented status 
is not considered to be their own responsibility. Furthermore, general perceptions of 
vulnerability, as well as the perceived charitability of illnesses, influence the willingness 
of officials to provide help. Most often a pregnant woman will be helped more adequately 
than a young man with knee problems. An HIV patient will obtain healthcare more easily 
than a diabetic patient with high blood pressure. Undocumented migrants also mention 
the importance of adopting a passive attitude and showing acceptance, politeness, 
kindness, patience, gratitude or submission in order to obtain access to healthcare. 
The longer that undocumented migrants have stayed in Belgium, the more likely they 
are to have access to healthcare.2 
Rights versus access in a historical perspective
Such instances of selectivity of care towards migrants have been common phenomena 
throughout history. This resonated in daily decision-making practices in eighteenth-




























between rural parishes. As the British historian Steven King put it, not every single 
mother was treated the same by welfare officials in the 18th and 19th centuries.3 Instead, 
there was room for negotiation on poor relief applications. Public poor relief was the 
early modern precursor of national welfare, which evolved since the Middle Ages from 
earlier traditions of charity. It lasted until the implementation of national welfare after 
the Second World War. Poor relief comprised old-age pensions, subsidies for healthcare, 
unemployment benefits and other forms of what we would now call ‘social rights’. 
However, relief was not a right, and it left open discretion to authorities on its application. 
Outcomes of such negotiations were based on more personal aspects such as kinship 
and friendship, and also on notions of belonging to the community. For example, older 
migrants in eighteenth-century Flanders who were no longer able to work were often 
considered deserving of help; migrant women whose husbands had recently passed away 
were also generally considered deserving of support. 
Selectivity towards individuals could be based on personal bias of decision-makers, 
but it was also employed instrumentally. Policymakers could change the criteria for 
migrants’ access to poor relief in function of the needs of the labour market. Brubaker, 
for example, argued that authorities extended the social rights of immigrants during 
periods of labour demand in twentieth-century Europe.4 Eighteenth-century rural 
parishes in England and in Flanders alike on the other hand allowed their inhabitants to 
move somewhere else while still receiving relief from the parish. In this way, they tried to 
promote an efficient labour allocation and to limit dependence on poor relief by allowing 
the poor to move in search of better means of survival. Notions of whether or not someone 
belonged and deserved health care thus depended upon more general considerations 
of the economic utility of the individual. They also relied on more personal and moral 
criteria of indigence, belonging and kinship. These criteria were subject to change, were 
bound by space and time, and most of all, were subject to individual decision-making.5
There are striking parallels between the decision-making processes regarding 
(undocumented) migrants’ access to care today and in the past. Welfare resources are 
limited to a certain community (nowadays the nation state) and are redistributed to a 
limited number of people. These limits presuppose criteria on inclusion and exclusion 
from welfare. Although laws exist on criteria for access to welfare, there was – and 
still is – ample room for deviation in daily decision-making. Such deviations are not 
surprising from the perspective of social history. Earlier research into the inclusion of 
immigrants, for example in asylum procedures, has demonstrated the role of on-the-




























form additional factors that complicate the decision-making of care providers in a way 
similar to other well-known biases based on gender or age. The informal mechanisms of 
including and excluding ‘outsiders’ in health care have remained relatively unchanged. 
Although the actual care might have evolved, the welfare system is still characterized 
by selectivity and instrumentalization. It is only the definition of ‘migrants’ that has 
dramatically changed, from short-distance to international travellers. A person who was 
considered a ‘migrant’ in 18th-century Flanders is a far cry from whoever is considered 
to be a ‘migrant’ nowadays. 
Transforming care practices
Practitioners need room for discretionary decision-making. However, this raises 
difficult ethical questions about what should be done to tackle disparities in care. Such 
disparities point to the broader patterns of inequality. One possible response to these 
inequalities directs attention towards individual healthcare providers. Professional 
competence training, for example, is designed to raise self-awareness of implicit 
bias and selectivity. Healthcare professionals could then be invited to re-orient 
their decision-making practices. They could change discriminatory care practices 
to develop an orientation toward migrants that is more ‘neutral’. Such training urges 
health professionals to eliminate prejudices about the type of individual deserving 
care, and to treat everybody equal before the law, regardless of their origin.   
Such efforts are however limited, as they only target the individual encounters between 
professionals and migrants. Locating the source of healthcare disparities identified by 
discretionary practices of individual health professionals may well obscure the broader 
structural factors that shape inequalities in care. Moreover, such competence training 
only offers limited answers. It does not address situations in which care providers are 
faced with legal limitations on access to care. In such contexts, individual efforts to 
eliminate personal engagement and treat everybody as equal under the law could be 
considered as a form of complicity, encouraging health professionals and social workers 
to adopt attitudes of relativism and apathy. 
In short, proper care for migrants requires self-awareness among care providers of their 
biases in their representation of ‘who deserves care’. This implies a permanent exercise 




























1 Roberfroid, D., Dauvrin, M., & Keygnaert, I. (2015). What healthcare for undocumented migrants in Belgium?, 
Brussels.
2 Lafaut, D. (2020) .“I was trying to speak to their human side” Coping responses of undocumented migrants to 
barriers in healthcare access in urban settings in Belgium. International Journal of Migration, Health and Social 
Care. Vol. ahead-of-print. 
3 King, S. (2013). Poor relief, settlement and belonging in England 1780s to 1840s (pp. 81-101). In: S. King & 
A. Winter (eds.), Migration, settlement and belonging in Europe, 1500–1930s. New York.
4 Brubaker, W. R. (1989). Membership without citizenship. The economic rights of non-citizens  (pp. 145-162). 
In: W. R. Brubaker (ed.), Immigration and the politics of citizenship in Europe and North-America. Lanham.
5 Schepers, M. (2018). Should they stay or should they go now? The discretionary character of poor relief, settle-
ment and removal in the Low Countries. BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review, 133(3): 48-71.
to existing legislation. It also requires transforming care practices in an ethical way, in 
a context of constantly changing – and increasingly restrictive – policies and public 
representations about care provision for migrants. It is essential that care providers 
adopt a critical attitude towards authority as well as a personalised approach towards 
beneficiaries. Their individual  efforts can obviously not be disconnected from  more 
collective efforts (e.g. by medical professional associations) to defend health rights and 




























The Fallacy of Migrants-Culture 
Preventing Access to Care in 
Later Life
by Saloua Berdai-Chaouni, Ann Claeys, Sylvia Hoens, Honghui Pan, An-Sofie Smetcoren
 
The ageing population of Europe is increasingly diverse. In Belgium, migrants are 
becoming a significant part of this population. However, up to the present day, access 
to healthcare services for this population has been hampered. Researchers and policy-
makers often argue that the cause of older migrants’ difficult access to care is ‘cultural 
barriers’. However, it is time to consider the role that institutionalized inequality plays in 
explaining the care barriers for older migrants, and more specifically, the intersection of 
racism and ageism. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, labour migrants arrived to fulfil the need for low-skilled 
workers in the mines and industry. At present, this group represents the first wave of 
ageing migrants in Belgian society and foreshadows an increasingly older population 
with a migration background, especially in the cities. In 2020 nearly half of Brussels’ 
population aged 65+ has a migration background. Although this diversification of the 
ageing population had been predicted, neither policymakers nor migrant communities 
were prepared for this evolution. The migrant communities kept alive their ‘dream’ of 
returning one day to their country of origin. These communities, and along with them 
the Belgian society and policymakers, were – and to some extent still are – oblivious to 
this natural process of ageing with its particular challenges and opportunities. It was only 
around 2000 that some policymakers started questioning who are these older migrants 
and do they have special needs?
Research into the intersection of migration and ageing has only emerged since the start 
of the millennium and the topic of ageing of migrants is still under-researched today. 
Our current knowledge about this population in Western Europe is limited and 




























policies regarding access to care by ageing migrants is the predominating attention paid 
to the culture of ageing migrants and how it shapes their life. This focus results in a one-
sided identification of this ageing population with ‘their’ culture. In other words, older 
migrants are assimilated with ‘their’ culture and seen as the ‘Other’. Since ‘culture’ is 
generally not defined or operationalized in the relevant policy documents and research, 
it is unclear what this term exactly means. In addition, ‘culture’ seems to have different 
meanings and is commonly perceived as a feature solely of people with a migration 
background, not of people from the dominant group. In the Belgian context, this focus 
on culture often means that the older migrant population is reduced to non-European, 
Muslim, people with coloured skin and ageing ‘Others’. 
This implies that individual factors other than cultural (such as life history, socio-
economic position, gender, religion, etc.) are overlooked in shaping the ageing experience 
of migrants. Additionally, other societal mechanisms (like the collective image that we 
have about ‘ageing’ and ‘migrants’) are often overlooked as influencers of this ageing 
experience of migrants. The dominant societal framework for the intersection of ‘ageing’ 
and ‘migration’ is negative in the West. The ageing population is often seen as dependent 
on, not contributing to, society via labour, hence becoming a societal economic burden 
and overconsuming ‘our’ healthcare. Migrants are also considered as a burden to ‘our’ 
society while we ignore their added value; for example, the contribution of migrant 
labourers to the construction of post-WWII Belgium is rarely recognized. In other 
words, being an older migrant is still perceived as a double burden on society. 
Older migrants are underserved in (health)care services, yet their cultural background 
is regularly put forward as the sole explanation for their limited access. This one-sided 
explanation confirms common myths about this population like, ‘in their culture, they 
care for their ageing parents’ or ‘they turn back to their country of origin when they age’. These 
myths prevent the awareness of practices of ‘othering’ as a possible underlying factor that 
can explain the lack of access to care for ageing migrants. The concept of ‘othering’ can 
be understood as an identification process through which boundaries are set between 
the ‘self ’ and the ‘others’ based on categorizations often set up in situations of inequality. 
Ageing migrants are considered as double the burden of ‘others’ because of the 
combination of their migrant origin and their age. Let us look a bit closer at examples of 
‘othering’ practices based on the ethnicity of older migrants. Several studies that include 
the stories of older migrants and their family caregivers point to the discrimination and 
racism experienced during their encounters with public services. As a family caregiver 




























me and to my father. Without any respect, like we were animals…it hurts me that my father 
has to endure such a racism at this stage of his life...’ .2 Not just culture but racism too is 
experienced as an additional barrier to access to care. 
The ‘othering’ of these groups influences how service providers engage with them.3 
Based on their skin colour, name, clothing and religious symbols (especially those 
associated with Islam), older adults are perceived as ‘different’ or ‘Other’ and are 
therefore approached differently by service providers. For example, care professionals 
categorize migrant care recipients based on their assumption on how ‘similar’ or how 
‘different’ this person is perceived to be compared with themselves. Both assumptions 
lead to a homogenous image of this person that influences the attitude of providing care 
to them. Overemphasising ‘otherness’, for example, can lead to feelings of uncertainty 
by professional caregivers, fuelled by an essentialist view of this ‘other’ group, thus 
preventing them from seeing the ‘person’ with his or her individual care needs. One 
example is automatically giving ‘Halal’ food to an older migrant based on their Arabic-
sounding name without even asking about his/her dietary wishes. This discrimination 
from provision of person-centred care can also be the result of the assumption of 
‘sameness’ of older migrants. Another example is the fact that cultural and religious 
needs of older European migrants, like Italians, are often not considered because they 
are assumed to be like ‘us’, referring to the dominant group of Belgo-Belgians. 
In addition to ethnicity-based othering, older migrants also seem to be subjected 
to age-based othering: ageism, i.e. the automatic negative image of older people as 
perceived by society. The ageist attitude toward ageing populations in the West is a 
seventh barrier to access services in addition to affordability, accessibility, availability, 
adequacy, acceptability and awareness.4 Older migrants are also affected by this general 
societal attitude. General manifestations of ageist actions (like taking over the decision-
making ability of older persons or bypassing older persons in their communication 
with caregivers) are accelerated by the language barrier faced by older migrants. Being 
dependent on close relatives for care and other decision-making can reduce the capability 
of older migrants to establish an independent relationship with care and social services. 
This leads to a feeling of loss of autonomy. However, this results from the fact that this 
first generation had already relied on their children for overcoming existing barriers in 
their contacts with services at a younger age. Because language courses for migrants were 
not provided at the time, and most services had no interpreters, this first generation of 
migrants had to rely on their young children to bridge the language barrier. This reliance 




























apparently resolves to some extent any communication- and administration-related 
accessibility barriers within public services. However, this can introduce an invisible 
barrier of ageism. 
It follows that the ‘othering’ of older migrants as a result of the intersection of ageism 
and racism presents a clearly overlooked barrier that hinders access to care services by 
older migrants. Although both migrant and non-migrant older adults experience ageism, 
which already hampers their access to services, racism is added to the explanatory 
cocktail against older migrants. This complex and invisible reality challenges the 
essentialist image of older migrants. Accessibility to services is not only defined by 
the presumed culture of older migrants’. For these older populations accessibility is 
also hampered by structural and organizational barriers that are influenced by the two 
forces of racism and ageism. Therefore, working towards providing accessible services 
for all older adults in our society can only be achieved in a societal context if society 
acknowledges and resists its ageist and racist structural mechanisms.
1 Torres, S. (2019). Ethnicity and old age: Expanding our imagination (Ageing in a Global Context). London: Policy 
Press. 
2 Berdai-Chaouni, S., Smetcoren, A.-S., & De Donder, L. (2020). Caring for migrant older Moroccans with dementia 
in Belgium as a complex and dynamic transnational network of informal and professional care: A qualitative 
study. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 101, 103413.
3 Milberg A., Torres S., & Ågård P. (2016). Health Care Professionals’ Understandings of cross-Cultural Interaction 
in End-of-Life Care: A Focus Group Study. PLoS ONE 11(11): e0165452.
4  Fret, B., De Donder, L., Lambotte, D., Dury, S., Van der Elst, M., De Witte, N., Switsers, L., Hoens, S., Van Regenmortel, 
S., & Verté, D. (2019). Access to care of frail community-dwelling older adults in Belgium: a qualitative study. 




























Foster Families Caring for 
Unaccompanied Refugee 
Minors Need to Be Supported
by Frank Van Holen and Johan Vanderfaeillie
Unaccompanied refugee minors are refugee children who have been separated from 
both parents and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible 
for doing so. From 2014 to 2018 no fewer than 5,517 asylum seekers in Belgium were 
declared as unaccompanied refugee minors. A major decision at arrival in Belgium 
regards the provision of a suitable living environment and appropriate care. Family foster 
care is increasingly put forward as the option of choice for these youngsters. Indeed, a 
narrative literature review showed that unaccompanied refugee minors placed in family 
foster care had better mental health outcomes and developed better than youngsters 
cared for in less supportive environments such as residential care, large refugee centers, 
or semi-autonomous or autonomous environments.1 Nevertheless, these youngsters 
are very vulnerable. Behavioural problems, trauma symptoms and cultural differences 
pose particular challenges to foster families. Therefore foster families who are caring for 
unaccompanied refugee minors need to be supported. 
Challenges
In line with international research, a recent Flemish study showed that unaccompanied 
refugee minors placed in family foster care have more behavioural problems and more 
trauma symptoms than Flemish-Dutch youngsters.2 Moreover, the level of resilience 
(the capacity to adapt positively in the context of significant risk or adversity) is lower 
when compared to Flemish-Dutch youngsters. This study also stressed the importance 
of social contact for these youngsters. Social contact with people regardless of their 




























their age (youngster or adult) is positively associated with mitigated trauma symptoms. 
Furthermore, social contact with autochthonous (Belgian) people is positively associated 
with fewer behavioural problems. However, it remains unclear whether social contact 
shields minors from trauma and behavioural problems or whether trauma symptoms 
and behavioural problems themselves lead to reduced social contact.
Although a placement in a foster family is associated with positive outcomes for many 
unaccompanied refugee minors, the breakdown of any such placement (premature, 
unplanned ending of placements due to negative reasons such as behavioural problems, 
running away, parenting problems) is a matter of concern. It was found that 14% of the 
placements of unaccompanied refugee minors in foster care broke down during the first 
year of placement.3 Three factors are associated with placement breakdown. Youngsters 
who experience traumatic events during their stay in Belgium are at greater risk of 
placement breakdown, while youngsters who have social contacts with peers of the same 
culture and with Belgian peers have a smaller likelihood of placement breakdown.
Regarding foster families, a distinction is often made between foster families with the 
same or a different cultural background than that of the unaccompanied refugee minor. 
However, results of international research regarding the preferability of culturally 
matched placements (in foster families with the same cultural background) above 
cross-cultural placements (in foster families with a different cultural background) are 
inconclusive.4 In addition, two Flemish studies show that the cultural background of the 
foster family is not a decisive factor affecting either the well-being of the unaccompanied 
refugee minor5 or the risk of breakdown during the first year of placement.6
Foster parents need support in order to fulfil their promising role in the care of 
unaccompanied refugee minors. Important differences exist between foster families 
depending on their cultural backgrounds. Foster families from the same culture are not 
always able to offer a high-quality child-rearing environment.7 Many of them also have 
a migration background, have gone through a stressful flight with traumatic experiences 
and face additional challenges such as financial problems, culture shock, learning the 
language, finding employment and racism in their post migration country. Foster 
parents with a different cultural background than that of the unaccompanied refugee 
minor (autochthonous foster parents) need to receive specific support in order to be 
able to provide appropriate care. They stress the importance of proper preparation of the 
unaccompanied refugee minor for family foster care, who should be given information 




























support related to their trauma histories. Foster carers themselves need to be briefed 
by experienced foster care workers, with openness to and information about culture, 
religion and language.8
Towards solutions
As unaccompanied refugee minors are at risk due to their trauma symptoms and 
behavioural problems, screening for and assessment of their mental health is 
recommended, and also provision of therapeutic treatment where needed. Furthermore, 
as resilience is not guaranteed, counselling that encourages resilience may be needed 
too. These sessions should aim to establish positive relationships with peers and adults, 
independence, autonomy and self-efficacy, and a sense of belonging. Moreover, special 
attention should be given to traumatic events experienced while being in Belgium. 
Intensive and structured collaboration between the professional services involved in the 
care of this target group (e.g. schools, psychological services, youth care facilities, social 
services) is key to meeting the needs of unaccompanied refugee minors in a more than 
adequate manner. As well as specialized support, social contact seems to be an important 
protective factor with regard to trauma symptoms and behavioural problems, and 
placement breakdown too. Facilitating contacts with peers and adults as well as people 
from the same culture as the autochthonous community is of major importance. Social 
contact promotes integration, mitigates trauma and behavioural problems and promotes 
placement stability. Therefore, activities that encourage social contact (such as schooling 
and leisure activities) are highly recommended.
When unaccompanied refugee minors are placed in foster care families, thorough 
assessment of the quality of the child-rearing environment of the foster family is 
recommended. Foster care agencies must ensure that the parenting environment is 
of sufficient quality and, if not, support should be given to fill any gaps (e.g. parenting 
support, social housing, adequate medical care) in order to improve the quality of 
the environment offered by the foster family in need of help to meet predetermined 
standards. Foster care agencies must ensure that foster parents with a different cultural 
background than that of the fostered child should be well prepared, trained, supervised 
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If foster care is going to fulfil its intended role when receiving the assignment from the 
reception center for unaccompanied refugee minors, there is a pressing need for adapted 
care, specialized services and support in various areas, assisting both the unaccompanied 






























Newcomers: a Village to Raise  
a Child, One Trustee to Lead  
the Way
by Liesbet De Backer
Unaccompanied minors arriving in Brussels face huge challenges. Acquiring residence 
status, finding accommodation, setting up a life project and learning at least one new 
language are just a few of the many tasks ahead of them. Such complex and multi-layered 
challenges require a coordinated approach, but the organizations accommodating 
these youngsters testify to the opposite. They point out structural weaknesses and 
inconsistencies in the present support system that cause immense difficulties for these 
new arrivals and negatively affect their further trajectories. These organizations agree on 
one point: they all explicitly condemn the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the current 
policy for welcoming young newcomers. The stories from the youngsters themselves 
confirm this, revealing the leading role played by coincidence in the current system: 
while some youngsters are lucky, many others are not 
Mustafa A arrives in Belgium before the age of 12. He is immediately assigned to a 
guardian and, due to his young age, is accommodated under the authority of Youthcare. 
During the first months of his stay he immerses himself fully in the new language: he 
follows introductory classes for non-native speakers in a school that accommodates 
high numbers of newcomers, so grouping him with youngsters of similar literacy 
levels. Mustafa makes a running start: after a year he is ready for mainstream education. 
The transition proves to be challenging, but the new school receives the necessary 
support from a follow-up coach assigned by his first school. Before long, Mustafa 
starts finding his way about and manages to make friends with a couple of classmates. 
In the residential setting he calls home he is part of a small group with a high assistant- 




























Mustafa’s guardian stays in close contact with his pupil, while still managing to 
coordinate his trajectory. The guardian helps to shape Mustafa’s aspirations, his social 
assistant’s approach and his family’s expectations into a coherent future project. 
By the time Mustafa turns 16, he starts longing for greater autonomy. At his own pace, 
he begins to assume more responsibilities for the practical set-up of his independent 
life. Gradually he incorporates into his own network the professional networks linked 
to his social assistant, guardian, school, etc. Approaching the age of 18, Mustafa has 
worked out how to manage and follow his own path. Meanwhile the actors who had 
been central to Mustafa’s life have increasingly positioned themselves on the sidelines. 
‘I’m always surrounded by warm people. That makes me a 100% happy,’ he comments.
Mustafa B is 15 when he arrives in a centre for observation and orientation. This centre 
accommodates large numbers of youngsters, therefore guidance is often limited to 
logistics and chaos control. Mustafa feels intimidated by these circumstances and melts 
into the crowd. After this first phase, he is transferred to a large-scale centre in the south 
of the country. He would have preferred to be learning Dutch because many members 
of his community are living in Flanders. Mustafa does not thrive in this situation. 
He experiences sleep difficulties and suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Neither the centre nor his school have the means to provide the much-needed 
psychological help. He does have a guardian but has only met him once or twice. 
Mustafa’s language development is stagnating. In the centre he only talks to a couple 
of peers in the local dialect of his home region. Nevertheless, he gets transferred to an 
independent living unit. Worries over the precarity of the situation of his family back 
home prevent him from attending school. By combining several illegal jobs, Mustafa 
manages to send his family some money. But due to his repeated attempts to find 
housing in the Brussels private property market, he continues to miss classes. Available 
housing options are depressing, but he sees no alternative. He gets caught in a vicious 
circle through digging financial holes then taking on badly paid jobs to settle his debts. 
When I ask who supports him the most in his young life, he answers: ‘My mother, but 
I can’t tell whether or not she is currently alive’. 
Although Mustafas A and B are clearly extremes at either end of a continuum, this 
narrative is not a plea for polarized or dichotomous thinking. What is important to point 
out is that all nuanced cases falling between these two extremes are also heavily driven 
by coincidence. As such, these stories of coincidence-driven and dispersed trajectories 




























For unaccompanied minor newcomers, and even for the actors supporting them, the 
accommodation and support system set in place is a maze. From the moment they arrive 
in Belgium until the moment they turn 18, many unaccompanied minors move from 
one authority to another. Arrival trajectories are not only highly complex, lived reality 
is far from the imaginary ideal dreamed up by bureaucrats. Due to lack of space in youth 
care accommodation centres, many unaccompanied minor newcomers do not receive 
the specialized assistance they need. It does not help matters that there appear to be 
significant variations in the quality of care and support afforded to unaccompanied 
minors, and the advice issued by a range of organizations is often conflicting. Lastly, this 
situation seems to be more visible in Brussels than in the rest of the country. Many of the 
actors in the Brussels area portray Brussels as an atypical and particularly challenging 
context for this target group, especially in terms of administrative accessibility, literacy 
and access to adequate support. At the moment, Brussels is a patchwork of Flemish and 
Wallonian integration models linked to different approaches. In Belgium the vulnerable 
status of unaccompanied minor newcomers thus seems to be aggravated by the complex 
institutional puzzle that faces them.
In practice, how do the inconsistencies of the Belgian support system negatively 
impact the arrival and further trajectories of unaccompanied minor newcomers? First-
hand accounts from these youngsters reveal that moving from one residential setting 
to the next is not just about changing houses. Residential moves result in breaches of 
all kinds: creating gaps in a support system and linked approaches, breaking ties and 
fragmenting a personal network. By the time these youngsters reach the age of 18, such 
fragmented trajectories usually result in fragmented networks. Yet these networks are 
vital to make the precarious transition from dependence to independence in order to live 
as an adult. When you compare their trajectories to those of youngsters born in Belgium 
and fully supported in their development for 18 years (both by personal networks and 
governmental policies), it is easy to see that the inadequacies of the current system will 
mark unaccompanied minor newcomers for life.
We should be capable of doing a better job. Pilot projects such as Minor L!nk and 
Steunfiguren by Minor Ndako and Parrainage by Mentor Escale in Brussels reveal that 
the guaranteed presence of just one support figure can make a huge difference in the 
life of a youngster, providing comprehensive, systematic and transparent guidance on 
a constant basis. This could remedy a youngster’s complex reality that seems so subject 
to the laws of chance. All that is needed is one person with a thorough knowledge of the 




























central role in the life of the minor and by providing information, orientation and follow-
up could steer him through the bureaucratic maze of Belgium in general, and Brussels in 
particular. 
To this end, one option would be to diversify and standardize the responsibilities of the 
guardian. With more resources, fewer pupils per guardian, and a checklist that can serve 
as a guideline for preparing pupils for adulthood, guardians could provide not only legal 
but also social support to minors. Another option would be to split up the current job 
description of the guardian. As their job requires specific knowledge and skills, guardians 
would dedicate their time to the legal representation of their minors, while the domain 
of societal assistance would be taken up by a so-called buddy. This support figure would 
be given a formal role in the youngster’s life, and – if the minor asked for this – would 
direct him towards appropriately helpful actors in the field. 
In its current legislature, the Flemish government already provides buddies to newcomers 
for 40 hours per person. While this measure is a step in the right direction, in my opinion 
a properly customized support can only be guaranteed if the intensity and the timeframe 
of the support were to be defined by the circumstances and the needs of the minor, 
rather than vice versa. 
It costs money to customize support. But research in the field of social work has shown 
that the costs of preventive measures are lower than the financial burden linked to 
several years of full-time specialized care. All youngsters need a steady guide in our 
institutionally complex city (and country as a whole). While we might not have the 
power to substantially simplify Belgium’s political and administrative structures right 




























Until the Lion Has a Voice, the 
Tales of the Hunt Will Only Be 
Those of the Hunter
by Elisabeth Bekers and Ilke Froyen
From the New Oxford Dictionary definition of the word ‘canon’ as a ‘list of literary works 
considered to be permanently established as being of the highest quality’, one could 
easily infer that literature is above and beyond politics. However, the permanence of any 
such list is to be taken with a large pinch of salt. Throughout literary history, authors 
and works have come in and out of fashion. These fluctuations have as much to do with 
trends in literary style as with the broader sociocultural and political contexts in which 
the texts emerge and the canon is selected. In Salman Rushdie’s words, ‘works of art, even 
works of entertainment, do not come into being in a social and political vacuum; and 
[…] the way they operate in a society cannot be separated from politics, from history’.1 
Consequently, the production of literature and the formation of the canon are subjected 
to past and present social discriminations. 
Feminists, for example, have sought to redress the long-time absence of works authored 
by women from the canon, while postcolonial critics have taken issue with the ongoing 
marginalization of writers from the (former) colonies. In her 1929 essay ‘A Room of 
One’s Own’, Virginia Woolf famously complained that Shakespeare’s equally gifted 
imaginary sister Judith never would have been given the opportunity to nurture her 
writing talent. Even women who against these odds did manage to create literature 
have not always received due recognition. Despite Woolf ’s tribute, in the same essay, to 
the literary genius of Aphra Behn (1649-1689), this female dramatist was still missing 
from the well-known Norton Anthology of English Literature when the authors of this 
article were students. Three decades later, Norton readers are luckier. Behn is no longer 
excluded; neither is Olaudah Equiano, whose 1789 slave narrative was the first book-
length autobiography by an African in English. In the late twentieth century, feminist, 




























much to the diversification of the literary canon. Especially writers with backgrounds 
of colonisation and histories of relocation have received increasing acknowledgment. 
This is reflected in the greater variety of English-language authors who have won the 
Nobel Prize for Literature since 1985, including the Nigerian (Yoruba) dramatist Wole 
Soyinka, the African American novelist Toni Morrison and the Japanese-born British 
author Kazuo Ishiguro. But changes are slow. As recently as 2019, Black British writer 
Bernardine Evaristo became only the first woman of colour to receive the Man Booker 
Prize, an achievement that was somewhat overshadowed by her having to share the red 
carpet with white Canadian author Margaret Atwood.
The expansion of the literary canon is not only significant in terms of the aesthetic 
innovations that are introduced; it also has a profound political impact, for ‘until the lion 
has a voice, the tales of the hunt will be only those of the hunter’ (Eritrean proverb). It 
therefore is imperative to broaden the literary field with authors whose writing moves 
beyond age-old, hegemonic perceptions and practices. Literature can help to open 
people’s minds and hearts to a widening range of voices, views, histories and tales. With its 
unique ability to deploy a myriad of genres, styles and forms, literature is able to provide 
not simply ‘fifty shades of grey’ but an infinite range of hues, moods and atmospheres. 
Literature can grant visibility, speech and agency to previously marginalised population 
groups, even to the point of reinserting them into histories from which they were – or 
still are – being erased. It can restore to readers a sense of the past that is not affected by 
a historical amnesia regarding its darkest pages. Literature can also give readers access 
to worlds they will never physically enter. It can expose them to perspectives and ideas 
they will never come across in their daily lives or read in the postings of their like-minded 
social media groups. Not surprisingly, theory-of-mind research has shown that reading 
literary fiction enhances one’s understanding of the mental states of others and that avid 
readers are more likely to develop a greater capacity for empathy.2 
Teachers and other promoters of literature in today’s increasingly pluricultural and 
multilingual society therefore have the indispensable role of broadening readers’ 
horizons by encouraging them to explore literature produced in an expanding variety of 
contexts. At university it is important that students of English Literary Studies should 
be taught not only the works of long-established white male icons of literary history. 
Alongside Chaucer and Shakespeare, they ought to read the Brontë sisters, whose 
masterful accounts of impossible love in the desolate wuthering heights of Yorkshire 
or in mid-nineteenth-century cosmopolitan Brussels were omitted from F.R. Leavis’s 




























English by historical and contemporary authors from beyond Britain’s shores. Students 
should learn, for example, how the late-eighteenth-century African Equiano inserts 
himself into the British canon by drawing on the literary techniques of Daniel Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe (1719) to narrate his journey from enslavement to freedom and 
abolitionist activism. Or how, in the course of the twentieth century, as Rushdie proclaims, 
“the Empire writes back”3 against the (former) colonial centre and shifts attention to 
the experiences and perspectives of the literary descendants of Man Friday, Robinson 
Crusoe’s colonial servant.4 But these writers ought not to be treated as mere sociological 
informants. At the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, for example, students are made aware that 
contemporary black women are not only introducing innovatory themes into the British 
literary scene, but are also experimenting with an array of literary techniques (narrative 
reversal, deconstructive humour, linguistic experimentation, generic hybridisation, 
metafiction etc.). At least in literary terms, it can be said that there is some ‘Black in 
the Union Jack’,5 a case in point being Evaristo’s multi-voiced poetic novel Girl, Woman, 
Other (2019). But the Man Booker Prize’s tardiness in honouring its first woman writer 
of colour confirms that the ongoing efforts at decolonising the canon, including the 
university’s literary curriculum, should not be relaxed.
In their efforts to develop a more inclusive literary canon, educators are joined by literary 
event organizers including Passa Porta. The international house of literature in Brussels 
encourages readers across and beyond the capital to discover new writing and to reflect 
on issues of solidarity, equality and liberty. It does so in collaboration with a wide range 
of guest authors and writers in residence, from literary icons to budding new talent to 
refugee writers. A more tongue-in-cheek initiative is their presentation of an alternative 
Nobel Prize for literature, one week before the official award in Stockholm. The 
alternative prize recognises the work of authors who could have – and perhaps should 
have – won the Nobel Prize but, for one reason or another, missed out on it. In 2019, 
for example, a wide variety of writers and readers paid homage to Virginia Woolf. Her 
great-niece Virginia Nicholson accepted the prize from the hands of Sulaiman Addonia. 
In his eulogy, this Brussels-based British-Eritrean author explained how Woolf had come 
into his life via book smugglers during his time in Saudi Arabia before he fled to London as 
an unaccompanied minor refugee. He recalls how he read ‘to find the incomprehensible, 
the insufferable acceptable somewhere, and literature was that place.’ For him, ‘writing 
was also about giving a refuge and a safe place inside us to all our characters, even those 
deemed unacceptable because they challenge the norms of our societies.’6 Through such 
personal stories, whether of the authors themselves or their fictional characters, readers 




























As Passa Porta’s programming illustrates, in the twenty-first century the traditional 
dominance of the white male canon can no longer be maintained. 
Contrary to the dictionary definition, a ‘canon’ list is hardly a fixed entity. It is the ever-
changing result of a continuing dialogue with the literature of the past: new perspectives 
encourage reappraisals of historical authors and revisions of the canon. It is also an 
ongoing engagement with the literature of the present. The growing recognition of 
different kinds of work widens the customary scope of the canon; it also generates 
new selection criteria and new conversations, which may well bypass the classic canon, 
while direct exchanges between newly emergent literary innovators may generate new 
paradigms. As in literary history, these challenges from the margins of the Empire of 
Literature will have a ripple effect. The questions asked today will undoubtedly lead to 
future inclusions. In turn, these new additions will stimulate further questioning and 
innovations. Put briefly, the canon is under permanent construction. 
1 Rushdie, S. (1984). Outside the Whale. Imaginary Homelands, p. 92. 
2 Comer Kidd, D., & Castano, E. (2013). Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind, Science, 342(6156): 
377-380.
 Chiaet, J. (4 Oct. 2013). Novel Finding: Reading Literary Fiction Improves Empathy. Scientific American, 
www.scientificamerican.com/article/novel-finding-reading-literary-fiction-improves-empathy/.
3 Rushdie, S. (3 July 1982). The Empire Writes Back, The Times.
4 Bekers, E. (2001). Robinson, Vrijdag en hun literaire nakomelingen: een postkoloniale blik op driehonderd jaar 
robinsonades, Streven, 68(11): 985-997.  
5 Gilroy, P. (1987). There Is No Black in the Union Jack. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 




























‘Don’t They Jump on the Seats?’
Questioning the Underrepresentation of Artists 
with Migrant Roots in the Cultural Labour 
Market of Brussels
by Eva Swyngedouw
Artists with migrant roots are underrepresented in the working population of the 
cultural labour market in Brussels. Our research1 shows that although 35% of all residents 
are foreigners and over 70% are of migrant descent, foreigners constitute only 17% of the 
workforce in the city’s performance arts sector.2 This ‘creative mismatch’ is all the more 
surprising, given the fact that these cultural ‘outsiders’ harbour tremendous potential to 
infuse the cultural sector with creativity and disruptive innovation. For example, plays 
where the majority of the people on- and off stage are of migrant background, such as 
‘Malcolm X’ and ‘Drarrie in de Nacht’ (KVS, the Flemish city theatre in Brussels ) and 
‘Fruit estrange(r)’ and ‘De Bruxelles à La Mecque’ (Ras-El-Hanout theatre troupe), bring 
innovative cultural practices to the scene. In general, these shows have been received 
with praise by both the public and the media. Various journals found ‘Malcolm X’, for 
example, to be a ‘milestone’ in the history of the KVS. 
‘We turned around and saw the most captivating image of the evening: 
the whole room of the KVS-Bol, filled to the brim, was dancing and 
clapping. And that room looked far from white. (…) At that moment, 
everyone realised: “A piece of theatre and city history is being written 





























Although the artistic projects by artists of migrant descent are often enthusiastically 
received, few plays of this kind are performed in Brussels. As I am about to show, 
I contend that these artists have more difficulties to enter the Brussels’ cultural labour 
market than do native artists4 because the various structural and personal hurdles 
they encounter throughout their careers do not confront native artists to the same 
degree. Gaining a better understanding of these obstacles and barriers is key to coming 
up with concrete solutions for making the Brussels creative labour market – and 
incidentally any other market – more inclusive. 
In general, we see that on a structural level the established cultural scene still resists 
staging plays by artists with a migrant background. As one artistic director, convinced 
that plays performed by the Ras-El-Hanout troupe should not be put on in large theatres, 
remarked:
‘You have a very big movement of artists (…) originating from the 
Maghrebi community − who are mainly occupied with making more 
accessible theatre. Folk theatre, comedy, slam (…). Ras-El-Hanout for 
example (…). But that is a completely different circuit (…). It is a different 
artistic quality’. 
(Artistic Director, 17.06.2016)
In this regard, the cultural establishment often categorizes arts from artists with a migrant 
background as belonging to the socio-cultural circuit instead of the cultural circuit with 
a big ‘C’. Ras-el-Hanout, for instance, is funded by the regional governmental services 
Actiris and Equal-Brussel, although these funds are predominantly intended to promote 
equal opportunities for minorities in Brussels in the labour market and society at large, 
not groups of artists. In addition, producers and actors of migrant descent have a history 
of being rejected by theatre venues on the grounds that their audiences might not be 




























One actor told us:
‘I found myself in a discussion with a theatre director where she said to 
me “Yes, but what kind of audience do you have? Don’t they jump on the 
seats?”’ 
(Stand-up Comedian and Actor, 20.04.2016)
Artists with migrant roots also have to overcome various personal obstacles throughout 
their career. Firstly, they report a lack of family support for their cultural endeavours. 
Many of these artists have grown up in poverty and their parents want to protect them 
from the precarious financial situation many artists live in today. Therefore, family 
members often expect them to choose a job with better employment prospects such as 
a doctor or engineer. 
These artists also often lack the artistic networks that provide jobs. Because many of 
them are self-taught they do not have access to networks that are often formed already at 
arts school. An actor and singer reports:
‘For me the first obstacle is the network. (…) When you have not been to 
school and you do not know the people it’s very difficult to break into the 
network. (…) They have certain a priori conceptions of you (…) like “he 
has not been to school, so he does not have the codes, so he is … maybe 
an opportunist or something like that.”’ 
(Actor and singer, 08.05.2017)
The above quote points out as well that artists of migrant background who did not 
manage to go to arts school often do not know the prevailing artistic standards of what 
is considered artistic quality. Most of them had to learn these norms ‘on the job’. Due 
to this, they generally already lag behind artists who have received a formal artistic 
education, and some of them will go one step further and choose to resist or completely 
reject these cultural norms. Instead they will use different cultural reference points and 
artistic standards from outside the established arts scene, such as street/urban arts, hip 
hop, street dance, stand-up comedy, etc. But these artistic forms are not regarded by the 
cultural establishment as meeting expected quality standards. As a result, such plays are 




























‘It is all about “What is art, what isn’t art?”  
We have different codes. (...) For example, we made a piece (…) and 
that was so deep-down Street. And suddenly theatre critics said: “Yes it 
reminded me of Ice-T who performed a rap song”.  
It makes you think, like, “you know you’ve seen Ice-T perform only once 
on MTV and that is your frame of reference.”  
It’s all about frames of reference’. 
(Dramaturge, 29.06.2017)
Artists of migrant descent participate in these urban cultural forms of expression 
because they set the standard in these genres. An actor explains:
‘When I was 18 or 19 I discovered rap,  
which was a revelation because at the time I didn’t see a lot of black 
people in the media, whether it was on television or in the newspapers, I 
felt like we didn’t exist. And there was something so strong about rap, it 
was black people (…) talking about society in a way we weren’t used to 
hearing about and that disturbed white reality a bit, and for me it was (…) 
revolutionary because it talked about me’. 
(Actor and singer, 08.05.2017)
This quote also shows the importance of role models. In the established cultural scene, 
artists with migrant roots experience a lack of role models that are ‘like them’. As a 
consequence, they feel as if they do not belong. They feel insecure because they are not 
being validated for who they are, so they drop out early and look for a job elsewhere. 
Lastly, the interviewees report experiencing various degrees of racism, like not being 
hired for certain roles or being mistaken for a non-creative worker such as the security 





























‘Everything that’s always proposed in the casting is always the same 
profile, it’s always either ‘Aisha’ who gets off the plane and wants her 
papers or it’s a 50-year-old mama who’s a nurse or a prostitute, that’s 
really the three roles that always came back when I read a script’. 
(Actress, 15.05.2017)
To sum up, we find that the existing artistic worlds are still exclusive and predominantly 
white bastions. We know that survival in the cultural labour market is already very 
difficult for native artists, let alone for artists with migrant roots who have to overcome 
the above-mentioned extra hurdles (see Rinschberg et al. 2018). How can we solve this 
conundrum? The findings of our study point to several actions that could be done to 
make the cultural sector a better reflection of Brussels society. 
First, it is important to make employment in the artistic sector stable and secure and 
to eradicate the precarious working conditions that most artists have to work in on a 
daily basis. For example, the artist status could be made more accessible by reducing the 
requisite number of hours worked. As a result, artists of all backgrounds would be under 
less pressure to find a more secure job elsewhere. Second, the distinctions made by 
policymakers between the cultural and the sociocultural scenes need to be re-examined, 
since these different categories already contain a value judgment of their own about 
culture. Third, it is vital to increase the number of artists of migrant descent working 
in the cultural labour markets so that aspiring artists can recognize themselves in the 
successful actor on stage or stage designer behind the scenes, rendering discrimination 
based on ethnicity obsolete in the long run.5 This could be done in several ways: 
establishing quotas, or setting up diversity action plans for instance. Hiring procedures 
could also be made more transparent so that cultural institutions do not perpetually tap 
into the existing ‘old boys’ network’. Furthermore, artists with migrant roots could gain 
experience in a paid internship programme, which could also facilitate their access to the 
regular cultural labour market. 
By increasing the numbers of artists of migrant background working in the cultural 
sector, a much-needed mentality change is about to take place on the subject of 
standards of artistic quality, a change that will offer opportunities for more openness 




























cultural labour market of Brussels a more inclusive and diverse space. In this way they 
will gradually transform the prevailing cultural norms and practices. The mainstream 
cultural sector just needs to follow their example.
1 Research conducted in the context of a 4-year-long Innoviris Anticipate project on working conditions within the 
cultural and creative industries of Brussels
2 Rinschbergh, F., Swyngedouw, E., & Vlegels, J. (eds.) (2018). Cultural and creative industries in Brussels.  
Creativity in a divided city. Brussels: VUBPRESS.
3 Knack (19 Oct. 2016). https://focus.knack.be/entertainment/podium/het-swingende-malcolm-x-is-een-mijl-
paal-in-de-geschiedenis-van-de-kvs-en-van-brussel/article-review-766657.html?cookie_check=1572947633
4 This research is based on 35 biographical interviews done in the context of a 4-year-long Innoviris Anticipate 
project.































Martial Arts for the Personal 
Development of Deprived 
Youngsters? 
Maybe if We Coach the Coaches!
by Marc Theeboom
A growing number of policymakers hold high expectations of sport, considering this 
domain as going far beyond just a healthy leisure activity. The Council of Europe, 
for example, sees sport as a tool for addressing the major societal challenges facing 
the EU, including migration, social exclusion, radicalisation, violent extremism and 
unemployment.1 Even the United Nations have repeatedly referred to sport as a cost-
effective and flexible tool for promoting peace and development objectives.2 
These expectations are often referred to as ‘sport-for-development’. But can we really 
expect that sport will have a significant positive impact on the lives of individuals that 
goes beyond the sports field and also affects their life situation or even lead to more 
tolerant communities and peaceful nations? An impact of this kind is also difficult to 
measure. Neither should we expect that simply the practice of sport will lead to such 
promising outcomes, given that most sports coaches are trained to teach specific sporting 
skills only, not to create general learning experiences. Coaches would require training in 
how to use sport as a developmental tool.
It is striking to see how strong the public belief is in the social value of sport. Apart from 
being a good way to improve one’s health, many people are convinced that the practice 
of a sport is an effective tool for helping people in their personal and social development. 
Since many sports are highly accessible and not requiring expensive investment, they 
are often used to attract and help young people living in marginalised situations who 
are facing various challenges in their daily lives. For example, their challenges might 




























discrimination or leaving school at an early age. Many people view sport as an ideal way 
to learn how to communicate better with disadvantaged young people and improve their 
sense of teamwork by teaching them to take on responsibility, to help others, to plan 
their lives and not give up easily. 
Strangely enough, the ‘harder’ martial arts such as boxing, kick-boxing and thai boxing, 
together with Brazilian jujitsu, are increasingly being used in programmes designed 
to help young people in their personal development. The attraction of these sports is 
often seen as an important asset for reaching specific youth groups. It is also believed 
that the practice of martial arts will help young people to develop self-esteem, overcome 
fear and control their emotions when they find themselves in stressful situations. 
The discipline is supposed to help them think more strategically and increase their 
capacity to anticipate actions and learn how to respect others. In short, these experiences 
are regarded as inspirational for young people for helping them to face up to challenges in 
their daily lives. Even though, paradoxically, the practice of martial arts may be employed 
as a means to encourage tolerance in others, it will come as no surprise that not everybody 
believes that there is an added value in teaching martial arts, especially not to those in 
problematic situations. A few examples from Belgium will illustrate this point. 
In September 2013, the mayor of Aalst, a medium-sized city in Belgium, decided to cancel 
the social project ‘Combat Sambo’. Sambo is a Russian variant of judo in which kicks and 
punches are allowed. The project was being run by the municipal sports department 
which gave sambo lessons to around 60 young people between 14 and 22 years old from 
12 different nationalities. This sport was used as a channel to reach young people who 
normally would not have attended organised leisure activities of their own accord. The 
sambo lessons were designed to help these young people in their personal development. 
Unfortunately, the city council raised objections to the use of martial arts for working 
with vulnerable young people. The councillors feared that these young people, mostly 
from an immigrant background, would use the techniques they had learned outside 
the gym to violent ends and to commit crimes. The sports official who was leading the 
project brought this story to the attention of the media and was subsequently fired. 
Another example occurred in autumn 2016 when the management of the Hasselt prison 
planned to introduce boxing sessions to prisoners as a therapeutic side activity. However, 
the prison guards resolutely rejected these plans on the grounds that these sessions could 
increase aggressive behaviour among the prisoners. They even threatened to strike if the 




























However, seeing that all the equipment was in place to start, the decision was taken to 
organise the boxing sessions for the guards instead. Afterwards, the guards were very 
positive about the added value of this activity and regretted their initial refusal with 
regard to prisoner participation. 
A final example: the Brussels Boxing Academy is a club that attracts many young people 
from deprived areas in Brussels and is known for using boxing as an educational tool. 
In 2015 it made media headlines because an accomplice of the Paris terrorist attacker 
had previously trained there. The club was forced to close for a while due to the public 
assumption that boxing had somehow exerted a negative influence on this former 
boxing trainee. 
Despite negative perceptions of martial arts, in recent years there has been an increase 
in these educational martial arts classes, as many people are convinced the contrary is 
true. Proponents defend the idea that the practice of martial arts can contribute to the 
personal development of vulnerable young people. International organisations such 
as ‘Fight for Peace’ for example, combine martial arts with educational and personal 
development of young people in communities affected by crime, violence and social 
exclusion. With local partners in 25 countries they are working to change the lives of 
young people in deprived communities through the practice of martial arts. Projects 
are also organised in major conflict areas such as the Middle East, Central Africa, Latin 
America, and elsewhere. This activity often incorporates objectives on working to 
achieve greater tolerance between various groups and communities. Whether or not 
these projects are effective in their implementation has yet to be seen.
But before addressing the issue of effectiveness, it is worth looking at the source of the 
firm public belief in the added social value of martial arts and of sport in general. What 
is the underlying logic here? 
It seems to spring from the basic assumption that when young people practise a sport 
regularly, they will get better at it. The improvement is not only on the technical level, 
but also the discipline proves helpful, for example, in teaching the participants to work 
better as a team or to respect their coach and the rules. Participants also learn the merits 
of perseverance and how to cope with winning and losing. Then it is also assumed that 
the participants will make use of the same skills in their daily lives and that this will 
help them develop more confidence and higher self-esteem. It is claimed that practising 




























encourage them to become more actively involved in their communities and at the same 
time set an example to others. In other words, sport will turn them into better citizens. 
They will become better integrated into their communities, and that will all eventually 
contribute towards better (or at least, more cohesive) communities. 
This logic seems simple and straightforward. But is it correct? 
If practising sport is supposed to contribute to greater tolerance, why do we see so much 
racism and violence on and off the field? Why is homophobia still found everywhere 
in sporting circles? How should we determine the social value of sport? By comparing 
athletes with non-athletes? Supposing we find a difference in behaviour, how can we 
then be sure that this difference is due to practising sport and not to something else? 
Or do we think that some people with certain characteristics tend to be more interested 
in sport and stay involved, while others stop? Can we really detect cause and effect? 
In other words, it seems that we are dealing here with the age-old dilemma of the chicken 
and the egg. 
Scientists remain highly sceptical of ‘sport-for-development’, despite the high expecta-
tions held by policymakers, despite the promises made by all those programmes using 
sport (or martial arts) as an educational or community-building tool for socially deprived 
groups. What they want to see is hard evidence. But the negative perceptions of martial 
arts also need to be based on evidence.
Some have argued that sport should not be used as a tool to help individuals overcome 
their difficulties. Instead it should be used to try to change the organisation and structure 
of society leading to situations of inequality in the first place.3 Knowing that this is easier 
said than done, other experts prefer to focus on what is needed for effectively increasing 
the potential of sport to help individuals.4 Their starting point is trying to get a better 
understanding of what actually happens when sports are played, as this is often not clear. 
Once we understand how sport is actually organised, there might be a better chance 
of determining its impact. That said, the umbrella term ‘sport’ covers a huge domain. 
Different sports come in many shapes and formats. The sports experience will surely 
depend on factors such as the motivation, condition and level of the participants, the 
rules that are used, the type of guidance, …
It would be naïve to think that personal assets such as communication skills, teamwork, 




























the practice of sport. Our own research has shown that, among other things, practising a 
sport can only lead to the acquisition of these skill sets if the sporting activity is explicitly 
organised in an experiential learning context, where participants are introduced to 
specific situations to which they are expected to respond. Later on they are encouraged 
to reflect on their personal learning experiences and how to utilise what they have 
learned outside of sport. 
It cannot be denied that martial arts offer splendid opportunities for providing these 
learning experiences. But it is clear that if the right kind of coaching and mentoring is not 
provided, then nothing is actually learned. A major problem is that most sports coaches 
are not trained to work on the personal and social development of their trainees.5 Their 
principal job is to teach technical sports skills. Although they are expected to help 
participants improve their technical sporting skills, this does not automatically lead to 
increased personal development in general. It follows, then, that the deliberate creation 
of learning experiences through the practice of sport will require specific expertise. 
Unfortunately, most existing courses for sports teachers and trainers do not offer this. 
Many educational sports projects have come under severe pressure because of high 
expectations. Where there are claims of added social value for the practice of sport 
(or martial arts), there should also be people with specific expertise at hand with the 
capacity to determine and also effectively deliver the expected outcomes. At some point, 
policymakers and other sponsors are likely to ask for hard evidence that will have to go 
beyond the point of citing a handful of individual success stories. 
It would surely help to be more realistic about the potential of sport-for-development, 
and to be clearer about what outcomes can really be expected. It would also help to ask 
the right questions, such as: What does ‘development’ actually mean? How can it be 
measured? And how should sport be organised to become an effective tool for experiential 
learning? Looking for some coherent answers here would be a sensible first step. 
1 Council of Europe (2017). EU Work Plan for Sport 2017–2020.
 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9639-2017-INIT/en/pdf
2 Lemke, W. (2016). The Role of sport in Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. UN Chronicle, LIII (2). August.
3 Hartmann, D., & Kwauk, C. (2011). Sport and Development: An Overview, Critique, and Reconstruction. Journal 
of Sport and Social Issues, 35(3): 284-305.
4 Coalter, F. (2007). A wider social role for sport. Who’s keeping the score? London: Routledge.
5 Jacobs, F. (2016). Addressing and navigating the social domain in sport: Coaches and physical education 





























We’re All Migrants Here: 
Citizenship and Urban Social 
Infrastructure
by Bas van Heur, Karel Arnaut and Bruno Meeus
« - Ce serait une ville peuplée uniquement d’étrangers.
- Mais c’est impossible ! S’ils habitent la même ville, ils seront 
concitoyens et nullement étrangers les uns aux autres ».1 
[“Then the city would be inhabited solely by foreigners.
“That’s not possible! If they are living in the same city they would be 
co-citizens and in no way strangers to each other.”]
Imagine the city as a place that is open and accessible to all. Irrespective of your 
nationality, your migration trajectory and legal status, this city provides free or at least 
affordable access to basic services such as health care, education, housing, mobility and 
culture. With ‘being from elsewhere’ increasingly becoming the norm – in Brussels, for 
instance, only 15% of its residents have Belgian roots – in order for such a city to flourish 
we need to get rid of the categorical distinction between migrants and ‘native’ citizens 
and open up urban services and infrastructures to everyone.
A politics of presence
Although for most of her history Europe has been a continent of interlinked cities and 
towns, over the last two centuries the rise of the modern state has subordinated the logic 





























image. Urban dwellers develop and maintain identities and practices that transcend the 
borders of the nation-state.2 To cater to these practices and thus to contribute to the 
development and prosperity of our cities, we need to rethink our notion of citizenship 
and the rights it entails. National citizenship is acquired either through birth within the 
nation-state and/or descent from parents who are already citizens or through a more or 
less lengthy process of naturalization. By definition this excludes a considerable part of 
the urban population from enjoying the social, economic and political rights that come 
with formal national citizenship. 
Urban citizenship relies on a different logic – what we would call a logic of presence. 
This entails awarding citizenship rights to everyone registered as resident in the city. 
This approach, although more radical and contested, may also award citizenship rights 
to those dwelling in the city but without an official residence or residence permit (such 
as homeless people or undocumented migrants). In this inclusive city, people gain 
citizenship rights when entering and living in the city, then lose these urban rights when 
leaving the city. The underlying idea of equal treatment of different (migrant) groups is 
in line with the New Urban Agenda of UN-Habitat, the UN’s New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants and the recently endorsed Global Compact for Migration.3 In this 
urban political community, there is no basis or reason for a distinction between ‘natives’ 
and citizens with a migration background. Such ‘autochthony’ is deeply exclusive and 
discriminating4 and breaks up the kind of conviviality, collaboration and solidarity on 
which our ‘city for all’ thrives.
But principles are only as good as the acts they produce. Good practices fortunately do 
exist. Municipal ID cards have been introduced by cities such as New York, Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, Vienna, Madrid, and Barcelona. These cards allow undocumented 
migrants to open a bank account, register their children for school, borrow books from 
a public library, or simply gain access to public buildings with controlled entry.5 The 
expansion of voting rights to the entire urban population is a logical next (but more 
contested) step in the creation of this urban political community. Historically, the 
acquisition of the right to vote has been the result of social struggle, slowly leading to the 
incorporation of women and working-class people (i.e. those without property holding 
rights) into the democratic process. But in our contemporary cities, a different trend is 
also visible with a substantial part of the urban populace deprived of the right to vote and 
decide on the future of what is also their city. In Brussels, for example, EU citizens with a 
residence permit are allowed to vote and run as candidate in local and EU elections (but 





























local elections on condition of having resided legally in Belgium for at least five years. Those 
without a residence permit cannot vote at all. Fighting for the political enfranchisement of 
these citizens is a logical next step towards a more inclusive and cohesive urban community.
The social infrastructure of cities
Municipal ID cards and the extension of voting rights to all urban dwellers are but 
a starting point for creating cities for all. A more substantive and comprehensive 
implementation of urban citizenship rights requires a rethinking of such rights, 
namely as rights steeped in (equal) access to an urban ‘social infrastructure’6 that provides 
a range of foundational urban services. This social infrastructure should be free of charge 
or at least highly affordable, and should cover basic needs in domains such as health care, 
education, housing, mobility and culture. This in turn would reduce the reliance of urban 
citizens on wage labour and allow them to participate as full citizens of the urban community. 
Aside from the closely related debate on universal basic income, a social infrastructural 
approach adopts a more collective perspective through a focus on the key public services 
that should be made accessible to all. This argument runs counter to the decades-long 
reduction of public services as a result of neoliberal policies; instead, it proposes a radical 
expansion of public services that would be accessible to all inhabitants irrespective of their 
national citizenship status. The state would continue to play an important role as provider 
of these social infrastructures, but this should not be understood as a ‘return’ to a centrally 
organized system. Due to the differentiation of lifestyles and the enormous social diversity, 
especially in cities, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution. Instead, social infrastructures 
are best achieved at the local level, in close cooperation with the actual ‘users’ such as 
grassroots organisations of migrants, neighbourhood associations, housing activists or 
workers’ unions.
In this scenario, it is also the government that needs to become more accessible. Municipal 
administrations, for instance, could provide language assistance in the languages actually 
spoken by those living in the city. Inspired by the example of New York, in 2018 Pascal 
Smet (then Minister of Mobility and Public Works in the Brussels regional government) 
suggested that municipal employees wear a badge indicating their language skills in order to 
enable and facilitate communication in languages other than the official Dutch and French. 
Health care would also profit from openness to language superdiversity as language barriers 





























excluded from anything but the most basic health care due to their legal status, fear of 
deportation or limited financial means. At present, it is not governments playing the 
most important role in this but NGOs, churches and networks of voluntary doctors. 
Education is another domain that can operate as a social infrastructure. Good practices 
exist, such as the programmes for promoting the enrolment and integration of refugees 
in universities. Ranging from the assessment of previous educational certificates to 
language support, specialized training and mentoring schemes, these initiatives go some 
way towards making education as accessible as possible. One of the most challenging 
domains is most certainly housing. Cities are both the predominant sites of migrant 
arrivals and the places with the highest pressures on the housing market. The influx of 
migrants creates de facto competition between different social groups as the ‘newcomers’ 
aggravate already severe problems of housing access. Achieving housing for all requires 
a profound political change and the pursuit of a mixed policy of expansion of social 
housing, together with support of related initiatives such as community land trusts and 
ensuring affordable rental housing on the private market.
Imagining the city as a place that is open and accessible to all might sound utopian but, 
as we have explained, working towards this utopia is above all a question of starting 
from a different premise: the politics of presence. Given that we are all migrants here, 
access to vital city resources needs to be more equally distributed. Making this happen 
in the current political climate will involve a lot of hard political and civic labour, but it 
will create a shared responsibility for the future of the city. With ‘being from elsewhere’ 
increasingly becoming the norm, it is the only realistic future we have.
1 Tassin, É. (2018). X comme Xénopolis. Tumultes, 51: 154.  
2 Glick Schiller, N., & Çağlar, A. (2009). Towards a comparative theory of locality in migration studies: Migrant 
incorporation and city scale. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35(2):177-202.
3 OECD. (2018). Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees. OECD Publishing.
4 De Genova, N. (2016). The ‘native’s point of view’ in the anthropology of migration. Anthropological Theory, 16(2-
3): 227-240.  
5 Delvino, N. (2017). European cities and migrants with Irregular Status: Municipal initiatives for the inclusion of 
irregular migrants in the provision of services. University of Oxford: Compas.

































No One is Illegal.
Niemand is illegaal!
Personne n’est illegal?
by Ronald Crouzé, Pieter Meurs, Minne Huysmans 
We all start our day with our own unique rituals, habits, coffee or tea. We do not talk too 
much about these habits, but we silently agree that we all have our own particular way of 
easing ourselves into each new day. From the moment we open our front door and step 
outside, we connect the intimate and private space of our living space with the public 
space of the city we live in. We all share the public space, but we do not share the same 
reality while walking in it. The way we move through the day is not only defined by who 
we are or want to be, but also by how we are defined by others.
Our front doors are all located in the city of Brussels. By ours, I mean the signatories 
to this chapter. From different districts we head to our VUB headquarters in south east 
Ixelles. There are thousands of people simultaneously mingling and engaging in the 
same new day. It often seems like organised chaos. Day after day: traffic jams of bikes, 
pedestrians, busses and trams, all heading for their destinations as they briefly cross 
each other. So much to see, but the three of us often see the same signs as we move 
through our day: NO ONE IS ILLEGAL. This boldly formulated statement – sometimes 
in Dutch or French: NIEMAND IS ILLEGAAL, PERSONNE N’EST ILLEGAL – 
printed on small black and white stickers can be found on many street corners in Brussels, 
decorating traffic lights, electrical boxes, walls, bikes, pubs, toilet doors and light poles. 
The ‘NO ONE IS ILLEGAL’ stickers are small and discreet in the urban landscape, 
yet the message is so clear and strong it doesn’t even use an exclamation mark or full 






























We’d like to argue it does. The simple message it conveys is the putting aside of mere 
legal considerations in order to think first and foremost about the human aspects of 
belonging to a society. We believe Hannah Arendt’s conception of citizenship can be 
very insightful for explaining this statement. She shows us that citizenship is not about 
legal status, but rather the way in which we act and create together as human beings. 
According to Arendt, citizenship refers to the possibility of every human being actively 
participating and shaping society.1 
Today, access to the social and political world is regulated by a formal, and thus legal 
conception, of citizenship. This has a long-lasting tradition dating back to the ancient 
Romans and Greeks. They were the first to reflect on the question of who belongs to 
a place or community, and therefore who is entitled to civil rights, and who isn’t. This 
is still what citizenship is about today: the differences made between so-called ‘original 
residents’ and newcomers, between insiders and outsiders, between those who are or 
are not allowed to participate and between legal and illegal residents. Such a rhetoric of 
opposites has, especially over the last decade of increased migration, strongly intensified 
today’s public debate: opinions vary from ‘we should defend everyone’s human rights’ to 
‘it is not “our” responsibility if they suffer’, from ‘these people are refugees’ to ‘they come 
here to profit from our system’, from ‘they are a threat to ‘our’ culture’ to ‘they enrich our 
culture’, and from ‘we should open our borders’ to ‘Schengen should be reconsidered’. In 
European political discourse and policy, this intensification translates into the creation 
of physical borders in Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia, the criminalisation of migrants 
and humanitarian aid in Italy, the tensions between Turkey and Europe over aid for 
refugees, or the rigid criteria for inclusion and integration in Flanders, the Netherlands 
and Denmark. 
The sticker (or rather its timely statement) challenges this apparently clear 
demarcation between legal and illegal, or between insider and outsider, and 
shows us another dimension of citizenship in at least two ways. First of all, 
what the sticker ‘NIEMAND IS ILLEGAAL’ forces us to do is to put aside 
the legal conditions and also think about the human aspects of citizenship, norms 
and values. Moving in from outside is tough, becoming an insider even tougher. 
The question of who can take part and who can’t is increasingly answered by an ideal 
of fitting in, by adhering to a specific set of so-called ‘Western’ (whatever that means) 
norms and values. This creates a situation in which the newcomer is both insider and 
outsider: insider insofar as a newcomer is granted the formal or legal status of residency, 





























values, nor to a certain ideal identity and language. Hence one can legally become an 
insider and have access to rights and services, but may find it hard to belong in a more 
emotional and culturally meaningful way because of personal experiences of exclusion 
by the mainstream population and because of cultural differences. Becoming both a legal 
insider and an insider who truly belongs here seems to be very strictly regulated: visibly 
by laws, and invisibly by norms and values that are hard to grasp. 
Secondly, PERSONNE N’EST ILLEGAL challenges the idea of citizenship as a legal 
condition for accessing and participating in the socio-political world. It questions 
the banality of ‘our’ legal differentiations of people: ‘we’ create the rules, ‘we’ regulate 
the access and ‘we’ tell you how one can become a citizen of this land. The sticker’s 
statement shows us the voice of the other, of the outsider. And that voice is important: 
the perspectives of newcomers on citizenship are rarely asked for in public debates 
on citizenship. Rather than be passive recipients of a citizenship status, newcomers 
themselves are able to define citizenship through practices and in relationships with other 
people and communities.2 The presence of transmigrants in the Brussels’ Maximilian 
Park is a good example here. As a consequence of this presence, the park was transformed 
into a space in which people – newcomers and local residents – organise themselves and 
engage with each other. Although the transmigrants do not enjoy the formal rights to 
live there, they do take part in shaping that space. Moreover, their presence is in itself a 
political act. This is precisely the way in which Arendt conceives citizenship: as a space 
that we create together by our actions and in which every human being may actively 
participate and shape the socio-political world.
Newcomers help us to understand that citizenship is a dynamic and continuous process in 
which we all are engaged. They also show us the potential for a redefinition of citizenship. 
Democracy has always been the result of dialogue, interaction and participation between 
people and groups with different backgrounds. This implies that what it means to be a 
citizen is not defined by the state alone. Rather, it is the citizens themselves who define 
the state.  On our daily trip across the city, we cross each other’s paths and can be sure 
that in so doing we are all defining the space we share. It all goes together with our daily 
habits, goals, rituals, coffee or tea.
1 Arendt, H. (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
2 Moosa-Mitha, M. (2005). Situating anti-oppressive theories within critical and difference-centered perspectives. 





























Ethnic Diversity in Brussels 
Politics: The Next Level
by Karen Celis1
After the May 2019 election, the level of ethnic minority representatives elected to 
the Brussels Parliament rose from about one fifth to one third. Together with the 44% 
proportion of women, the ethnic diversification of the Brussels Parliament results in a 
highly visible ‘push-back’ of the typical politician (white and male) who has historically 
dominated Belgium’s political institutions, and who is generally overrepresented 
especially where political power resides. For many, the increase in ethnic minority and 
women representatives looks like a ‘natural evolution’, a spontaneous synchronisation 
of the Brussels Parliament with Brussels’ population demographics. It is a recognition 
of innovative leadership qualities and potential amongst women and ethnic minorities 
in Brussels. The increase of ‘other’ (read: non-white, non-male) representatives is 
not, however, all that spontaneous. Politics is all about power, and the rule of thumb 
here is that those who have power tend to hold onto it. Rather than evolving naturally, 
diversification is both fought for and resisted.
The power struggle for inclusion and recognition is, from a democratic perspective, well 
worth the investment of social capital, energy and material resources. The symbolic 
importance of political diversification is significant. It sends out the message that ethnic 
minorities in Brussels matter and that later on in life they too can ‘make it’ to the top. Such 
a message is specifically relevant to the younger generation. The presence of minorities 
in the Brussels Parliament is an important and visible enactment of their full political 
citizenship. It also says something about the fairness and justice of the Brussels political 
system, parties and establishment. 
The presence of non-elites, i.e. members of groups other than those who are considered 
to be the traditional elite, can also engender a deeper democratic transformation. It is 
expected to establish a tighter connection between political institutions and government, 
on the one hand, and the political needs, dreams and wishes of diverse populations on 





























business, which non-elites might well achieve through changing politics from the inside 
out. Some of the newly elected representatives will stay in politics, and become part of the 
political elites – some have already achieved this. When included in the party leadership 
and parliamentary party groups, ethnic minorities may participate in the drafting of the 
party’s electoral programmes and bills, in negotiating government coalitions, agreements 
and mandates, and in decision-making on party politics, policies and strategies for future 
recruitment and selection.
Here again, such an evolution towards a better connection with the diversity of 
citizens as a result of greater diversity among politicians might well not come about as 
naturally and spontaneously as one might expect. Not all ethnic minority representatives 
are willing to represent ‘their communities’. Some of them might consider such an 
expectation somewhat stigmatizing and may well resist the very idea of having to take up 
the extra task of representing ‘their group’ due to their socio-demographic characteristics. 
Others may even reject outright the very idea of their belonging to an ethnic community. 
Even if ethnic minority politicians are willing to represent their ethnic minority’s issues 
and interests, they might not find themselves in the position to do so due to a lack of 
support from their parties and political colleagues, and even due to blunt resistance. 
In short, while it is possible for the diversification of the content of politics to change, 
together with its personnel, there are no guarantees. 
Those in favour of improving the connection between the political institutions and 
diverse citizenry should not count on individual representatives alone, and in Brussels 
they do not have to. The Brussels governmental agreement contains five promising 
institutional innovations that can be mobilized to further increase ethnic diversity in 
Brussels’ politics. It supports: (i) additional meetings of the Council of Ministers with 
civil society to discuss Brussels’ issues and topics; (ii) new forms of citizen participation to 
examine the future complex challenges that reflect Brussels’ diversity; (iii) initiatives for 
joint decision-making in the Brussels Parliament such as joint parliamentary committees 
composed of elected representatives and citizens, and reforms that increase petitions 
as a more attractive means for citizens to take legislative initiatives; (iv) participative 
and collaborative budgets covering, among other things, the funding of social cohesion 
initiatives and city planning; (v) local governments and regional institutions in their 
reform efforts to enable citizens initiatives and citizen-government collaboration. 
These are five key opportunities that can, jointly or in parallel with the numerical 





























between Brussels’ diverse citizenry and politics. Brussels’ rich and highly diverse civil 
society can be ‘pulled into’ a political conversation and co-creation with legislators and 
members of government to develop policies on ethnic minority issues and interests. 
It would turn decision-making into a deliberation with the ones concerned that sets out 
to establish fair and just outcomes for all citizens of Brussels, including the least well-off 
and marginalized. The increase in ethnic minority representatives and these institutional 
innovations together generate an unseen window of opportunity for the Brussels 
Parliament and Government to close the gap between politics and Brussels’ diverse 
citizens. It is also an unseen opportunity for addressing the issue of the drastic decrease 
in levels of trust and legitimacy that affects the formal institutions of our representative 
democracies, including those of Brussels. Again, this will not happen by magic. 
Ethnic minorities – within and beyond the formal institutions – can now seize this 
opportunity to use the institutional innovations for their benefit. Yet, most importantly, 
as a result of the five promises of the Brussels governmental agreement, the proper 
representation of ethnic minorities has now become an obligation falling back onto 
them. Rather than putting this responsibility onto the ethnic minorities’ own shoulders, 
it is now the institution’s formal obligation to bring the diversification of Brussels politics 
up to the next level.






























Empowering Cities to Make 
Immigrant Integration Happen
by Deniz Ay
Immigration is largely an urban phenomenon. Although the popular representation of 
international immigrants often corresponds to images from camp-settings, about 60% 
percent of the refugees live in cities worldwide.1 One in every five international migrants 
lives in one of just 20 global cities, and for 18 of these cities, international migrants 
represent around 20% of their total population.2 Immigrants arriving in large numbers, 
often in waves, is no longer unusual, yet global instability is growing due to several push 
factors ranging from armed conflicts to the climate crisis. If cities act as a node for the 
vast majority of immigrants, the quest for integration is inherently local and it starts 
inside cities.3 The question is: what role can cities play in reversing the narrative that 
turns an immigration background into a source of structural inequality? Answers to this 
question could help build up resilient societies that embrace diversity.
The majority of international migrants ending up in cities have been following either 
family members and community networks established by earlier migratory waves, or 
their dreams of better access to the social and economic opportunities associated with 
cities. Generations of immigrant communities have established ethnic enclaves in every 
cosmopolitan city. These established networks provide the social infrastructure and 
the immediate support that newcomers need to initiate the long process of integration. 
Receiving communities may also develop emergency responses, as they did for the 
massive influx of refugees to Western Europe in 2015. These self-organized voluntary 
measures helped to mitigate the crisis by addressing the short-term primary needs of 
newcomers such as food and shelter. But these ad-hoc community responses often fade 
away once the crisis has peaked. 
When the short-term emergency response ends, immigrant integration emerges as 
a lingering challenge for cities. Access to decent housing, education and language 
training, and also to employment opportunities, are the most pressing challenges for 





























between newcomers and established residents, and eliminating the differences in access 
to economic and political opportunities. Integration has three practical components: 
social, economic and political. Social integration is the mutual process of social bonding 
between the immigrant and the receiving communities. Social integration involves 
bilateral dialogue, understanding and respect, which make it a two-way process that 
involves both the newcomers and their hosts. Economic integration includes the 
incorporation of newcomers into the economic system, whether as employers or 
employees, thereby contributing to the wealth shared by the whole society, including the 
newcomers and the established inhabitants. Finally, political integration opens the door 
for immigrants to gain access to representation and participation in the political system. 
In a real democracy, neither the place of birth nor the origin of a jobseeker’s parents 
should be used to determine that applicant’s employability, access to basic services, 
or their means of political participation and representation. These three aspects 
of immigrant integration are therefore also key determinants of a democratic city, 
where all residents have equal access to jobs, education, and basic services. With this 
formula we can move beyond the limited and technical interpretation of “immigrant 
integration” towards a more inclusive and practical approach that aims to minimize the 
social, economic and political barriers for new residents. As a natural consequence of 
this broader understanding of integration, any development towards better integration 
strategies would benefit all the denizens of a city, not just its immigrants. For instance, 
all newcomers with access to language and professional training for entering the labour 
market will soon start paying taxes to contribute to the city. Entrepreneurial immigrants 
create jobs and help to revitalize local economies and decaying neighborhoods, often 
by starting small businesses. To ensure the benefits of refugees and immigrants to 
their receiving communities, many cities in the USA have adopted comprehensive 
welcoming programmes and strategic plans with bipartisan support in order to achieve 
successful social, economic and political integration. These integration policies include 
providing access to education programmes for children and adults, developing capacity 
in immigrant and refugee leaders, and facilitating community building among receiving 
communities and the newcomers. 
The city is organized on a scale that is efficient and effective to make integration happen. 
It is easier to develop integration policies addressing the specific local context on the 
scale of a city than to do the same at national level, its mainstream alternative. Despite 
the relevance of housing access to achieving social and economic integration, national 





























significantly in terms of their local housing markets or capacities to provide decent 
accommodation to these newcomers. Therefore national housing policies essentially 
have only limited capacity to address the immigrants’ housing problems on the ground. 
Cities are able to address affordable and accessible housing by utilizing the knowledge 
of market conditions and developing targeted solutions as local as neighbourhood level. 
For instance, community housing is a tool used in several cities in Canada and Australia 
as a part of local affordable housing policies targeting immigrants. Policy innovations to 
combine housing and immigrant integration also include self-building housing projects 
implemented in Italy.4 
Immediate access to language training, which is essential for all aspects of integration, 
is also easier to provide at city level. A successful example of such an initiative is run by 
“Hispi” in Düsseldorf, Germany. As a local non-governmental organization, Hispi5 recruits 
volunteers to assist immigrants in language acquisition since 2015. It is supported with 
donations from individuals and cooperatives, also partnerships with local businesses and 
the local government. Learning the language through direct social interaction with peers 
also initiates the building of a social network between the immigrants and newcomers. 
Cities have the flexibility to mobilize local capacities and coordinate volunteers to start 
the language training quickly rather than waiting for the state bureaucracy to provide 
access and allocate resources.
Monitoring and evaluating the integration policies are more feasible at city level 
because it is easier to collect data and feedback on policy performance at local level 
than at national level. This will improve capability to develop better strategies and 
local partnerships between the city governments and other local institutions such as 
universities, community-based organizations and non-governmental organizations 
focusing on immigration. A city-level agenda for integration is in stark contrast to the 
sluggish centralized policies guided by the state bureaucracy. National governments’ 
integration policies start by classifying immigrants according to their legal status: asylum 
seekers, refugees, illegal immigrants, aliens, etc. A decentralized city-based approach 
to integration enables a departure from legal boundaries to what services people are 
entitled, and embraces a needs-based approach to supporting those in need. 
Empowering cities to activate their promising potential to make immigrant integration 
happen will benefit their entire populations. These mechanisms may include 
transfers of financial and administrative powers from national/federal governments to 





























between the cities themselves, namely the city networks. The potential of cities to speed 
up immigrant integration is already mobilized through the activities of various city 
networks. City networks operate under transnational institutions like the Intercultural 
Cities (ICC) programme of the Council of Europe, as a collective effort by several city 
governments, like Eurocities, and non-governmental organizations like Welcoming 
America in the USA. These city networks aim to empower cities through facilitating 
knowledge exchanges on integration practice and professional community-building 
for practitioners. One tangible outcome of these networks is the mobilization of 
innovative and progressive strategies for integration. These developments help city 
governments to think and act in partnership with their civil society, public and private 
sectors, going beyond their national governments’ political and legislative boundaries. As 
progressive gestures these city networks also have the potential to affect their national/
federal governments’ policy frameworks, either by allowing greater autonomy to local 
governments to form immigration policy or by providing administrative support for 
implementing bottom-up integration strategies. 
City networks also have symbolic functions such as legitimizing local integration 
efforts and positioning cities as welcoming places for immigrants.6 Activities of these 
city networks are funded through grants from various sources, including governments, 
supranational organizations, non-governmental organizations and corporate actors. 
Empowering these networks is a simple step towards helping cities to work together to 
create cooperation in order to develop and spread innovative local integration strategies. 
Learning and knowledge exchanges will also foster collaborations and solidarity between 
cities, which can trigger mechanisms reaching beyond their national boundaries to start 
building a global coalition for immigrant integration.
Empowering cities to lead the immigrant integration programmes will benefit the whole 
of society because successful city-level programmes can create tangible social, economic 
and political benefits for all. It is also possible to increase the role of cities in integration if 
the receiving communities demand and provide support to their cities’ commitment to 
effective integration strategies. This political stance can become more widespread with 
the policymakers’ and civil society’s commitment to inform the general public about the 
“public benefits” of well-thought-out integration strategies. Often the barrier is not the 
lack of financial resources but rather the lack of popular support and political demand 
from those with socioeconomic privileges who block diversity policies that benefit both 
the established residents and the newcomers. In a city, political and practical mobilization 





























official governing bodies to their electorates. This city-level approach to immigrant 
integration ultimately challenges the conventional idea of citizenship as membership of 
a nation. And with this political opening, a new progressive interpretation of citizenship, 
i.e. ‘cityzenship’, based on inhabitance and informed by human rights emerges as a more 
inclusive alternative that matches the contemporary global political conditions and the 
growing mobility of people.7
1 Muggah, R., & Abdenur, A. (2018). Refugees and the City: The Twenty-First-Century Front Line. Waterloo, ON, 
Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation.  
2 IOM (2015). World Migration Report. Migrants and cities: New partnerships to manage mobility. Geneva, 
Switzerland: IOM. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/wmr2015_en.pdf
3 De Graauw, E., & Vermeulen, F. (2016). Cities and the politics of immigrant integration: a comparison of Berlin, 
Amsterdam, New York City, and San Francisco. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(6): 989-1012.
4 Semprebon, M., & Haddock, V. S. (2016). Innovative housing practices involving immigrants: the case of 
self-building in Italy. Journal of Housing, 31(3): 439-455.
5 Hispi das Lernhaus: https://www.hispi.de/ueber-hispi/
6 Caponio, T. (2019). City Networks and the Multilevel governance of migration. Policy discourses and actions.   
Policy Discourses and Actions (January 2019). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper 
No. RSCAS, 8.




























Tolerance Towards LGBT Can Be 
Developed from within Religions
by Filip Van Droogenbroeck, Bram Spruyt, Jessy Siongers
Belgium is often considered a liberal country when compared with other European 
countries when it comes to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) issues. 
Same-sex couples gained the right in Belgium to marry or register in civil union in 2003, 
and the right to adopt children in 2006. Public support for granting the right to same-sex 
marriage is higher in Belgium than the EU average. Since 2012, criminal assaults have met 
severer penalties when discrimination is proven to be a motivating element. Moreover, 
combatting negative attitudes towards homosexuals is included in the declared goals of 
secondary education. 
All this, however, does not preclude that, even in Belgium, LGBTs continue to be faced 
with prejudice, hatred and violence. The latter is thought to be one of the key elements 
that contribute to the higher prevalence of school bullying, substance abuse, suicidal 
thoughts and/or problematic behaviour among LGBT youth. In this regard, religion 
seems to play an important role, even though major religious traditions all have a message 
of universal compassion and tolerance, research has revealed a higher prevalence of 
prejudice against minority groups (racial, ethnic and sexual) among people of faith in 
comparison to non-religious people. 
Classic modernization and secularization theory predicted that religiosity would soon 
become something of the past but it is clear that migration processes created a society 
where religion will continue to play an important role. Drawing upon our own empirical 
research, we aim to show how tolerance can be developed from within religions and 
that such a strategy does not require the abolition of the religious identity in order to be 
compatible with secular values such as LGBT rights. 
Although Belgium is historically a Catholic country, church attendance has dropped 




























However, Catholic beliefs still exert an important influence on political values and cultural 
conservatism. In addition, a growing proportion of the Belgian population is of Moroccan 
or Turkish origin who generally strongly support the Islamic faith. A liberal attitude 
towards LGBT rights creates a tension with adherents of conservative interpretations 
of Abrahamic religions (including Christianity and Islam), which encourages a group 
norm on heteronormativity that proscribes homosexuality. Therefore, it will become 
crucial to find ways to promote tolerant and respectful attitudes towards LGBTs (and 
also other minority groups) among religious people in a way that does not stigmatize or 
misrecognize religious convictions. 
This clear paradox between the message of universal compassion inherent in all 
religions and the (on average) higher prevalence of anti-gay sentiment among religious 
people, highlights the complexity of the relationship between religion and prejudice 
towards homosexuals. To understand this paradox, it is worth examining how religion is 
used in academic research. 
Whether you measure religion from the aspect of people’s religious affiliation 
(eg. Christian or Muslim), religiosity (eg. subjective importance of religion), or religious 
practices (frequency of attendance at religious services), there emerges a clear positive 
relationship with anti-gay prejudice, regardless of the religious denomination. Early on, 
however, it was realised that this approach oversimplifies the quantification of religiosity 
as it cannot reflect all the different ways in which religion is experienced. In this context, 
Batson, Schoenrade and Ventis proposed the existence of a type of religious orientation 
which they called quest orientation, which is theoretically associated with tolerance.1 
The concept of quest orientation is designed to be more in-tune with the idea of having a 
mature religion incorporating a critical, open-ended approach to existential questions. 
Having a religious quest orientation involves a willingness to entertain doubts, to be 
self-critical and to confront complex problems, such as ethical responsibility, without 
reducing their complexity. 
In our research, we investigated the relationship between religious identity, self-rated 
religiosity, religious quest orientation, authoritarianism and negative attitudes towards 
homosexuals among 2834 Christian and Muslim young people aged 14-23 in Flanders.2 
Our comparison of the relationships between different aspects of religiosity for two 
different religious faiths allowed us to gain a better understanding of the relationship 




























reported more prejudice against homosexuality than young Christians, even though the 
factors that presuppose prejudice among Christians – gender, low educational tracks, 
high self-rated religiosity, authoritarianism and quest orientation – are equally found 
among Muslims. Of all the religious indicators only a religious quest orientation was 
found to lead to less anti-gay sentiment in both religious groups. 
Our findings have important implications for contemporary societies. According to 
classic secularisation thinking, religion will soon lose its importance and its meaning for 
the public and political debate due to advancing modernisation. In his paper “Religion in 
the Public Sphere”, Habermas states that supporters of the secularist view are convinced 
“that in the long run, religious views will inevitably melt under the sun of scientific 
criticism and that religious communities will not be able to withstand the pressures of 
some unstoppable cultural and social modernisation”.3 
Adherents of the secularisation thesis anticipate that Muslim minorities in European 
countries will undergo the same secularisation processes and will eventually find 
themselves absorbed in the secular way of life. This line of reasoning suffers from two 
major problems: firstly, it denies the fact that the secularisation process is mainly a West 
European phenomenon, therefore exceptional in the rest of the world. In the USA, for 
example, there is a lower degree of secularisation even though the same modernisation 
tendencies exist. In countries such as Morocco and Turkey, increasing modernisation 
does not appear to decrease religiosity. In addition, research in the Netherlands has 
shown that second generation Muslims with higher levels of education do not report 
a lower degree of self-rated religiosity or religious practice than second-generation 
Muslims with lower education levels. In other words, it is naïve to assert that religion will 
disappear with increasing modernisation. Religion is here to stay. 
Neither does this line of thinking respect the identity of the religious individual. Indeed, 
from the perspective of secularisation, religious individuals are expected to become 
secular, abandoning their prior religious convictions as the latter are considered to be 
incompatible with secularist ideals. Furthermore, the lack of respect is often shown 
towards minority groups for whom religion is very important. Belonging to a religious 
community gives immigrants refuge, respect and access to the resources they need for 




























The key question, then, remains how Western societies, nowadays incorporating a 
growing population of young Muslims, are able to promote a tolerant and respectful 
attitude towards homosexuals in a way that neither stigmatises nor misrecognises 
religious convictions. 
According to Habermas, there is a need for a post-secular perspective that accepts 
that religious communities will not disappear as a result of modernisation. In a post-
secular world, secularist and religious traditions will need to tolerate and take each 
other seriously. This post-secular perspective examines how religious traditions can 
be respected without sacrificing the accomplishments of secularisation. This requires 
a shared and complementary learning process. On the secular side, it is necessary to 
acquire a post-metaphysical thinking which refrains from issuing both ontological 
statements and overweening presumptions of scientific knowledge (for instance, “There 
is no life after death”). Such an attitude acknowledges the relativity of the metaphysical 
assumptions of naturalists.4 As long as secularists stick to their convictions that religious 
traditions are archaic and anachronistic remnants of pre-modern societies characterised 
by cruelty and irrationality, there is no space for mutual understanding. On the religious 
side, Habermas holds there is a need to develop reflexive religion. This does not mean 
that religious individuals need to negate their religious beliefs, but rather to recognise 
that freedom of religion exists. They should accept that there is room for reasonable and 
courteous debate on religious beliefs/philosophies of life. 
All too often, previous discussions have remained on a philosophical plane that lacks a 
concrete anchor for them to work in practice. Religious quest orientation may prove to 
be the necessary missing link. Our research indicates that a religious quest orientation 
is positively related to the acceptance of homosexuality by both Christian and Muslim 
youth, even after taking into account self-reported religiosity, authoritarianism and other 
mediating factors. Young people with a religious quest orientation seem to be more in-
tune with the universal compassionate message of their religious traditions, which can 
mitigate the influence of the objections raised by the more conservative interpretations 
of their religion with regard to homosexuality. A religious quest orientation gives hope 
for the development of tolerance from within the religion which does not require the 
abolition of the religious identity in order to be compatible with secular values. Since 
it can apply to both Muslim and Christian youth, it opens up hope for the future. 
Hence ways must be found for cultivating a religious quest orientation among religious 




























intolerance toward gays/lesbians is not necessarily related to being religious per se but 
with how religion is experienced. 
1 Batson, C. D., Schoenrade, P., & Ventis, W. L. (1993). Religion and the individual: A social-psychological 
perspective. New York: Oxford University Press.  
2 Van Droogenbroeck, F., Spruyt, B., Siongers, J., & Keppens, G. (2016). Religious Quest Orientation and Anti-
Gay Sentiment: Nuancing the Relationship Between Religiosity and Negative Attitudes Toward Homosexuality 
Among Young Muslims and Christians in Flanders. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 55(4): 787-
799.   
3 Habermas, J. (2006). Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy, 14(1): 1-25.  
4 For example, Habermas states that the naturalist background of secularism is still the object of an ongoing 
and open-ended philosophical debate. The radical form of naturalism reduces the whole of reality to a physical 
reality and devalues all categories of statements that cannot be reduced to controlled observations, nomological 




























Europe Needs to Change its 
Understanding of Secularism to 
Accommodate Diversity 
by Shilpi Pandey and Stefaan Smis
In various European states, we have recently witnessed how heated debates about the 
wearing or banning of the burqa (full-face veil) or hijab (headscarf) have divided society. 
Often the discussion was fueled by opposing views on how to interpret the freedom 
of religion that has been recognized by various human rights instruments including 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights). The debate has outstripped socio-political circles and is 
now continued in legal arenas before national courts and tribunals. Even the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has in various cases been called to give its opinion 
on the matter. In a series of landmark judgments, the Strasbourg Court has ruled that 
banning the hijab or burqa in public spaces does not violate the freedom of religion.1 
While freedom of religion is an essential human right, it is not framed as an absolute 
right under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is therefore 
subject to certain limitations as long as they are prescribed by law and deemed necessary 
in a democratic society. The ECHR has accepted the ban on the burqa or hijab as valid 
in the spirit of ‘living together’ in a democratic secular society. Hence it is evident that 
a specific understanding of secularism in modern European societies has become the 
guiding principle for defining the place of religion and religious identities. This raises 
the question, whether this version of secularism is capable of accommodating diversity 
in a more diverse Europe. 
It is widely accepted that the adoption of secularism in Europe was successful in diffusing 
tension between Catholics and Protestants and was later able to also accommodate people 
from Christian faith and those who had distanced themselves from these churches or 
religions. However, in our current European societies that are increasingly characterized 




























to act according to certain prescripts in all situations and places, the stance of European 
secularism is under scrutiny. One can, therefore, ask whether it still serves as the cement 
that allows for the accommodation of diversity or whether, on the contrary, it has become 
a barrier, putting obstacles in the path of our ambitions to form a diverse society where 
everyone feels at home. Is there today a need to rethink secularism? We are not pleading 
for the rejection of secularism but rather defending the view that there is a need to reflect 
on what kind of diversity we are willing to espouse in Europe. This kind of diversity will 
dictate whether and/or how secularism needs to be reinterpreted. We strongly believe 
there is a need to make secularism more neutral so that it may also accommodate the new 
forms of diversity in Europe.  
The origin of secularism in Europe can be traced back to the times when Protestantism 
started to pose a challenge to Catholicism. One could argue that the concept was 
invented by the Protestant movement to reduce the power of the Catholic Church.2 
By considering religion as a strictly personal matter for the individual and by removing 
the influence of the Catholic Church on the state through clear segregation between 
church and state, the Protestant movements created an instrument limiting the influence 
of the Catholic Church in public affairs and, in so doing, managed to create a space for 
their own influence. This specifically historical understanding of secularism has been an 
important factor in defining the nature of European societies.3 Over the years, the church-
state divide has also become one of the main features defining the limits of religious 
freedoms in many European states. While secularism requires states to be non-religious 
and neutral in their religious identity, the same requirement has also been extended to 
the practice of religion by individuals in the sense that religion has become confined to 
the private sphere. In other words, through the process of secularization, religion has 
become ‘domesticated’ and reduced to an exclusively private affair to be practiced either 
in the home or in specially built places of worship. This specific nature of the religious 
construction of secularism supports a single perspective on how religion should be 
present in a society while obliging all religions to remain within the private sphere. 
Interestingly, a closer look at the history of secularism clearly shows that secularism 
itself is, in reality, a non-neutral concept and has a specific religious and historical 
understanding in Europe. While this stance for ‘neutrality’ would have been sufficient 
for a largely homogenous European society, a similar stance for religious neutrality 
presents serious challenges to the governance and protection of the increasingly diverse 
and multicultural population of today’s Europe. Due to this specific understanding, 




























when applied to modern European multicultural and pluralistic societies. That under-
standing of secularism is in itself unable to respect or nurture diversity because it results 
in further isolation and exclusion of certain minorities from the public sphere. Several 
European societies have, however, moved from being largely homogenous to being 
extensively heterogeneous and multicultural. While the majority population does have a 
religiously ‘neutral’ identity in the European context, it nevertheless presents a challenge 
for certain (new) minorities whose religion imposes on them a way of life governed by 
certain prescripts – some of them being visually emblematic – irrespective of the private-
public divide. For example, growing a beard and wearing a turban are essential for men 
practising Sikhism. Other religions such as Islam, Buddhism or Judaism require their 
followers to grow or shave their hair, to wear certain items or apparel, to be selective 
in what they eat or drink, to fast during a certain period of the year, to pray at certain 
moments of the day or to behave according to certain standards. You cannot be a follower 
of these religions if you do not obey these rules. However, to fit within the secular 
identity of our European societies all religious identities must limit themselves to the 
private sphere. Secularism and its imposed ‘neutralities’, therefore, oblige such minority 
religions to adopt a neutral stance in public spheres even though their religion requires 
them to live according to religious rules irrespective of their situation. This forces them 
to adhere to one identity set over another, yet doing this compromises their freedom 
of religion. As there is only one unique manner in which a state can identify itself as a 
secular state, it excludes religion to an extent where the latter remains a purely isolated 
private affair. The consequence is that many European democracies have been pursuing 
strategies of cultural assimilation through policies of harmonization of ‘other’ identities 
(not belonging to the secular traditions) with the notion of European identity.
In the light of the increasingly multicultural nature of European societies, these 
assimilation strategies will constantly present new challenges based on claims of 
violations of freedom of religion. Therefore this is an important issue which needs careful 
deliberation and a positive discourse on the meaning of secularism in multicultural 
European societies. It is both relevant and necessary to find methods of accommodating 
wide religious and cultural diversity, because our increasingly diverse societies await 
solutions that are able to handle diversity without compromising freedom of religion. 
1 The three main judgments in this regard have been SAS v France (App. no. 43835/11), Belkacemi and Oussar v 
Belgium (App. no. 37798/13) and Dakir v Belgium (App. No. 37798/13).
2 See De Roover, J. (2015). Europe, India, and the limits of secularism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 60-63. 











































Brussels is Tarred with Racism
by Géraldine André, Safaa Charafi, Laura Westerveen and Dounia Bourabain
Hosting the European Institutions, Brussels is often considered the capital of the 
European Union. With almost 180 nationalities and 100 languages spoken, Brussels is 
also one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world. After Dubai, the EU capital has 
the highest percentage of residents born outside the country. According to the World 
Migration Report of the International Organization for Migration, more than 62% of 
the residents of Brussels are foreign-born, originating mainly from North Africa and 
Turkey. Among Belgian cities, Brussels is the most diverse city, closely followed by the 
city of Antwerp. Over the past one and a half centuries, the demographics of the city 
have been considerably shaped by migration flows, resulting in a high degree of (among 
others) ethnic, racial, linguistic, cultural, social and religious diversity. Undeniably, 
Brussels is characterized by a highly mobile and international population, which further 
accentuates the challenges of creating an equal and just society with respect to its ethnic 
minorities.
Although Brussels is characterized by a greatly diverse population, data on the 
discrimination of people with a migration background are abundant. They show that 
inhabitants with a migration background do not benefit from the same opportunities 
and chances as people of Belgian origin. Is this enough to consider Brussels a racist 
city? When we talk about racism, the first thing that comes to mind is the visible and 
deliberate behaviour of individuals discriminating against others because of their skin 
colour, their religion, their origins, and so on. But individuals are not the only ones 
who produce or enact racist behaviours. There are also more implicit and hidden kinds 
of racism, such as the one produced by institutional bodies. Indeed, organizations and 
institutions of a country or a city can be structured in such a way that they (re)produce this 
discrimination against minorities. In the case of Brussels, ethnic minorities are confronted 
with systemic discrimination that affects their neighbourhood, their choice of streams 
and educational routes and their possibilities to enroll in a good school. Ultimately, the 
extent of such institutional racism has a major impact on the career pathways of minority 
students and thus on their future living standards. Actually, their range of possibilities is 





































markets organized. By looking at urban segregation and the structure of the education 
system and labour market in Brussels, it becomes clear that Brussels, under its veil of 
superdiversity, is tarred with racism.
Even though communes and neighbourhoods are not homogeneous and the dynamics 
of urban segregation are not static, Brussels is a highly polarized city. The peripheries of 
the capital are composed of the most socio-economically favoured and most European 
neighbourhoods. The central and north-western districts of Brussels are where non-
Europeans and people with a migration background are concentrated. These districts 
also accumulate different difficulties and disadvantages: low incomes, insecurity in the 
job market and in individual households. In Brussels, urban segregation particularly 
affects the youngest generation: children and young people (0-19 years) are strongly 
represented in disadvantaged neighborhoods. There is a significant imbalance between 
the communes in terms of available school places: socio-economically deprived areas are 
the least equipped with school infrastructures. Organized in this way, the city distributes 
public goods and services in an unequal way amongst its inhabitants and from their 
youngest age! 
The Belgian system of education (organized by the different language communities, each 
having their own schools in Brussels) is especially unequal. Educational inequalities are 
mainly the result of a school system organized as a quasi-market, based on the free school 
choice by families and public funding according to the number of pupils enrolled in the 
school. Consequently, schools are in competition and develop strategies to attract pupils 
according to different characteristics (academic, demographic, etc.). This organization 
results in a strong differentiation between ‘good schools’ and ‘bad schools’ and an 
unequal distribution of pupils. In the competition between schools, pupils from socio-
economically disadvantaged families and pupils with a migration background are the 
ones who often end up in more disadvantaged schools. If one takes into account the 
nationality of the pupils, foreign students are in the least favourable schools. Among the 
foreign students, students from Turkey, Ex-Yugoslavia and Eastern European countries 
are in the least advantaged schools. Students from the Congo, Ex-URSS and Morocco 
occupy intermediate positions, but are still in less advantaged schools. As there are 
many inhabitants in Brussels, the effects of the school market are magnified. In primary 
education, pupils living in the most European neighbourhoods are also those who attend 
the most European schools. In neighbourhoods that are relatively less European, the 
enrolment in ‘good schools’ is more observed among Belgian and European families 





































The educational field in Belgium is also characterized by an early school guidance 
system between different tracks, ranging from the most academic tracks (general tracks) 
to the least advantaged school tracks (vocational tracks). Stereotypes about students 
with a migration background affect their school orientation and educational pathway. 
In Brussels, there is an overrepresentation of pupils with a migration background in 
the least advantaged tracks of secondary education. For example, 80% of the parents of 
pupils in technical and vocational education are born abroad, whereas this is the case for 
only 40% of the mothers and fathers of students in the general track. 
The systemic discrimination encountered by people with a migration background 
does not stop at the end of their schooling. Quite the opposite: since the end of the 
1990s, research has highlighted the systematic difficulties that jobseekers with a foreign 
origin face on the Brussels job market. People with a migration background have a 
harder time finding a job compared to jobseekers of Belgian or European origin. Yet 
discrimination in the Brussels job market does not affect all jobseekers with a migration 
background equally. People with a non-European origin are overrepresented among the 
unemployed population. By contrast, people of European (but non-Belgian) origin are 
much less likely to be part of this unemployed population. The overrepresentation in 
unemployment concerns mostly people of Sub-Saharan, North African and Turkish 
origins. The overrepresentation of people of non-European origin in unemployment 
can be observed among young jobseekers as well, albeit to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, 
the unemployment rate among young people of non-European origin remains high, 
especially among young people of North African and Turkish origin. This issue is 
also affected by gender, since women of African, Maghrebi, and Turkish origins are 
more likely to be unemployed than their male counterparts. In addition to the gaps in 
employment rate, people with a migration background are overrepresented in low-paid, 
temporary and part-time jobs. They are also more likely to be overqualified for the work 
that they do and earn substantially less than people of Belgian origin. 
While Brussels’ diverse population has clearly left its mark on the city, ethnic 
minorities are thus still confronted with systemic discrimination in the European 
capital. This institutional racism manifests itself in various forms of structural exclusion 
in, for example, the educational or professional context. One of the key issues for Brussels 
is how to secure more equality between its diverse inhabitants, especially in education, 
the job market and the housing market. Recognizing the existence of institutional forms 
of racism within Brussels institutions and organizations is an important first step towards 





































to take up the fight against racial discrimination and work towards more equality for all 
its inhabitants. 





































The Emancipation of Animals 
Will Not Be Built on Racism
by Mariska Jung
The practice of ritual slaughter of animals according to Jewish and Islamic rites has 
been at the centre of many fierce public and political debates in Belgium in recent years. 
Consequently, the regional governments of Flanders and Wallonia implemented a law 
banning ritual slaughter without prior stunning. The law came into full effect in both 
regions in January and September 2019 respectively. The Brussels Capital Region is still 
enmeshed in discussions on a possible restriction of the practice. In this contribution 
I contend that the politicization of ritual slaughter does not occur in a political vacuum. 
Instead, the wider backdrop of the European Muslim Question should be taken into 
account if one wants to understand why ritual slaughter should be currently such a hot 
topic. This means moving the current political debate beyond its presentation as a one-
dimensional tension between animal welfare versus religious freedom.
In his book ‘Recalling the Caliphate: Decolonization and World Order’ Salman Sayyid 
writes: ‘The interrogation of Islam has become one of the most pressing questions of our time. 
The Muslim Question (…) refers to a series of interrogations and speculations in which 
Islam and/or Muslims exist as a difficulty that needs to be addressed. Thus, the Muslim 
Question is a mode of enquiry that opens a space for interventions: cultural, governmental and 
epistemological.’1 Since the turn of the millennium, and like many European countries, 
Belgium has in its own way posed the Muslim Question. In this country, the visibility of 
mosques and Islamic clothing have become the vehicles through which this question is 
most often expressed. In 2010 Belgium was the first European country to have passed a bill 
in the Federal Parliament that prohibited the wearing in all public spaces of face-covering 
clothing. Such a ban mostly affects Muslim women wearing a face veil. Despite the fact 
that the bill was never implemented due to the premature dissolution of the parliament, 
it has had a significant impact on the framing of the Muslim Question. For example, the 
various proposals leading up to this bill were drafted in a context of post 9/11 debates 
on Islam, terrorism, ‘failed’ multiculturalism and rising right-wing Flemish nationalism. 





































Next to face-veiling, Belgian politicians and local administrators have restricted Muslim 
women’s ability to wear a headscarf in a variety of public spaces, such as in the workplace, 
on the labour market and in schools. The headscarf has captured much of the political 
and public attention in public debates on Muslims during the past two decades. Many 
instances were highly mediatized, such as the election of the first veiled woman in the 
Brussels Parliament in 2009. The salient political and media debates on issues pertaining 
to Islam or Muslims have led to the development of a climate in which anything Islamic 
is at risk of being met with apprehension or suspicion from the start. The ways in which 
Belgium addresses Islam has led the country to represent Islam first and foremost, in 
Sayyid’s words, as ‘a difficulty that needs to be addressed’. 
The societal positioning of Islam as something inherently suspicious may contribute 
to the racialization of Muslims in Belgium. However, the position that Islamophobia 
is a form of racism is generally met with severe criticism. The argument against 
understanding Islamophobia as racism usually goes as follows: ‘Islam is a religion and not 
a race so Muslims cannot be experiencing racism. At most, they may be confronted with 
religion-based discrimination. Furthermore, the days when physical characteristics such 
as skin colour or the size of one’s head were taken as indicative for one’s racial inferiority 
are far behind us. Such biological racism no longer holds, thus racism is no longer a 
problem in Western countries.’ Renowned critical race scholar David T. Goldberg 
calls this idea of having moved beyond racism the ‘politics of post-race’. In a post-racial 
political context, racism is narrowly defined as biological racism and it is claimed that 
such racism is no longer an organizing principle of today’s societies. Like many other 
scholars, Goldberg takes issue with the claim of having overcome racism. Race has never 
been solely about physical characteristics. Interpretations of the physical characteristics 
of groups of people have always been intertwined with negative ideas about their culture, 
customs, practices, religion, language and perceptions of gender, as is famously shown 
by Ann Stoler in her work on the colonial Dutch East Indies. Establishing a racial 
hierarchy and classifying groups of people accordingly has thus always been connected 
to interpretations of their religious or other spiritual systems. European colonizers 
racially classified the ‘new’ communities they encountered. This classification emerged 
on the basis of the knowledge of the European settlers instead of the knowledge of the 
communities themselves. This means that ‘others’ were being categorized according to 
European standards with Europeanness at the top of such a hierarchy. In other words, 
race and religion are intimately connected, and racism against Muslims cannot be a priori 
dismissed because ‘Islam is not a race’. What needs to be further studied, then, is how 





































by whom are Muslims being collectivized, essentialized and represented as inferior to 
Western and Belgian standards? 
The politicization of ritual slaughter is not new. Animal ethics have historically 
functioned in the establishment of racial hierarchies and oppression. For example, 
the historical studies of legal scholar Maneesha Deckha reveal that the British Empire 
sought to ‘civilize’ its colonized peoples through the establishment of various policies, 
including those designed to stop and prevent cruelty towards animals in the colonies. 
Deckha reminds us that while the colonized peoples were considered to be in need 
of ‘rehabilitation’, the British themselves did not think of their own animal practices 
such as meat consumption or hunting as corroding their humanity. In other words, 
what constitutes as ‘cruelty towards animals’ was defined with a pro-British bias. 
The colonized peoples were measured against this standard and on the basis thereof 
were put into a box of the racial classification system. In this system, being equal to or 
surpassing the box of white Christian British people was never possible. Presenting ritual 
slaughter as a problem and depicting it as an extremely cruel and bloody practice was 
also part of the Nazi propaganda in the 1930s and 1940s. I thus argue that these past 
realities warrant at the very minimum a careful and conscious reflection on the ways in 
which the politicization of ritual slaughter today figures in the wider political climate 
and the articulation of the Muslim Question. It remains to be studied in what exact ways 
debates on ritual slaughter function in the racialization of Muslims in Belgium today.2 
As a complicated matter that involves many different political ideologies, ethics and 
historically grown power relations, the issue of ritual slaughter is not easily ‘solved’. What 
is needed is sensitivity to the Belgian social and political context in which this practice 
becomes politicized as well as to the historical background from which discussions on 
the matter evolve. This implies that the debate on ritual slaughter cannot be reduced to 
a straightforward opposition between religious freedom and animal welfare. It is much 
more complex. When the debate is simplified and the topic isolated from its historical 
and socio-political context, we run the risk that a progressive cause such as animal 
welfare turns into a vehicle for racism and oppression. On the contrary, in the interest of 
collective liberation and justice, I maintain that the emancipation of animals should not 
be built on racism.3 
1 Sayyid, S. (2014). Recalling the Caliphate. Decolonisation and World Order. London: Hurst & Company, p. 3.
2 See: Jung, M. Animals, race and religion in post-racial Europe, PhD in progress.
3 The wording of this stance is loosely based on the acclaimed poem and song by Gil Scott-Heron titled 
‘The Revolution Will Not Be Televised’. This phrase became an important slogan for the Black Power movement 





































Anti-Gypsyism: When a 
‘Specific’ Form of Racism is 
Considered ‘Reasonable’
by Serena D’Agostino
‘This is their way of life, and they’re not looking for help from anyone. We can offer them 
all sorts of assistance, but we can’t force them to take it.’1 This is a statement made by Alain 
Kestemont, alderman for prevention and urban safety of the municipality of Anderlecht 
in Brussels. He was commenting on the recent municipal decisions to clear up some 
so-called ‘Roma camps’ due to the precarious and unhygienic conditions of the sites. 
Kestemont belongs to a Belgian political party (DéFI), which describes itself as ‘the 
party of social liberalism’ that embraces ‘progressive values’.2 
Kestemont’s declaration could be framed as one of the many examples of widespread 
political discourses that contribute to fostering anti-Gypsyism. Anti-Gypsyism is a 
complex phenomenon that exists all around the world. It concerns the historically 
rooted anti-Roma sentiment that translates into violent acts of discrimination against 
Roma people and their marginalization. Like any other kind of racism, anti-Gypsyism 
builds on long-established forms of oppression carried out and maintained by the most 
powerful and privileged classes. It manifests itself in many ways and at different political 
and societal levels.
Anti-Gypsyism is generally defined as a ‘specific’ form of racism. The term specific 
is nonetheless often misconstrued or abused. Politicians, the media, policymakers, 
as well as ordinary citizens use it to define the Roma as people with ‘specific’ culture 
and ‘specific’ behaviours – where ‘specific’ has a typically negative connotation. Over 
the centuries, this attitude has contributed to the reinforcement and diffusion of Roma 
stereotypes and anti-Roma rhetoric. The latter builds on the idea that the Roma’s 
way of life and culture, as well as their so-called inclination to act badly and to cause 





































– and/or to treat them differently. Thus it is not ‘we’ who marginalize them, but ‘they’ 
who violate our rights and fail in their duties. This ‘no-one-to-blame-but-oneself ’ logic 
has determined what Huub van Baar somewhat provocatively frames as ‘reasonable 
anti-Gypsyism’3: given the misbehaviours of the Roma, we are reasonably allowed to 
reprimand and exclude them.
‘Reasonable anti-Gypsyism’ reveals itself as considering and treating the Roma as ‘the 
other’ with primitive cultural practices, weird manners, low intelligence and/or criminal 
propensity. It is rooted in mainstream culture and is spread by individuals, mass media, 
politics and institutions. It can be translated into policies and laws, and this always leads 
to dangerous consequences. Several illustrations can be drawn from our past and recent 
history. For instance, in a bombing in Oberwart (Austria) in 1995, four Roma were 
killed. Until the non-Roma perpetrator of the attack was arrested two years later, the 
authorities thought that it had been a self-inflicted accident. We can also think of the 
Roma murders by neo-Nazi groups in Hungary in 2008 and 2009, or the expulsion of 
Romanian and Bulgarian Roma people from France in 2010. Another example: the overt 
threats to the Roma living in the so-called campi nomadi (literally, ‘nomad camps’) in 
Italy issued by Matteo Salvini, the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the 
Interior – who has recurrently and blatantly made statements such as: ‘But is it normal 
for a gypsy woman in Milan to say: “Salvini should be shot in the head?” Be good, dirty 
gypsy (zingaraccia), be good, for the BULLDOZER is arriving soon’.4
Europe is steeped in blaming and stereotyping the Roma. Over the years, myths 
surrounding the Roma have been internalized by the majority populations to the 
point that people are now believing they are true. Hence, many of these myths have 
become plausible. Public opinion that declares ‘after all, the Roma deserve to be treated 
differently’ steadily reinforces and legitimates a reasonable anti-Gypsyism. Such myths 
and stereotypes have different origins.
Politics is at the core of the proliferation of anti-Roma sentiment. Although in Europe 
anti-Gypsyism has traditionally been considered a right-wing phenomenon, it goes 
far beyond right-wing extremism. Anti-Gypsyism is an ideology of oppression that is 
spread and practised by all kinds of people: moderate politicians, citizens, the police, 
policymakers, and even some progressive media channels. A ‘reasonable anti-Gypsyism’ 
is today omnipresent throughout Europe and widely shared and accepted across 
political divisions, representatives and votes of any party5 – as Kestemont’s statement 





































general and addresses some groups more or less explicitly. Regarding Roma women, for 
instance, both politics and the media have significantly fueled the stereotyped image 
of the thieving, begging, illiterate, hypersexualized or even prostituted Gypsy. In 2007, 
a judicial case occurred in Romania against the former President Traian Băsescu, who 
referred to a Roma female journalist as ‘filthy Gypsy’ and ‘birdie’ – păsărică in Romanian, 
a pejorative term with demeaning and sexual connotations. 
Current European policies aim to combat discrimination against the Roma by fostering 
their socio-economic integration, mainly through education, employment, health and 
housing. Further steps in this direction are surely needed. Yet, poor living conditions, 
segregated school systems (e.g. in Bulgaria) and unequal treatment in health structures 
should be understood as the effects of discriminatory behaviours and treatment, rather 
than their causes. Just think of the segregated maternity wards for Roma women in public 
hospitals and the many cases of forced sterilization recorded even recently in certain 
Central and Eastern European countries such as Slovakia.
Anti-Roma prejudice and stereotypes can also be diffused and consolidated through 
policy documents. Vaguely phrased and/or unclear policies are likely to foster 
stigmatization of the Roma. By way of example, in its 2018 ‘Diversity Barometer’ 
(Baromètre de la Diversité: Enseignement) the Belgian Interfederal Centre for Equal 
Opportunities, UNIA, repeatedly emphasizes how the ‘cultural diversity’ of the Roma 
and/or Gens du voyage affects their children’s education. Yet UNIA’s Barometer takes 
understanding of such a ‘cultural diversity’ for granted and does not provide the reader 
with any clarification of what it actually means. Given the damaging effects of the racial 
culturalization of the Roma over the centuries, the lack of accuracy and/or clarity in the 
way policies are formulated contributes to diffusing the preconception that Roma are by 
culture not inclined to scholarization, education or work.
A few years ago, in a tiny picturesque village of Southern Italy, a brawl broke out between 
newcomers from Romania and young natives. In the aftermath of the fight, signs were 
posted on the walls of the village bearing the slogan ‘VIA I ROM!’ (‘Roma out!’). A huge 
misunderstanding evidently took place. The local population was unaware that not all 
Romanians are Roma and that barely 16%6 of the European Roma actually come from 
Romania. This incident adds to the long list of mistakes, misinterpretations and myths 
about the Roma that have been bandied about in European societies since the Middle 





































In 2000, Kathryn D. Carlisle – the then local monitor for the European Roma Rights 
Centre (ERRC) in Italy – aimed to debunk this myth in her piece Stealing Children: 
Institutionalising Romani Children in Italy. She shows that, for at least the past two 
hundred years, non-Romani state, church and charity authorities have been stealing 
Romani children from Romani families and remanding them into institutional care. On 
the other hand, the legend of Roma as kidnappers persists in Italy and in many other 
European countries such as Greece – where the story of the kidnapped ‘blonde angel 
Maria’ (deemed too blonde to be a Roma child) went viral in 2013. To date, there are 
no acknowledged cases in which Roma have been proved to have been involved in 
kidnapping. 
These examples show that anti-Gypsyism is constantly fueled by prejudice and ignorance 
at all political and societal levels. Although it is framed as a ‘specific’ form of racism, 
anti-Gypsyism is not specific in nature. Like all racisms, anti-Gypsyism is about hate, 
oppression and marginalization. It is about unequal access to, and unjust dynamics of, 
power. As such, it can never be ‘reasonable’.
1 Own italics. Source: Hope, A. (2019). Anderlecht clears Roma camp; Molenbeek lets theirs remain. The Brussels 
Times, 2 August 2019; available at https://www.brusselstimes.com/brussels/62433/anderlecht-clears-roma-
camp-molenbeek-lets-theirs-remain/ (Accessed 3 November 2019). 
2  DéFI’s official website, at https://defi.eu/nos-idees/ (Accessed 6 March 2020). 
3 van Baar, H. (2014). The Emergence of a Reasonable Anti-Gypsyism in Europe. In T. Agarin (ed.), When Stereotype 
Meets Prejudice: Antiziganism in European Societies. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag.
4 Matteo Salvini’s official Twitter account, 1 August 2019, own translation. 
5 Cf. ‘Antigypsyism: a Reference Paper’ (version June 2017) by the Alliance against Antigypsyism; available at 
http://www.antigypsyism.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Antigypsyism-reference-paper-16.06.2017.pdf 
(Accessed 3 November 2020).  
6 This percentage builds on the latest estimates on the Roma population (2 July 2012) prepared by the Support 
Team of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe (CoE) for Roma Issues; 





































Discrimination from the 
Majority Society Affects the 
Identities of Ethnic Minorities
by Yijia Huang
Since the terrorist attacks in Brussels in 2016, Muslim Belgians have been facing 
increasing discrimination from members of the majority population in ways both 
implicit and explicit. Muslims are usually misrepresented in the media, which to 
some extent encourages Islamophobia. Furthermore, Muslims are more often than 
not negatively portrayed by populist parties in order to win elections. Even when 
Muslims are not immigrants but born and raised in the host society, they still encounter 
discrimination and stigmatization.
Discrimination towards ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Muslims, is 
widespread in Belgium. According to Eurobarometer surveys,1 discrimination based on 
ethnic origin is the most widespread type of discrimination in both Belgium and EU.2 
The percentage of Belgians’ perception or experience of discrimination is relatively 
higher than that in other EU member states. Besides, in the years 2008 and 2012, 
discrimination based on religion was the second most common form of discrimination 
in Belgium,3 while the average percentage for the EU is much lower.4 As shown by these 
statistics, the problem of racial and religious discrimination is serious. It is worthy of 
our attention and the problem needs to be solved. At least, people’s mindsets should 
be changed to reduce prejudice, stigma and discrimination which all have impacts on a 
person’s identity. If you are discriminated against and stigmatized in the country of your 
birth, would you then still ‘feel Belgian’?
This contribution argues that discrimination against second or later generation Muslim 
Belgians contributes to the strengthening of their ethnic identity and the weakening of 





































which is a combination of ethnic (Moroccan/Turkish/other), national (Belgian) and 
religious (Muslim) identities. 
What is identity? Identity is a complex concept. It is multi-faceted and fluid. The word 
‘multi-faceted’ refers to the interrelated and dependent relationships among various 
identities, such as national identity, ethnic identity and religious identity. ‘Fluid’ implies 
that identity is not a finished product, and it is in constant change under the impact 
of different factors, such as where you are (social context) and with whom you are 
(interpersonal relationship). For example, as a Belgian Muslim you might feel Belgian 
when in Morocco or in France and Moroccan when interacting with Belgians with no 
migrant origin. Additionally, identity does not remain stable, and your identity might 
change over the years. Identity is constructed and re-constructed through interactions 
with others and with society at large. Under these circumstances, the identities of ethnic 
and religious minority Belgians will be constructed differently in a friendly (inclusive) or 
an unfriendly (exclusive) society. If you listen to or read a continuous negative discourse 
about Muslims in the media, you might feel less Belgian than if the discourse is neutral 
or welcoming. That is to say, their identities are affected by the way they are treated by 
members of the native population. Put simply, the frequently quoted term ‘identity’ is 
one’s sense of belonging to a certain group, and it is built on the distinction between 
‘us’ and ‘others’. One’s own identity is decided not only by how he/she looks at himself/
herself (self-recognition), but also by what others think of him/her (the perceptions of 
others). In this case, the hostile environment in which discrimination takes place plays 
a significant role in forming and reforming the identities of Belgians with ethnic and 
Muslim backgrounds. 
The reactive ethnicity theory first brought up by Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut 
predicts that when minorities face perceived threats, exclusion or discrimination, they 
will form a ‘reactive ethnicity’ as a reaction to the unfriendly environment (in the 
country of residence) where they live and grow up. It highlights ‘the role of hostile 
context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than the erosion of ethnicity’.5 
Moroccan Belgians might thus feel more Moroccan than Belgian, and this is not 
necessarily a continuing loyalty to the home country of their parents or grandparents. 
Research in Germany confirms the reactive ethnicity theory. By conducting interviews 
in Germany and observing the daily life of the participants (Turkish-German youths), 
Çelik suggested that reactive ethnicity emerges as the second generations perceive or 
experience discrimination.6 A more recent study by Daniel Herda also provides evidence 





































in Michigan, Herda found out that direct experiences of discrimination result in 
weaker identification with America and stronger identification with Islam. He further 
pointed out that anticipated discrimination is enough to lead to the aforementioned 
consequences, and personal experiences are not required. For South and Southeast Asian 
Muslim Americans, ‘anticipated discrimination predicts more negative attitudes toward 
America and weakened American identification’7 because of their more distinctive racial 
and cultural features than other groups. 
When terminologies are improperly applied to refer to second and later generation 
Belgians, there may be unwanted consequences of excluding and discriminating them. 
Hence, I propose that terms like ‘immigrant’ should be avoided to use and that other 
terms like ‘integrate’ and ‘integration’ should be used cautiously when researchers discuss 
the second, third or later generations, even though they are widely and frequently applied 
in previous or current academic studies. People born and raised in Belgium have Belgian 
nationality and are Belgian citizens. Therefore, it seems rather unfair and prejudiced to 
call such people ‘immigrants’. It is also problematic to require second or later generations 
to integrate into Belgium which is their own country. Why should native-born ethnic 
Belgians integrate into Belgium? This notion of integration often confronts rejection 
from second or later generations. In her book, Dominique Schnapper8 states first of 
all that the term ‘integration’ gets criticized because it reflects the idea of the majority 
population imposed upon the ethnic minorities. It implies that ethnic minorities’ cultures 
and identities are unacceptable, and that they should conform to the established norms.9 
However, she holds the opinion that it is unavoidable for researchers to use the term 
‘integration’ when the research focus is on the relations between the ethnic minorities 
and the majorities, but she also demonstrates that the connotation of the word needs 
to be clarified. It may be true that minorities are brought up by parents who are under 
the influence of Moroccan (or Turkish, or other ethnic) and Islamic culture, and they 
themselves are under the influence of both Belgian and Moroccan culture; but they can 
be Moroccan in terms of ethnicity, they can be Belgian in terms of nationality, and at the 
same time they can be Muslims in terms of religious identity. These various identities 
are not necessarily in conflict. The different identities can coexist, and they are inclusive, 
not exclusive.
It is questionable that second or later generation ethnic Belgians are often blamed for 
not feeling really Belgian. Belgians with ethnic and Muslim backgrounds are usually 
treated as if they were outsiders or foreigners. For instance, they will be asked in their 





































‘I’m Belgian’, the hurtful question will subsequently follow, ‘How about your origin?’. 
Maybe it is out of kindness or curiosity to treat them differently, but the special 
attention paid to them may turn out to be a kind of racial or religious discrimination. 
The government and the mainstream population would like the second generations to 
‘integrate’ better and feel more Belgian. This way of thinking and practice may push them 
far away. In practical terms, the best way is to accept difference and embrace uniqueness, 
and to allow minorities to maintain their unique identity composed of ethnic (Moroccan/
Turkish/other), national (Belgian) and religious (Islamic) characteristics. 
The tolerance and open-mindedness from the majority Belgians will make Belgium 
more diverse and vibrant, which is also beneficial for harmonious identity construction. 
In a tolerant society where there is less or no discrimination and everyone feels at home, 
their attachment to the country will accordingly be enhanced. Such cultural, ethnic and 
religious distinctiveness should be regarded as an asset instead of a burden for Belgium. 
By being part of Belgian society, Belgians with ethnic backgrounds enrich the life and 
experiences of all Belgian people to a greater extent. To a certain degree, it is not the 
second or third-generation Belgians who should take the initiative and make a change, 
but the members of the majority society. As a matter of fact, the second or later generation 
Belgians are an essential and inseparable component of Belgian society, which makes 
Belgium more diversified. All in all, in view of a more harmonious environment, the best 
way is to embrace and include the ethnic minorities, not to exclude them.
1 The surveys were conducted on the same topic respectively in the years 2008, 2012 and 2015.
2 Statistics from Eurobarometer surveys: year 2008: BE: 71%, EU: 62%; year 2012: BE: 68%, EU: 56%; year 2015: 
BE: 74%, EU: 64%.
3 As for Belgium, the number in 2008 was 53%; the number in 2012 was 60%.
4 As for the EU, the number in 2008 was 42%; the number in 2012 was 39%.
5 Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2001). Legacies: The story of the immigrant second generation. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: Univ of California Press, p. 148.
6 Çelik, Ç. (2015). ‘Having a German passport will not make me German’: reactive ethnicity and oppositional 
identity among disadvantaged male Turkish second-generation youth in Germany. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
38(9): 1646-1662. 
7 Herda, D. (2018). Reactive ethnicity and anticipated discrimination among American Muslims in Southeastern 
Michigan. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 38(3): 372. 
8 In the book Qu’est-ce que l’intégration, Dominique Schnapper elaborated on the history and controversy of the 
term ‘integration’. Schnapper, D. (2007). Qu’est-ce que l’intégration? Paris: Éditions Gallimard.
9 The original text is in French: ‘Parler d’intégration peut sembler impliquer que les comportements doivent se 





































Ethnic Studies Major(s) and 
Archiving Initiatives as Crucial 
Tools of Liberation
by Tundé Adefioye
We need to continue to do the work to stop centering white European intellectual 
production, by anchoring our understanding of Black studies as a degree course, not 
just as some kind of intellectual exercise. Since the Black studies major comes out of 
struggles of liberation in the US, it has to continue to be imbedded in this sense of 
urgency. Many Black scholars, including Fred Moten, have said numerous times that 
Black studies criticize ‘western civilization’. If this is true, then it is logical that Stuart 
Hall’s scholarship should have spearheaded the first Black Studies Department in the UK 
at Birmingham City University. Hall was not only an observer and scholar of the uprisings 
in the 1970s and 1980s against the racist oppression in the UK, but also a participant and 
organizer of actions to liberate people of colour. Kehinde Andrews, one of the professors 
at Birmingham City University, writes that ‘Black studies is also vital because it aims 
to change not only the face but also the nature of universities. Any approach rooted 
in the experience of Black populations will rapidly understand the serious issues of 
discrimination and exclusion faced across the globe. We therefore cannot be content to 
gain access to academia. We have to ensure that Black studies can be used to connect the 
university to the struggles to improve conditions in wider society’.1 
What is clear is that spaces like the Africa Museum in Tervuren are not sufficient, nor 
safe spaces for all, especially not for many people of colour who want to participate in 
the act of memorialization. It might be a beginning for some, but others have shown their 
disdain. During the re-opening of the Africa Museum, activists gathered and planted 
bloodied papier-mâché hands in the museum grounds, because ‘… they are not content 
with the new museum, which they believe is not decolonized enough’.2 This action would 






































In Lose Your Mother, Saidiya Hartman writes:
‘Remembering slavery’ became a potent means of silencing the past in 
the very guise of preserving it, since it effectively curbed all discussion of 
African slavery and its entailments – class exploitation, gender inequality, 
ethnic clashes, and regional conflict. The sorcery of the state, like the 
sorcery of marabouts and herbalists, was also intended to wash away the 
past…and to pacify the heirs of slaves, except that now this process was 
described as memorializing rather than forgetting.3 
This is in essence what the so-called Africa Museum is – a place of forgetting. A place 
akin to Disneyland where families can walk through spaces that present very colonized 
perspectives on what a people and a place are. In a capitalist, imperialist and colonizing 
country such as Belgium such spaces have the right to exist, but the budget they have 
should be cut tremendously. Most important in cutting that budget would be the 
redistribution of the resources to initiatives and individuals who are active in archiving 
the realities of people of colour in Belgium. To name just a few: think of Black History 
Month (Belgium), MVSLIM, Unie Van Turkse Verenigingen. The other part of the 
budget gleaned from the Africa Museum could be used to introduce an Ethnic Studies 
degree course into at least one university. Any takers…VUB perhaps?
When observing a country like Belgium, the question arises why one of its universities is 
not offering a Black studies degree, or at least an Ethnic studies major covering the reality 
of Black people, Moroccans, Turks and other individuals of colour in Belgium, also 
focusing on their struggles for equity and indeed liberation. This last point is why some 
scholars in the US have proposed that ‘Ethnic Studies’ be named ‘Liberation Studies’. Not 
only would this map the work of organizations like the Arab European League, Bamko-
Cran, Baas Over Eigen Hoofd, Black Speaks Back and others, but it would also provide 
deeper analysis of the work of artists and writers like Chika Unigwe, Rachida Lamrabet, 
Luanda Casella, Seckou Ouoluguem, NoMoBs and an array of many others. By engaging 
in this practice, it would ensure that the extremely important work of new ‘meaning-
making process’, as Gloria Wekker calls it, is being done through documentation and 
archiving. People of colour currently living within the borders of Belgium would have 
a chance to see their stories and histories memorialized, and future generations would 





































seeing themselves mirrored in the stories we tell of ourselves. Many young individuals 
are continuing to blaze the path to this new meaning-making. Take for example the 
young people of colour behind the popular cult radio show Lowkey Radio. According to 
one of its founding members, Christopher Kiaku: 
‘It started when we recognized there was a void. The type of music we 
wanted to hear was not being played on radio platforms operated by the 
VRT. We had already a history together, starting the hyped rap collective 
Young Nation, which originated from our time as the only Black kids in a 
high school in Dilbeek.’
The work of The Black Archives in Amsterdam shows us that, through dedication, 
individuals can create an initiative that does the work of memorializing the current 
realities and past of people of colour. So much so that the Black Archives were invited 
to collaborate by a major museum in Amsterdam. More importantly, it was visited by 
none other than Angela Davis, who has also acknowledged the crucial work that they do. 
During a speech after her visit to The Black Archives, Angela Davis said:
‘It is important to recognize that, as we move forward in our collective 
struggles against racism, heteropatriarchy, capitalism, that we delve 
more deeply into our histories and discover new more illuminating 
connections that help us to understand the significance of forging new 
solidarities across oceans and across national borders, across lines 
of division. …This of course requires us to create a robust historical 
memory. An historical memory that calls upon us to take note of as many 
past promises of global solidarity as possible. Promises ... especially 
among people who have suffered the injustices and violence’s of slavery 
and colonialism. Those who were described as… the insulted, the hurt, 
the dispossessed…’.4 
Another way of encapsulating this is that we need to create an ec(h)o-system of archiving, 
one that would be made and managed by a major institution. Not only that, smaller 
initiatives need to be encouraged, stimulated and maintained through these acts of 





































which serve not only to inform future generations to give them greater understanding 
of themselves, but also to illuminate global solidarities. This could reveal how we 
understand our collective desires to resolve pressing issues such as the global climate 
crisis, inequality and other oppressive systems in which some of us still find ourselves. 
In her most recent book, Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments, Saidiya Hartman asserts:
 
‘Every historian of the multitude, the dispossessed, the subaltern, and the 
enslaved is forced to grapple with the power and authority of the archive 
and the limits it sets on…whose perspective matters, and who is endowed 
with the gravity and authority of historical actor…The endeavor is to 
recover the insurgent ground of these lives; to exhume open rebellion 
from the case file, to untether waywardness, refusal…and to illuminate 
the radical imagination and everyday anarchy of ordinary colored girls, 
which has not only been overlooked, but is nearly unimaginable’.5
Although Hartman writes this as a professor at Columbia University, one could extend 
this as a call to action to exhume the lives of different actors in current and past Belgian 
and European societies, to ordinary individuals, self-organizing initiatives, volunteer 
organizations, and so on. This exhumation and recovery of stories and people’s heritage 
need to be done on different levels, and various actors need to play a role. In fact, we 
must see this as a necessary and bold step towards truly growing our understanding of 
the Flemish canon and what we know to be the Western canon in general. This type of 
speculation would not only allow us to imagine the lives of ordinary people but would 
also allow us to dig deeper and shed new light on how we have understood and continue 
to understand ourselves. This will provide a way of gazing into a future that we might not 
have illustrated for our collective society.
1 Kehinde, A. (20 May 2016). At Last the UK has a Black Studies University Course. It’s Long Overdue.  
www.theguardian.com. (Accessed on 9 December 2019).
2 Nkiambote, R. (8 Dec. 2018). Protest met ‘bebloede’ kartonnen handen aan AfricaMuseum. Bruzz.com. 
 (Accessed on 1 December 2019).
3 Hartman, S. (2007). Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
4 Davis, A. (12 Jun. 2018). Angela Davis About her Visit at The Black Archives and Uncovering Histories of Global 
Solidarities. http://www.theblackarchives.nl/home.html. (Accessed on 10 December 2019).















































































































Tackling Racism in Brussels: 
Yes We Can!
by Dounia Bourabain, Laura Westerveen, Safaa Charafi and Géraldine André
When we talk about racism, we usually discuss its presence in different domains of life. 
It is of course a necessary first step towards describing and exposing the existence of 
discrimination and racism. Yet we often do not go beyond that. Frequently, the question 
of how we can tackle racism is neglected. The fact that cities such as Brussels are 
‘superdiverse’ does not automatically solve racism. Thus, the next step would be to think 
about, discuss and carry out strategies to dismantle racism in all areas of life, at both 
individual and structural level. 
 
To tackle racism, we need to dig into the roots of racism itself. Racism can be explained 
through the individual biases and prejudices individuals hold over ‘others’, those who 
are not considered to be part of their group. These biases and prejudices are created 
through automatic processes in our brains that categorize all the impulses it receives on 
a daily basis. In order to get a grip on the complex world we live in, the brain makes 
‘files’ through the process of pigeonholing, by connecting types of people to a few 
simplified characteristics. To give an example, seeing a veiled woman might trigger 
stereotypical images of cultural backwardness. These files are regularly influenced by 
the messages your brain processes every day. The main channels through which these 
messages are transmitted are parents, education, (social) media, and so forth. Although 
most people use the excuse that we cannot stop our brain from stereotyping, we actually 
can do something to change our behaviour. We can change the files in our brain if we 
actively work on becoming more aware of racism in society. The question is what can 
we do to change our awareness and tackle racism in our neighbourhood, school, hobby 
organizations or local youth club? 
 
Bring people together is the answer! Most public spaces in Brussels are still strongly 
segregated along ethnic lines. Segregation exists in housing, schools, workplaces and 
also in entertainment spaces such as hobby associations. Segregation hinders (ethnic) 





































other people. What we need is positive intergroup contact in our everyday interactions. 
Is it that simple, you might wonder. There are certain criteria that need to be taken into 
account if we really want these contacts to create less prejudice. The first criterion is 
to have a common goal for all participants of the interaction. This can easily be made 
possible in classrooms where students work together or in workplaces where group 
efforts are encouraged. A second criterion is that every person has an equal status within 
the interaction. This means that there should not be a dominant leader in the group 
who would try to control the conversation. A third criterion is intergroup cooperation, 
meaning that everyone in the group should be allowed to have a role in achieving the 
main goal. Finally, being supported by authorities or the law provides more grounds for 
enhancing the interaction between people of different ethnic backgrounds. Looking at 
these criteria, we can imagine that it is possible to reduce prejudice and therefore racism 
in the long run. How exactly can we do this in Brussels? In public spaces the criteria for 
positive intergroup contact can easily be applied. For the younger generation, we can for 
example target hobby associations where members work together towards a main goal – 
such as learning a new sport – as equal members of a team. This shows that intergroup 
encounters can be supported within existing institutions.
 
Racism has an impact on both our everyday encounters and our societal institutions 
such as the education system and the economy. It cannot be tackled at the level of 
individual interactions alone, but should be addressed at structural level as well. The 
existence of institutional racism needs to be recognized. This form of racism originates 
from the design of our societal institutions. In contrast with individual racism, 
institutional racism does not refer to individual prejudices of people, but rather to the 
ways in which institutional policies and practices bring about inequalities between 
minorities and majorities. For example, when minority students systematically find 
themselves in disadvantaged schools or in lower tracks of education, we can call this 
‘institutional racism’. This reflects not necessarily – or only – an individual teacher’s 
prejudices towards a single student, but also the way in which the institutions are 
organized. While the right to equal treatment is anchored in our laws to a large extent, 
the fact that minorities have not participated on an equal basis in the construction of our 
institutions is often not acknowledged. To ensure the equal participation of all groups in 
social interaction, we need to recognize that institutionalized norms and values defined 
by the majority can put minorities (intentionally or indirectly) at a disadvantage in 
society. Take for instance the standard rule of certain employers that the wearing of a 
headscarf on the work floor is not allowed. This standard leads to a structural exclusion 





































we begin to think about how to change our institutions in order to tackle racism at the 
structural level. 
 
Tackling racism at the structural level also implies the implementation of redistributive 
policy measures. Institutional racism essentially leads to an unequal distribution of 
power and resources between minority and majority groups. Changing this requires us 
to adapt our institutional policies and practices to an approach favouring a more equal 
distribution. Much of the current anti-discrimination legislation focuses on guaranteeing 
the equal treatment of minority groups. While this is important, it is not enough to 
reach full equality, as borne out in the persistent inequalities that minority groups are 
confronted with. Because of the structural nature of racism, we need to combine anti-
discrimination measures aimed at countering individual racism with the development 
of ‘race-conscious’ equality policies. These are policies that tackle inequalities through 
recognising ethnic or racial minorities (for instance when defining the target group of a 
policy). This includes positive actions. Positive actions are policy measures that promote 
equality by preventing or compensating for the disadvantages experienced by racialized 
and other disadvantaged groups. These can range from strategies of active recruitment 
outside the traditional networks to measures promoting equal representation in decision-
making procedures.
 
In Brussels, as both city and region, there still exist structural inequalities between 
majority and minority groups in education, employment, housing and other important 
societal domains. In 2017, the Brussels-Capital Region adopted new anti-discrimination 
legislation. This legislation enables the use of situation testing and mystery calls, which 
are field experiments in which the existence of racism is tested for, based on real-life 
observations. In so doing, Brussels goes beyond the anti-discrimination laws and 
regulations of the other regions. Despite this legislation, we argue that concrete positive 
actions still need to be implemented in favour of different actors and domains. For 
example, the practice of early tracking in both the francophone and Flemish education 
systems in Belgium seems to have a disadvantageous impact on pupils with a migration 
background, whereas it could be adapted to a system in which tracking only happens at a 
later age. Another example is the area of employment. The government should strive for 
a better representation of the population mix in public positions by actively seeking out 
minority applicants and supporting them throughout the application procedure. These 






































Brussels is a superdiverse city and region, but it is still marked by racism and consequent 
inequalities. Given that racism operates at several different, but interrelated, levels, 
we propose a two-track strategy to counter racism. On the individual level, fostering 
intergroup contact could help reduce prejudice and overcome racist stereotypes about 
the ‘other’. To facilitate intergroup contact in Brussels, spaces are needed for positive 
encounters on an equal basis. On the structural level, the recognition of institutional 
racism and the implementation of positive actions could promote more equality between 
majority and minority groups in fields such as education and employment. So the idea 
that racism is “unavoidable” and “unsolvable” should no longer be an excuse. To take 





































Discrimination Tests: A Potential 
Stepping Stone for Human Rights
by Pieter-Paul Verhaeghe
Discrimination refers to the adverse treatment of people because of their racial or ethnic 
origin, gender, age, disability or another ‘protected’ ground. In modern societies there 
should be no place for this kind of inequality because it is clearly at odds with elementary 
human rights. However, racism is still a structural problem in Brussels, in Belgium and 
in many other countries.1 It is also hard for victims to prove or even know that they are 
being discriminated against. On the one hand, a job candidate of Moroccan descent 
might not be able to get a job interview, which would lead him to think he was not 
sufficiently capable to do the job, although in fact he was discriminated against. On the 
other hand, he might also be turned down and think he had been discriminated against, 
although it was for professional reasons he was not invited to the interview. In other 
words, discrimination can be both under- and over-assumed by people. That is why we 
need instruments to provide ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of discrimination. In my 
view, discrimination tests are very suitable for achieving this aim.
Discrimination tests – also known as ‘tests de situation’ in French, ‘praktijktesten’ in 
Dutch or ‘audit studies’ in American English – have been used for decades by scholars 
and activists. Discrimination tests are a field experimental technique, in which pairs of 
candidates apply for a job vacancy or rental advertisement, for example. Both candidates 
are similar in all relevant characteristics, except with respect to the discrimination ground 
under scrutiny (e.g. a candidate with a Moroccan-sounding name paired with a candidate 
with a Belgian-sounding name). Afterwards, the treatment of both candidates by the 
employer or landlord is compared and any significant adverse treatment is considered to 
be due to discrimination.
I believe in the power of discrimination tests for several reasons. The results of 
discrimination tests fuel the public debate on discrimination. Public debate means that 
policymakers are forced to speak out about the matter, and maybe also to actually do 





































might start to reflect about their own behaviour. From social-psychological studies we 
know that much discriminatory behaviour often happens unconsciously and without 
intention to discriminate. Public debate might, therefore, encourage employers or 
landlords, for example, to think about their actions and whether or not they are being 
(unconsciously) discriminatory. In other words, discrimination tests could be used as 
educational tools to raise awareness about our (implicit) biases.
Discrimination tests can also be used for legal procedures, such as lawsuits or mediation. 
In Belgium many official complaints about discrimination are dismissed because of 
lack of evidence; in consequence the anti-discrimination legislation often remains a 
dead letter. Each of these dismissed complaints represents a human story of rejection, 
frustration and anger. If they had had the hard evidence from discrimination tests in their 
hands, victims or civil rights organizations would have been able to make a better case 
when suing perpetrators. If we organized discrimination tests on the labour or housing 
market in a proactive way, the anti-discrimination laws would have more flesh on their 
bones and the complainants would get the service to which they are entitled. American 
research suggests that in cities where legal discrimination tests were performed by fair 
housing agencies (and where prejudiced real estate agents were subsequently fined), 
there was a significant decrease in discrimination in the housing market.2
Finally, there is scientific evidence that, even without sanctions, discrimination tests could 
be effective in some way against discrimination. In a quasi-experiment we performed in 
2015 in the Belgian city of Ghent, we found that real estate agents who knew that they 
might be monitored through discrimination tests (but not how or when) subsequently 
discriminated much less. The net discrimination rate for getting an invitation to visit a 
rental dwelling dropped significantly from 26% to 10% in the time span of only a few 
months. The explanation is that the discrimination controls made realtors reflect on 
their often unconscious reactions, leading to less bias in their selection as a consequence. 
Moreover, that reduction appeared to be a long-term change when it was combined 
with legal tests too.3 The case-study of Ghent corroborates the previous arguments that 
discrimination tests could best be used as both educational and legal instruments.
The implementation of discrimination tests in 2015 in Ghent did not go unnoticed. 
These tests became a controversial topic and an ideological symbol for both left-wing 
and right-wing parties in Belgium, useful for scoring points among their supporters. As 
the administrator of many of the tests, I could personally experience how fiercely that 





































letters of support to suspicions expressed in social media and research proposals that 
were blocked for political reasons.
Notwithstanding this polarization, over the past years we have witnessed a shift in the 
public debate on discrimination tests. The government of the Brussels Capital Region 
was the first in Belgium to adopt legal discrimination tests in its anti-discrimination 
legislation with respect to the labour and housing markets, and to reserve the necessary 
budget to implement the tests. Brussels was soon followed by the Belgian government, 
but there the tests were only made possible on paper, but not in practice. A major break-
through was made in 2018-2019: several local governments explicitly mentioned the 
introduction of discrimination tests in the local labour and housing markets in their 
policy plans for the forthcoming six years. It is important to note that this concerned 
cities governed by various political coalitions, such as Mechelen, Leuven, Kortrijk and 
Antwerp (in addition to Ghent, which had already introduced these tests back in 2015). 
In this way, the discrimination tests shifted from being a political symbol to what they 
are today: neither the “holy grail to solve racism” nor the “stick to punish employers 
and landlords”, but an important measuring instrument to establish discrimination in an 
objective manner, comparable to the use of speed cameras and alcohol tests on the roads. 
The use of discrimination tests has become ever less a political choice, and increasingly 
a sign of good governance.
This was possible because three types of actor met around the instrument of 
discrimination tests in Belgium: civil society organizations, academic institutions and 
politicians. The civil society organizations never stopped advocating the use of legal 
discrimination tests, with academics performing research to improve the quality of 
these tests. Last but not least, some politicians made the tests a priority during political 
negotiations. Together they formed a powerful coalition of those willing to use them 
which could counter all arguments from their opponents.
Although the tone in the debate about discrimination tests has certainly made a U turn, 
the broader hegemonic discourse about equality and racism has not been shifted yet. 
So, triumph would be misplaced at this moment. Discrimination tests could be used 
by policymakers for many reasons. In the city of Ghent, it was considered as both 
a preventive and legal instrument against discrimination. Moreover, the tests were 
part of a broader policy and discourse against discrimination, exclusion and poverty. 
Discrimination tests could, however, be misused too. They could, for example, serve as 





































1 Verhaeghe, P. P. (2017). Liever Sandra dan Samira? Over discriminatie, mystery shopping en praktijktesten. 
Berchem: Uitgeverij EPO; Quillian, L., Pager, D., Hexel, O., & Midtboen, A. (2017). Meta-analysis of field 
experiments shows no changes in racial discrimination in hiring over time. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America, 114.
2 Ross, S., & Galster, G. (2007). Fair housing enforcement and changes in discrimination between 1989 and 2000. 
An exploratory study (pp. 177-202). In J. Goering (ed.), Fragile rights within cities. Government, housing and 
fairness. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
3  Verhaeghe, P. P., & Ghekiere, A. (2020). Is de discriminatie op de Gentse woningmarkt structureel gedaald? 
Brussel: Vakgroep Sociologie, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. 
in our society. In this vein, politicians might defend their policy with the argument ‘that 
we are not as bad as they claim, since we are performing discrimination tests’. It is too 
early to make a final balance, but time will tell whether the discrimination tests should be 
seen as a stepping-stone for human rights, or rather as a token gesture for a policy where 





































Unity in Diversity: The Brussels 
Identity Glues Everyone Together
by Petrus te Braak, Laora Mastari, Hélène Lemblé and Gil Keppens
Shared identities carry a great importance with regard to social cohesion: they offer 
us the feeling that we belong to a bigger whole, such as a group or culture. Decades 
of research have shown that such a feeling of connectedness to a bigger whole is key 
to our psychological well-being. This is true for people with and without a migration 
background. Yet research has especially emphasized its significance for people with a 
migration background, i.e. both first – and second – generation migrants. They have 
the possibility to construct their identity based on a feeling of connectedness to both 
the dominant group/culture of the country they inhabit and the ethnic culture of their 
country of origin. For a long time, migration and integration policies have held the view 
that maintaining both cultures is incompatible for identity construction. We now know 
that perceiving identities as unilayered is a serious misconception. Although differences 
do occur in the degree of connectedness to the ethnic or dominant culture, they do not 
rule each other out. 
Interestingly, recent data show that young people living in Brussels, both those with 
and without a migration background, above all feel very connected to Brussels. 
The connection they feel with Brussels is deeper than their connections with Belgium, 
Flanders, Wallonia or any other country. We believe this has everything to do with 
the demographic composition of Brussels. After Dubai, Brussels is the second most 
superdiverse city in the world. From an ethnographical point of view, this means that 
there is no clear dominant ethnic group. In Brussels everyone is a ‘minority’, everyone 
is ‘the other.’ No majority or dominant group can force an identity on another, and 
therefore, a shared ‘umbrella identity’ is at everyone’s disposal. Everyone, regardless of 
one’s ethnic roots, can identify with Brussels. 
The capital of Belgium, centered between Flanders and Wallonia, is home to a very 





































distinguished by a diversity of ethnic, cultural, social, linguistic, and religious 
backgrounds. Historically, the term ‘Zinneke’ was given to street dogs that were 
thrown in the river Zenne, which is the only Belgian river that crosses all three regions 
of Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. ‘Zinneke’ was used to label people in a somewhat 
pejorative sense by calling them a bastard with no clear, pure or plain origin. Zinnekes 
are opposed to ‘Ketjes’, the label of people whose ancestors were all born in Brussels. In 
the current modern context, the connotation of this label has adapted to the reality of 
a new superdiverse Brussels. In this new context, ‘Zinneke’ is no longer an insult, but 
rather a label that is worn with pride. A good example for this is the biennial Zinneke 
Parade that celebrates the diversity of Brusselians. Nowadays, Zinneke is a genuine 
Brussels symbol that stands for a Brussels identity marked by diversity and inclusion. 
This Brussels identity is carried with a certain pride by an extremely broad group of 
individuals, due to its non-exclusive connotation. It is precisely this inclusiveness that 
is an important factor in the construction of a collective identity, giving you a sense of 
belonging to a larger entity or group.
In two recent surveys1 it became clear that Brussels indeed offers an identity with which 
many people can identify themselves. For Brusselians, the different layers available to 
be identified with are Belgium, Brussels, Flanders, Wallonia, and/or their country or 
countries of origin. Brusselians were asked how they identified themselves with the 
following question: ‘Indicate how attached you are to the following cities, villages, 
regions, and countries’. Young Brusselians with a migration background identify 
themselves in the first place with Brussels and feel only a subordinate attachment to 
Belgium, while their country of origin comes in third place. Among older Brusselians, 
a similar ranking holds for people with and without a migration background. However, 
in contrast to the young Brussels population with a migration background, the older 
generation’s identification with Belgium ranked above their identification with Brussels, 
while their country of origin again takes third place. It is remarkable, however, that 
Brusselians, both young and old, both with and without a migration background, only 
weakly identify with Wallonia and/or Flanders. 
The tendency of young people with a migration background to identify primarily with 
Brussels illustrates that this city grants a sense of belonging that neither Belgium nor 
their country of origin seems to offer. How can this be explained? A lot of people with a 
migration background have a connection to their country of origin in the sense that they 
cling to some parts of the culture (such as listening to music, watching TV channels, 





































with friends and/or family. While this connection is still apparent, it can be difficult 
for them to construct an identity based only on this connection. Often, citizens of their 
country of origin perceive them as different and, in turn, they may feel different. In 
addition, only a small part of their lives takes place in their country of origin, while they 
work, study, live etc in Brussels. Therefore, as a shared living environment for different 
groups, Brussels is much more tangible. But then why won’t they identify with Belgium 
as a whole, Flanders or Wallonia? 
This is where it becomes interesting. We argue that in Brussels people with a migration 
background are for once not made to feel they are in a minority. In Flanders, Wallonia 
or Belgium as a whole, they are often perceived and depicted as a minority group. When 
you are perceived and stigmatized on this ground, a common reaction is to identify more 
profoundly with the ethnic group of origin. It can even go as far as actively opposing 
any other form of identification. After all, why would you identify with a group that 
stigmatizes you? 
In Brussels a distinction between ‘us’ versus ‘them’ is less likely to be made. Most 
Brusselians are Zinnekes and belong neither to the minority nor to the majority. 
Imposing a predisposed identity is impossible in Brussels, due to its myriad of cultures. 
Rather, Brussels is an open canvas that can be coloured and understood by everyone in 
a different way. Besides, in contrast to the Belgian, Flemish and Walloon identities, the 
Brussels identity cannot fall back on a (perhaps imaginary) common past. Brusselians 
from different cultures and ethnic groups do not really share a common history. The 
Brussels identity is rather based on a common present and future in a shared living 
environment that is characterized by diversity. Exactly within this diversity lies unity 
regarding identity formation. In Brussels the shared identity of the Zinnekes has been 
and is still created today in an organic, bottom-up way in which every citizen interprets 
and gives meaning to a shared identity. 
What can we learn from the Brussels example? That inclusive identities are never 
predisposed or predefined. If Belgium, Wallonia and Flanders want to be inclusive and 
would like to have a shared identity, they could learn from the example of the Zinnekes 
in Brussels. Do not forget that the Zenne is the only river in Belgium that flows across the 
borders of Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. 
1 The Youth Research Platform’s JOP-Scholenmonitor gathered data in 2018 among 1279 pupils from the 2nd and 
3rd grade of all Dutch-speaking schools in Brussels. The BRUXODUS-survey, financed by INNOVIRIS, gathered 





































From – but not of – Europe: The 
Vicious Cycle of Inequalities in 
Belgium
by Gabriel Zohar
Immigrants seeking an alternative life in an unknown country face an uphill battle. 
The challenges of acclimatizing to a new culture entail learning a different language, 
navigating a different community, seeking employment, finding accommodation 
and adjusting to confusing cultural norms and social expectations. Unfortunately, the 
evidence continues to point to a disconcerting truth that, no matter what individuals 
with an immigrant background do to integrate into mainstream society, the odds are 
stacked against them.1 In fact, even their children and grandchildren are affected by these 
disadvantages, generation after generation. 
Belgium is among the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) with the lowest levels of income inequality. Nevertheless, 
social mobility is alarmingly low. In Belgium, it takes on average as much as four 
generations for children of low-income families to reach the average income of the 
country. Moreover, unemployment levels are three times higher among residents/
citizens with at least one parent from outside the EU than among residents/citizens 
with both parents and grandparents born in Belgium.2 As such, it is no wonder that the 
percentage of people living below the poverty line is almost six times higher for some 
ethnic minorities, such as those from Turkish (59%) and Moroccan origin (56%) than 
for native Belgians (10%).
The low levels of income inequality in Belgium are therefore disguising an unfortunate 
reality. In Belgium, children with immigrant backgrounds have higher chances of 
lower academic achievement, unemployment, discrimination at school and in the 
workplace, and a higher likelihood of poverty. Minorities thus often face more barriers 





































and in the labour market, physical differences and names reflecting a non-native ethnic 
group negatively influence access and success.3 As a result, the chances of moving up or 
down the social ladder are heavily influenced by inherited traits for specific groups. 
How did we get here? In the 1950s and 1960s, when Belgium welcomed many ‘guest 
workers’, it was thought that the educational differences between the native population 
and the new immigrants would lessen over time, as new immigrants would become more 
accustomed to their new environments. But that did not happen. Research by Phalet 
and Swyngedouw in 2003 has shown that the differences in educational opportunities, 
performances and expectations between residents/citizens of immigrant descent and 
native populations in Belgium have decreased over time, but certainly not disappeared. 
And this is still the case today. 
Although the influence of the parental socio-economic status on students’ achievements 
in secondary education is not unique to this country, it is ‘particularly strong in Belgium’. 
In fact, Belgium remains among the top four – out of 43 countries – with the highest 
impact of socioeconomic background on educational achievement.4 This impact is 
different across populations. Based on a statistical analysis, Verhaeghe and colleagues 
in 2016 pointed to differences in educational tracks (general, technical, vocational or 
school/workplace), delays in educational trajectories and expectations of finding a job 
among three different population groups in Belgium (natives, residents/citizens with 
specifically EU15 background, and residents/citizens with non-EU15 background). 
And whereas socio-economic status could explain most of the differences between 
natives and individuals with EU15 background, it could not account for individuals with 
a non-EU15 background. When individuals were asked for reasons why they could not 
find a job, most of the youngsters within the EU15 group referred to difficult times on 
the labour market. Most respondents with a non-EU15 background emphasized they 
were not ‘given a fair chance’.5
This constitutes a big challenge to face up to in Belgium. Schools have the potential to 
meet the challenges, as they are places where democracy is taught. This process should 
begin with the recognition that the educational institutions themselves have contributed 
to the problem to some extent. Boone and Van Houtte concluded, for instance, that 
teachers in Belgium are biased against pupils with both immigrant status and socio-
economic status when providing academic recommendations. Ethnic minorities are 
more prone to be steered towards technical rather than academic paths, compared 





































(2010), it was also found that about one in every five people with an ethnic background 
from North Africa in Belgium has been discriminated against by school personnel. 
At work or at school, ethnicity (24%), religion (9%), skin colour (5%), and age (2%) are 
the primary sources of discrimination. The rate of discrimination today against residents/
citizens with a Turkish background in Belgium – whether at work, in education, health, 
housing, public services and shops – is more than twice that experienced by the previous 
generation (28% versus 13%).6
As such, these reports support what other studies on ethnic equality policies in Europe 
suggested long ago. Belgian citizens with immigrant background are still considered to 
be migrants, even several generations after having obtained Belgian citizenship. In any 
case, there is a lot of evidence to support the argument that there is a strong link between 
ethnicity, discrimination, poverty, low educational attainment and poor access to the 
labour market for ethnic minorities in Belgium.
The population of this country has grown by 6% over the last ten years,7 mainly due 
to the growing influx of immigrant population, – +40% since 2007 – which currently 
represents 17% of the total population in Belgium. With a growing immigrant population, 
the systematic perpetuation of low educational attainments and poor labour market 
prospects poses a serious challenge for the present and the future of this country.
There are no simple solutions to this puzzle. But if a favorable future is to be chosen, 
even small changes may trigger significant transformations. One of the triggers I would 
suggest is to shift the collective mindset to one of greater recognition of the fact that it 
is possible to belong to any ethnicity without being automatically located somewhere 
at the fringes of society as outsiders. Therefore, it is essential to stop the classification 
of individuals using language. Terms such as ‘native’, ‘immigrant’, ‘second or third 
generation’ or ‘European’ are all the result of classifications that enhance the differences 
rather than the similarities of sectors of our population. No citizen, regardless of their 
background, should be considered as an immigrant in a country where he or she has 
been born. 
Perhaps it is time to reshape a broader national identity that has greater social weight 
than issues of ethnicity. Social inequalities will not be reduced until the integration 
of citizens is no longer viewed as the result of a process of adaptation to the culture 





































community. Neither ethnicity nor social status should be a factor in assessing a citizen’s 
ability to achieve success in any given society. This is an achievable task that will require, 
among many other efforts, the reconceptualization of the concept of belonging in the 
direction of a notion that includes respect for the dignity of the other.
1 Mednick, F. (2020). Lectures on immigration, global education, and development. Vrije Universiteit Brussel. 
2 OECD (2015). Settling In 2015: Indicators of Immigrant Integration. OECD Publishing.
3 EUMDS (2010, 2017). Second European Union, Minorities and Discrimination Survey. Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the European Union.  
4 OECD (2019). International Migration Outlook 2019. OECD Publishing. 
5 Verhaeghe, F., Bradt, L., Van Houtte, M., & Derluyn, I. (2016). Structural assimilation in young first, second and 
third-generation migrants in Flanders. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(15): 2728-2748. 
6 Boone, S., & Van Houtte, M. (2012). Why are teacher recommendations at the transition? from primary to secondary 






































Recognising Diversity:  
Not “If” but “How”
by Lena Imeraj and Tuba Bircan
Cities of differences 
European cities today have become centres of diversity. But what do we mean by 
diversity? Diversity can be defined as ‘the fact of many different types of things or 
people being included in something; or as a range of different things or people’.1 From an 
urban point of view, diverse cities represent people with different languages, citizenship, 
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, class, physical abilities, wealth, gender, identity, 
race and lifestyle. In reality, diversity is generally taken to mean being represented in one 
chosen category, namely ‘migrant/minority status’. As such, being a migrant (descendant) 
remains a pertinent criterion of exclusion and many people persist in viewing the 
inhabitants of the city as in two opposing groups: ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Societal groups 
are compared and contrasted: the integrated and the segregated, the included and the 
excluded, the ordered and the disordered, the accepted and the non-accepted, the 
haves and the have-nots. But diversity is not about binaries; it is about recognising and 
respecting that people are each unique in their own way. Hence, diversity has an inherent 
multidimensional nature. 
Taking ‘migrant status’ as a starting point, today’s intricate make-up of the capital city 
has indeed been fed by perpetual immigration. But ethnic diversity has also become 
more and more self-sustained: it is not new immigration but the excess of births over 
deaths that maintains minority population numbers. The wide variety of life experiences 
leads to an enormous heterogeneity within ethnic groups, which becomes even more 
apparent against a background of increasing socio-economic inequalities and patterns 
of residential segregation. Over time, this has resulted in a reality where there are more 
differences within groups than between them. Remarkably, this diversity-within- 
diversity view goes mostly unnoticed in public debate. Yet, if diversity is poorly 
understood then how can the argument in favour of or against it be straightforward? 





































There are numerous and multifaceted challenges facing cities that aim to meet the 
needs of increasingly diverse populations and handle the pertinent risks of exclusion 
and damaged social cohesion. But diversity in itself is neither good nor bad. The real 
issue when addressing diversity is knowing how to understand and engage with its 
multidimensional nature. 
A stranger in Brussels
Being a ‘migrant’ – reflecting one of the core aspects of diversity – is a state of being 
that has no concrete definition. But it can be described using a variety of characteristics 
that relate to demographics, people’s motivations and opportunities, and also the timing, 
duration and eventual outcome of their migration history. While some people decide to 
migrate voluntarily for reasons of economic activity, family reunification or education, 
others may be unwilling migrants, needing to seek asylum for a safer life. With the same 
variation as the abovementioned “migrant” status, Brussels has a complex and dynamic 
structure with recognised opportunities and challenges. Between 2000 and 2019, 
Brussels experienced a general population growth from 960,000 to roughly 1,200,000 
inhabitants, through natural growth and international immigration. Around 60% of 
Brussels inhabitants are of foreign origin;2 approximately 184 nationalities are found 
in Brussels, ranking this city the second most ethnically, racially and culturally diverse 
area in the world after Dubai.3 
The structural inclusion of migrants and their descendants is crucial for the 
development of a culturally rich, socially cohesive and liveable society. However, the 
complexity and fragmentation of inclusion processes arise from the persistent spatial, 
social and symbolic frictions between individuals of different ethnic groups in Brussels. 
The capital city cherishes its own culture, heritage, values, traditions, languages and 
ways of life. Thus, diversity is an undisputable reality in Brussels. Having said that, 
along with sense of belonging and trust, diversity is one of the key aspects of social 
cohesion. One of the main challenges for urban areas is guaranteeing social cohesion 
and equal opportunities for all. We also know that positive contact experiences 
between members of different groups can lead to cooperation, trust and respect, and 
hence can improve social cohesion. Accordingly, if recognition of differences, mutual 






































Now let us engage in a short thought exercise. Imagine a handful of strangers in 
Brussels: who would you picture and where would they live? Would that stranger be 
wealthy or poor, skilled or unskilled, coloured or white, live next door or certainly not 
in your neighbourhood? Would he/she be young or old, male or female, alone or with 
his/her family? Perhaps you might imagine all kinds of strangers living in any number 
of Brussels neighbourhoods. Or instead, would only a specific type of stranger as 
described and bluntly stigmatised in some prevailing stereotypes come to mind? Maybe 
you can form a mental picture of some recently-arrived strangers. Would they be speaking 
a different dialect than a local-born Bruxellois (assuming they have a shared language) 
with a variety of aspirations and backgrounds? Could they be newcomers working 
at the headquarters of international companies or European institutions, students 
studying graduate degrees in local universities, or people fleeing conflict areas worldwide? 
They would most likely be living in widely different neighbourhoods as some of them 
have plenty of money to spend while others have nothing to spend at all. Or instead 
you might imagine long-established strangers born and raised in the city, being (fully) 
accepted by the locals, living amidst them, contributing to urban growth and having 
converged to our normal. Could these strangers be in difficulties, possibly? Even though 
born and raised in the city, could they still be struggling to negotiate and establish their 
position, identity and sense of belonging to the community? Do they want or need to live 
close to their co-ethnic community, by choice or by lack of choice? Or are they destined, 
no matter how hard they try, to remain perceived as perpetual foreigners because of their 
dark skin colour, religion or sexual preference, or background of poverty? Such people 
are likely to be confined to poor neighbourhoods where poverty is concentrated because 
a considerable share of the housing market is denied to them. Or are you visualising 
expatriates from neighbouring or more distant countries who, sharing linguistic, cultural 
and political attitudes, find it easier to settle and live amongst other dissimilar foreigners? 
Desirable expatriates, coming from a handful of developed countries, bringing with 
them education, wealth and skills and so allowed to live close to our homes because they 
have the financial and intellectual resources to afford and obtain a nice house? Perhaps 
you might try to form a mental picture of the invisible strangers sleeping in railway 
stations, the undocumented homeless, victims of human trafficking and so on. They 
are unwanted and therefore unseen. Or maybe you are thinking of strangers in transit, 
tourists or seasonal labourers, who are visiting the city or just passing through. 
From the above thought exercise we have just seen that people whom we label with 
the single word ‘stranger’ actually belong to an incredibly mixed group of people with 





































beliefs, motivations and experiences. They live in different districts in our host society 
according to their financial resources or the availability of a co-ethnic community 
to turn to, or the willingness of others – meaning us and not them – to share the same 
neighbourhood, neighbours, school, friends and so on and build their home. Their 
living environments may or may not be closely located next to our neighbourhoods 
with pronounced real or imaginary boundaries. This degree of integration depends on 
how others perceive and value the stranger stereotypes assigned to a particular person 
or group. The terms stranger and migrant have become defined by ideas of who does or 
does not belong to our society while setting aside the many contributions they might be 
making to society. So, whatever stereotype picture came into your mind in the thought 
exercise described above will depend on how deeply you were looking at the people 
around you. Ideally, you should have been seeing a vast and intricate throng of strangers 
and a fragmented patchwork of Brussels neighbourhoods that are, presumably, home to 
strangers of many or few kinds. If only we would be willing to see and acknowledge the 
uniqueness of all strangers.
Does being a stranger entail hidden costs? The answer is yes, but not always to the same 
degree. Strangers who are not really ‘wanted’ by the host society may, due to lack of 
acceptance in their surroundings, be prone to exclusion and discrimination in areas such 
as education, employment, housing and healthcare. Greater disadvantages may accrue to 
strangers who come from negatively perceived social groups defined by criteria of ethnicity 
and/or socioeconomic resources. But heaviest to bear are the costs that fall on strangers 
who are categorized on grounds of disability, race, religion or cultural and political beliefs. 
They have to struggle against discrimination, stigmatisation and criminalisation. 
Recognition: see me for who I truly am 
In reality, thousands of strangers come to Brussels, some to settle here for the 
long term, others are just passing through. Many people may be living together in 
neighbourhoods even though they do not belong to the same social or ethnic group 
or share real-life experiences. The same is true for people who display similar or quite 
different characteristics and attitudes with regard to education, employment, family 
composition and transgenerational characteristics. So, one should not ask the question if 
but how differences between and within minority groups in urban settings matter when 





































Diversity is increasingly underpinned by a strong ideological commitment of city leaders 
to promote inclusion. They strive to achieve integration and convergence but this rarely 
turns out as expected. In truth, de facto inclusion and integration is largely a myth. Ex-
isting policies fail to comprehend the dynamic nature of diversity and often rely upon 
long-lasting population categories or on particular neighbourhoods solely focusing on 
ethnicity and race. Accordingly, ignorance of the immense diversity of ethnic minorities 
leads to an unheeded social reality.
Although the concept of social cohesion and its link with diversity is usually discussed 
through the lens of the host communities, it is essential to consider the strangers’ view-
points too. People need a balance between representing themselves and their aspirations 
for how to be recognised in their community. Consequently, given the escalating urban 
complexity, acknowledging the presence of minorities and recognising diversity is not 
enough. Minority groups wish not only to be recognised in their diversity, but also deep-
ly care about ‘how’ they are perceived by natives, other ethnic groups and within their 
communities.
Cities are required to demonstrate social and political commitment and to pay special 
attention to holding frank and fruitful discussions on diversity and its impacts with all 
its citizens. Thus, cities need to support not only cultural awareness and cooperation but 
also spontaneous and constructive communication in order to build trust, inclusiveness 
and social cohesion. Moreover, a bolder presence and representation of people with di-
verse backgrounds in political decision-making and policy design – as a complement to 
the current monocultural elite – would promote critical thinking and strengthen cities 
in their governance of diversity. Their contributions would enhance urban institutional 
capacity to deal effectively with cultural diversity and its challenges. We might wonder 
what cities would be like if their leaders could be more diverse, assuming that the real-life 
experiences of people with different gender, age, ethnicity, religion, resources, etc. could 
inform and shape urban design differently. Ultimately, the challenge will be to appreciate 
and reconcile the strengths of openness and closedness of all communities, which in the 
end is not a matter of ability but one of will.
1 Cambridge Dictionary.
2 People born in a foreign country and/or having (grand)parents being born in a foreign country.





































‘You Don’t Belong Here!’: 
Expulsion Doubles the 
Punishment for One Criminal 
Offence
by Lars Breuls and Kristel Beyens
“I have been in Belgium for 32 years. I speak Dutch very well. My mother 
lives here, my son, my sister. My whole life is here. Yes, I have been in 
prison, but I have served my sentence completely. Yet, I am still detained. 
They have taken my residence permit and when I go free, I cannot even 
work any more.” 
(Karim, pseudonym)
Karim is awaiting expulsion in an immigration detention centre. He lost his residence 
permit after being convicted for a criminal offence. While doing research on immigration 
detention in Belgium, we soon learned that several people were in a situation similar to 
Karim’s. Before long we realized that convicted foreign nationals are not only subjected 
to prison sentences but are increasingly targeted by the immigration control system 
and singled out for expulsion. This is experienced as an extra punishment. In political 
discourse and in media coverage expulsion is often presented as an effective instrument 
of crime control. In practice, however, the use of expulsion as a component of crime 
control leads to several harmful consequences, not only for the individuals involved but 
also for society as a whole.
According to immigration law, foreign nationals who do not possess a residence permit 
must leave the country. They are potentially subject to a forced removal or an expulsion. 





































It could be argued that they should constitute a main priority for expulsion – 
an argument also put forward by the Belgian government. At the same time, following 
the Belgian Prison Act of 2005, ‘the rehabilitation of the offender and the preparation of 
his reintegration into society’ is an important objective of imprisonment for all prisoners. 
Even if they are not re-entering Belgian society, foreign national prisoners without a 
residence permit should be prepared for their return to their official country of origin. 
However, foreign nationals receive no practical assistance with their return nor help with 
rebuilding their lives once they are back in a country that they have usually left several 
years previously. Their right to re-integration has thus been neglected.
Foreign national prisoners who do possess a residence permit can also be subjected to 
immigration control following a criminal conviction, as in the case of Karim. A residence 
permit can be revoked (taken away) after conviction for a criminal offence. In 2002, 
the then Minister of Internal Affairs Antoine Duquesne introduced several protective 
measures which were inscribed in the Belgian Foreigners Act in 2005: people who were 
born in Belgian territory or who had arrived before they were twelve years old and resided 
regularly in Belgian territory would never lose their residence permit. In February 2017, 
these protections were abolished by the then Secretary of State for Migration Theo 
Francken. Newly passed legislation created the possibility of more easily revoking the 
residence permits of foreign nationals who are considered to be a threat to the public 
order. Even if they are born in Belgium – a legal ground for prohibition of expulsion in 
the past – they can now lose their residence permit and become subjected to a forced 
removal order if they pose ‘a serious threat to the public order’. This is a broad and 
multi-interpretable concept that leaves a lot of discretionary power to the administrative 
caseworkers working for the Immigration Department. The terror attacks in Paris in 
November 2015 were mentioned in the newspapers by the former Secretary of State for 
Migration to justify the need for the new law. As Francken explained: ‘The “terrorist of 
Paris” had French nationality but could not be expelled because he was born in Belgium.’
In fact, the notion of ‘serious threat to the public order’ is broader than terrorism: 
it depends on evolving case law and may also cover drug dealing.
Karim lost his residence permit after the 2017 legislation came into force. He was 
serving a prison sentence of 37 months – although not for ‘terrorism’, he emphasized. 
He had already been living in Belgium since he was five years old. After the grounds for 
protection were abandoned, he nevertheless lost his residence permit. ‘I’m in a hopeless 





































detention for five months. I know that they want me to go back to Morocco, but I am here in 
Belgium since I was five. I have never been back to Morocco’. The Moroccan embassy is 
not cooperating in his case, which means that Karim will probably resist his expulsion. 
In the absence of a valid travel document, the Belgian government must contact the 
diplomatic authorities of the presumed country of origin to ask for the identification 
of the person and consequently for the delivery of a travel document, a so-called 
‘laissez-passer’. If the diplomatic authorities do not cooperate and no travel document is 
obtained, the expulsion cannot be carried out. Not every country is willing to cooperate 
easily, especially when convicted people and/or people with long-term bonds to Belgian 
society are involved. People then become ‘unidentified’ and ‘undeportable’.
This does not mean that Karim’s life will remain unaffected. Every person in Belgian 
territory without a residence permit who does not cooperate with expulsion can be 
detained on several occasions in a closed immigration detention centre. Re-apprehension 
and re-detention in an immigration compound is thus possible once Karim is released. 
Suddenly, Karim will be residing ‘illegally’ in Belgium without a residence permit, with 
heavy impact on his daily life (e.g. no possibility of getting a legal job and potentially 
even more detention).
This example illustrates how the detention and expulsion of migrants have become 
important tools for controlling foreign nationals who are convicted for criminal offences. 
This has severe consequences for the persons involved. People in a similar situation are 
expressing their feelings of being doubly or even trebly punished: first they serve a prison 
sentence, then their residence permit is revoked, then they are taken into administrative 
detention with a view to expulsion. They have the feeling of not being given a second 
chance – a chance for reintegration into the country they have been residing in for a 
long time. They are forced to leave the country where they have grown up and they 
have suddenly become ‘illegal’. They have the feeling that they are not receiving equal 
treatment compared to Belgian offenders who end up in prison. Hamid (pseudonym), 
who is staying in immigration detention in the Netherlands, where similar possibilities 
of revoking a residence permit exist, explains: 
‘When I was young, I only hung out with Dutch boys. They also committed 
criminal offences. They showed me the way. I felt like I was part of their 






































Not only is expulsion increasingly used as an instrument of crime control, it is also 
portrayed in the media as such. Yet broader issues remain mostly out of the picture. Are 
societies not responsible for the inclusion of persons convicted with a prison sentence 
who have been legally residing in their territories during a certain amount of time? This 
question is rarely posed, let alone satisfactorily answered. But even leaving aside the 
question of reintegration, current practices also raise questions about fulfilling another 
aim of punishment: the prevention of recidivism. It is debatable whether sending 
people to a country where they have no place to stay, no family to rely upon and, in 
some cases, have never even visited before, can be considered as an effective ‘crime 
prevention strategy’. It looks more like merely a blunt ‘not in my backyard’ or ‘dumping’ 
policy. Moreover, when a former residence permit is revoked and an expulsion cannot be 
carried out due to diplomatic non-cooperation, people are ‘pushed into illegality’. They 
can no longer live their former life (for instance, working regularly) and can repeatedly 
be detained in immigration detention following police control after being released. In 
the end, these practices of migration control not only harm the individuals subjected to 
it, but also our society at large.
1 De Ridder, S., Breuls, L., & Vanquekelberghe, C. (2017). Buitenlandse gedetineerden (zonder verblijfsrecht) 
binnen de Belgische penitentiaire context (pp. 507-527). In: K. Beyens & S. Snacken (eds.), Straffen. Een 





































Belgian Children in Syria 
Should Not Pay for the Sins of 
Their Parents
by Marijke Van Buggenhout, Nadia Fadil and Els Dumortier
‘My 4-year-old niece, who lost her arm after a gunshot wound, asked her mom if the arm 
went to heaven and if she should now follow.’
Together with her little brother and sister, this toddler is one of the 70 Belgian children 
located in refugee camps in north-east Syria.1 The living conditions of these children 
have been reported as dramatic. A multi-disciplinary humanitarian team visited the 
camps for the second time in June 2019 and reported a deterioration in the hygienic, 
sanitary and overall living conditions in the camps due to overpopulation, resulting in 
a decline of physical and mental health.  The report indicates that most children suffer 
from chronic malnutrition, resulting in irreversible consequences for their growth and 
development.2 By the end of 2019, five Belgian children were reported to have died in the 
camps. Although accurate figures do not exist, a large proportion of Western-European 
citizens in these detention camps consists of children under the age of ten.
From 2017 onwards, the right of return for these children of European ISIS fighters 
and militants has been the subject of heated discussion. European countries have been 
divided on how to deal with those who have been dubbed by some as ‘the Children of 
the Caliphate’. Though governments claim that these children should not be punished 
for their parents’ mistakes, and do have a right to repatriation, the hesitant and reluctant 
behaviour of several European countries, including Belgium, obliges us to conclude 
otherwise.
Most European governments agree on the need to rescue children from the situation in 
which they find themselves and have even proceeded with the repatriation of orphans 





































its moral responsibility to undertake all feasible measures to bring back children up to 
the age of ten from Syria. Rightfully so as, according to criminal law, juvenile justice 
systems, international human- and children’s rights standards, children cannot be held 
responsible for the actions of their parents. According to the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, member states even bear an active duty to protect children 
from all forms of violence. 
But the return of all children remains a thorny issue. A central reason behind this 
ambivalent position has to do with the overwhelming hostility towards the possible 
return of the parents. Most of these parents have been condemned for participation in 
terrorist activities; officials fear that repatriation of the children would entail the risk of 
a return of the parents. Indeed, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states 
that a personal relationship between a child and a parent is inalienable. Several officials 
have thus warned that a return of the children could imply a possibility for the parents 
to return. Some European countries such as Denmark, the UK and Belgium have even 
proceeded with revoking the nationality of the parents.
Regarding the repatriation, the consistent strategy of the European member states has 
been passivity and deferral of any possible action. Often the instability of the ‘war zone’ 
is invoked to legitimise a government’s inaction. Yet, since December 2017 (the moment 
when the Belgian government announced the repatriation of the children), long periods 
of relative stability have passed. A succession of academics, doctors, psychologists and 
journalists have regularly visited the camps. Compared to such initiatives to reach out 
to and help these Belgian children, the government’s argument ‘we are doing all we can’ 
does look pale.
In the face of the growing pressure from civil society, the press and several lawsuits, 
the Belgian state has recently opted for a new approach: a repatriation of the children 
without their mothers. This means that mothers are coersed into ‘deliberately’ giving 
away their children in spite of the fact that separating children from their mothers 
breaches a number of fundamental psychosocial and judicial principles. In a context of 
armed conflict, the mother is often the only care figure left. This is exactly why the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child forbids the separation of children and parents in 
armed conflicts. 
Hence, it needs to be concluded that, in reality, these children are paying for the sins of 





































‘state of exception’ is at play here: a situation where certain citizens are deprived of their 
constitutional rights such as the right to a fair trial and due process. The parents, who 
are considered ‘terrorists’, have been designated as public enemies and their citizenship 
rights are being questioned. The vehement opposition of most European states to 
repatriate and prosecute them within their own territories (and in several cases to oust 
them from their nationality), illustrates this international tendency to tighten human 
and citizen’s rights when it comes to terrorism offences. Hence the children are bearing 
the consequences of this ‘state of exception’. 
This state of exception is also legitimised by the idea that departing to Syria is seen 
as the adoption of an extremist and dangerous lifestyle that is incompatible with ‘our’ 
European values. This justifies the idea that we should keep them as far away as possible 
from Europe or by ousting them from their nationality. Though one can seriously 
question whether departing to the Caliphate should imply a loss of constitutional 
rights, it is even harder to maintain that (new-born) children have also made a choice in 
favour of the Caliphate and hence deserve to lose their constitutional rights. An often-
heard argument in the debates around the children is that their exposure to ‘extremist’ 
worldviews will turn them into a potential hazard. In so doing, we witness a reversal 
of the ‘right to protection’: rather than benefiting from the right to be protected, their 
‘assumed’ early socialization in Syria is what turns them into a hazard. 
As a consequence, the condition of ‘exceptionality’ extends not only to the parents, 
but also to the children. These children are stripped of almost every right imaginable: 
their right to education, health, protection, citizenship, and – by leaving them in 
extremely dangerous circumstances – even their right to life. Together with the public 
framing of these children as potentially dangerous and undesired amongst ‘us’, it becomes 
increasingly clear that these children are being severely damaged, not because they have 
committed terrorist acts or shown extremist behaviour themselves, but simply for being 
born of parents who are seen as such. 
Exodus 20.5: You shall not bow down to them or worship them; for I, 
the Lord your God, am a jealous God, punishing the children for the sin of 
the parents to the third and fourth generation of those who hate me.
1 These children find themselves in detention sections in the camps Al Hol and Al Roj.
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The pictures in this book and on the cover were taken by photographer Esma Alouet. Born and raised 
in Genk, Esma currently lives in Amsterdam. Having graduated as a clinical psychologist from KU 
Leuven, she draws inspiration from both her Moroccan cultural background and her experience as a 
psychologist in addiction therapy. Her photography is dynamic, establishing an equilibrium between 
fashion, portraits and stills.
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